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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THE IDEA OF ABSOLUTE ETHICAL LIFE:  HEGEL’S ACCOUNT OF FREEDOM 
AND NATURAL LAW IN HIS EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 
 
This dissertation project focuses on G.W.F. Hegel’s early philosophical writings, 
though primarily on the Natural Law essay (1802/3), and how, through those writings, 
Hegel positions himself in relation to other thinkers, such as Fichte.  Broadly, the modern 
period saw with it the rise of accounts of what is called natural law.  Philosophers prior to 
Hegel argued that the proper account of natural law must be rooted in some kind of 
universal framework:  either the basis of law must be the shared empirical facts of human 
nature (empiricism), or the basis of law must be found in the universal demands on what it 
means to be a rational being (a priorism).  Hegel’s essay presents a compelling argument 
for why such accounts for natural law are inadequate.   
 
The first part of this dissertation engages in the exegetical project of understanding 
Hegel’s critique of prior philosophical methods for generating accounts of natural law.  
Through an engagement with Fichte’s philosophical works related to the sciences of 
morality and legality, I recapitulate Hegel’s critique of key elements within Fichte’s 
philosophical system.  These critiques focus on what Hegel argues are the problematic 
aspects of a philosophical system that is rooted in merely the concept of the Absolute, a 
one-sided articulation of reality that gives undue primacy to the subjective aspect of human 
life.  I argue that these critiques frame the important philosophical insights that Hegel 
brings to bear on his account of natural law.  Next, I provide an account of why Hegel 
thinks that the philosophical programs of empiricism and a priorism fail to capture the 
heart of what it means to think about law within a community.   
 
The second part of this dissertation provides an account of Hegel’s conception of 
absolute ethical life and its ramifications on our thinking about communal life.  Beginning 
with Hegel’s conception of freedom, I explore Hegel’s argument for why a domain of 
meaning that is prior to individual reveals itself in both positive and negative ways.  
Furthermore, I show that this argument sets the stage for articulating the impossibility of a 
system of laws that address the real demands of freedom.  Hegel’s argument for why the 
underlying logic of ethical life is on a path towards a point of indifference provides a 
compelling answer to the question of how we should understand the relationship between 
law and the community.  One main conclusion of the Natural Law essay is that the basic 
mode of communal life is grounded in an ongoing tension between the positive content of 
     
 
the community and its institutions and the negative power of the individual to either 
participate or deny the claims of the community.  I articulate why, given the logic of ethical 
life, the basic mode of participating in communal life involves participating in the birth, 
life, and death of laws, where the truth of this cycle is in the growth and maintenance of 
the community through its own tragic self-consumption.  Furthermore, I argue that the 
Natural Law essay provides a framework for incorporating the empirical into an account 
of natural law through history.  Finally, I close by offering some insights from Hegel’s 
account that are relevant to our current dialogues about what it means to live in a 
community, specifically that his account of natural law places a demand on how we should 
engage in dialogues within a historical perspective.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation project is focused on Hegel’s critique of two prominent 
philosophies of natural law from the 17th and 18th centuries.  In contrast to accounts of 
law based on the divine commands of God or on the history of jurisprudence for the 
community, natural law is the name given to accounts of human law that are rooted in a 
‘scientific’ outlook.  In short, philosophers prior to Hegel argued that the proper account 
of law must be rooted in some kind of universal framework:  either the basis of law must 
be the shared empirical facts of human nature, or the basis of law must be found in the 
universal demands on what it means to be a rational being.  Hegel’s essay, Natural Law, 
presents a compelling argument for why such accounts for natural law are inadequate.   
Before we enter into a more detailed account of the path that this project takes, I 
offer the two following examples to orient ourselves.  The purpose of these examples is 
to show that beneath the layer of obviousness of common experiences resides a complex 
network of meaning, a network that turns out to be intimately connected to the idea of 
how the community interprets itself as lawful and meaningful. 
The first example I wish to consider is the stop sign.  At first glance, the stop sign 
plays a simple role in the community:  the direction of traffic at a particular intersection 
among the various routes of travel in the community.  We can, however, peel back the 
layer of obviousness from the stop sign and come to see its deeper truth.  First, the stop 
sign is a physical object that is imbued with meaning:  the stop sign is, in part, the 
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objectification of how the community has organized itself.  The sign is itself a 
manifestation of a law that is held by the community, we might say, but this response is 
too vague.  Let us consider the stop sign in action, so to speak.  When I am approaching 
the stop sign, the sign is the object of my experience where I acknowledge, at least 
implicitly, the claim that the underlying law has on me.  The stop sign presents itself as 
an obligation to be followed.  And by obeying the stop sign, I am implicitly 
acknowledging more than the mere claim that this particular sign has on me.  Indeed, I 
am acknowledging that the laws of the community have a claim on me, and this is one 
instance through which I show myself as a member of the lawful community.  The stop 
sign is, in other words, yet another opportunity for me to prove to myself and others that I 
am a member of the community and am claimed by the network of meaning that goes 
into the stop sign.   
The stop sign, then, becomes a site where members of the community implicitly 
reaffirm their relationship to the network of meaning that shapes their experiences.  Each 
member of the community, when approaching the stop sign, could ignore the sign.  
However, by not ignoring the sign, each member of the community participates in the 
continual reaffirmation of the network of meaning as underwriting her own experiences.  
Following Socrates in the Crito, we might say the laws are our true parents, and just as 
we are comfortable acknowledging the shaping power of our formative years with our 
family, we should readily acknowledge the truer and deeper shaping power of the laws of 
the community.1   
 
1 Plato and G. M. A Grube, Five Dialogues (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 2009), 54–55.  “We [the 
Laws] say that the one who disobeys does wrong in three ways, first because in us he disobeys his parents, 
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The stop sign is an example of something that may appear as a limitation on my 
freedom, but in reality, the stop sign is the site where my freedom may be actualized in 
the world.  This example is challenging a conception of freedom which claims that to be 
free is to be given the space to make an unrestrained choice:  the site of freedom is in the 
private space of the individual, in the power to make a decision that is wholly self-
authored.  The stop sign points to everyday experiences where the freedom of the 
individual is made real not simply in the inner life of the individual, but in the 
intersection between the individual and her circumstances.  This dissertation project is in 
part concerned with tracing Hegel’s argument for why the concrete reality of freedom is 
intimately tied to the content of the world:  the site of freedom turns out to be where the 
distinction between the private space of the individual and the public content of the 
community is made ambiguous.  Given that the reality of freedom is a kind of collision of 
two spheres, a philosophy of natural law needs to articulate the complex way in which 
this apparent collision is resolved into a concrete and flourishing human reality.   
Whereas the first example focuses on the way in which the individual realizes 
herself in a meaningful way through the already-established network of meaning that is 
the hidden ground of her reflection on her experiences and sense of self, the next example 
focuses on the way in which the individual expresses her freedom through her opposition 
to that very same grounding network of meaning.   
Suppose that the life of a community is organized around the imposition of a strict 
ban on some particular activity established many years in the past.  Along the lines of the 
 
also those who brought him up, and because, in spite of his agreement, he neither obeys us nor, if we do 
something wrong, does he try to persuade us to do better.” 
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first example, the community itself perceives the ban as not merely a denial of something 
to someone; in addition, the community also interprets the ban as an expression of 
appropriate and meaningful human effort.  The ban is yet another opportunity for 
members of the community to reveal their commitment to the shared networking of 
meaning.  Suppose further that there are several individuals opposed to the ban.  While 
these individuals participate in the community in many ways, they have decided that the 
ban, that particular aspect of the communal life, is unwarranted and a hindrance on their 
freedom.  These individuals willfully and flagrantly undermine the ban, and the 
community takes notice.  Citations, violations, and arrests follow.  At the same time, 
however, the seed of what initially appeared as dissent has now grown into a more 
vigorous and wide-spread dialogue within the community about the function and 
legitimacy of the ban.  To some, the conditions of communal life that were influential to 
the institution of the ban have changed; to others, the ban originated in a time where the 
oppression of one particular part of the community was extensive; to others still, in light 
of the current protests, supporting the ban is now a mark of patriotic activity, and those 
who do not support the ban are undermining the very fabric of the community itself.  In 
short, individuals are expressing their takes on the situation, and those individuals 
introduce discordance into the dialogue.   
Let us suppose that despite the pressure to lift the ban from some individuals, the 
community decides to uphold the ban, reaffirming the idea that supporting the ban is 
supporting the health of the community.  For those individuals who opposed the ban, 
however, their convictions remain unchanged:  they continue to promote a dialogue about 
the ban by appealing to the provincial supreme court.  For our purposes, we do not need 
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to concern ourselves with the resolution put forth by the court regarding the ban.  Our 
concern is with the fact that within the seemingly harmonious and grounded community 
arose a tension between individuals and the community that could not be resolved.  
Despite the pressures of the community at large, those individuals were convinced of 
their position.  The expression of conviction turns out to be a moment where the freedom 
of the individual confronts the shared network of meaning that grounds the individual’s 
life within the community, and the individual shows herself to be self-assured in her own 
understanding of the situation.   
We may be of the mindset that appealing to a universal framework for 
determining the form and content of law would resolve the tensions expressed in the 
example above.  We may think that a universal framework would be able to distill and 
determine the appropriateness and legitimacy of a particular expression by the 
community or the individual.  But Hegel’s position is that those universal frameworks 
rooted in some kind of static principle fail to capture the reality of the relationships 
between the community, the individual, and law.  This dissertation project explores 
Hegel’s argument for why the method behind the formulation of prominent universal 
frameworks of natural law, while containing concepts that fail to capture the concrete 
reality of the human situation, nevertheless reveal crucial ‘threads’ that the philosophy of 
natural law needs to incorporate into its account.   
The above examples show two dynamics at play within the community:  (1) the 
‘reality’ of the community expressed through participation in shared networks of 
meaning and (2) the ‘reality’ of the individual expressed through the denial of the claims 
put forth by that very same network.  The conclusions reached by Hegel about what 
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something like natural law looks like in reality centres on the organic and dynamic 
relationship between the individual and the community, where that relationship takes the 
shape of a community grappling with its own historical narrative.   
This dissertation project argues that the Natural Law essay may be understood as 
articulating three broad threads of thought related to what philosophy can claim about the 
possibility of a science of natural law.  The first thread deals with two problematic ways 
in which accounts of natural law have proceeded in philosophy of the 17th and 18th 
centuries.  In order to understand the significance and subtlety of Hegel’s account of 
natural law within the context of absolute ethical life, we first turn to his analysis of two 
traditionally dominant ways of conceiving the role of law within human reality.  The two 
problematic ways of articulating natural law are empiricism and a priorism.  In this work, 
I refer to each articulation as a program; the reason behind doing so is that while accounts 
of natural law may differ from each other, our focus is on the conceptual program that 
marks out an account as either one rooted in the empirical or the a priori.  For Hegel, the 
nuances of absolute ethical life can only be made clear if we first recognize that these two 
dominant, but ultimately inadequate, ways of conceiving law within human reality reveal 
fundamental aspects of what it means to be a human within a community of humans.  The 
respective inadequacies revealed by Hegel foreshadow the task of philosophy in putting 
forth an account of natural law.  These fundamental but opposed aspects demand to be 
incorporated into a philosophical account of human reality, but, as we shall see, only the 
concept of absolute ethical life is able to hold together these opposed but necessary 
aspects.   
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Chapter One focuses on Hegel’s critique of the program of formulating an 
account of natural law that is rooted in the empirical.  The path through the critique in the 
chapter begins with an account of natural law found in Hobbes’ Leviathan.  The purpose 
of exploring Hobbes’ account is not to discern the scope and complexities of his 
philosophical position; rather, the focus is on emphasizing a few key instances in the 
Leviathan where Hobbes appeals to the empirical, to natural facts about human nature, 
that inform his account of what he argues are the philosophical foundations that ground a 
system of law.  Having revealed elements within Hobbes’ account that are rooted in the 
empirical, the chapter then examines the critique that Hegel puts forth regarding the 
problems inherent in drawing on the empirical when formulating an account of natural 
law.  I emphasize that the heart of the critique focuses on the problem of generating the 
principle that is the foundation of a universal framework:  since the empirical program 
operates by appealing to basic facts about human nature or the world in order to ground 
its first principles in the empirical, the first principle employed by this program is in 
reality a determinate piece of content elevated to the status of an abstract principle.  
Hegel argues that the logical move of taking a determinate and particular content and 
elevating it to the level of a grounding principle cannot be justified through necessity.  
The empirical program fails to provide sufficient justification for why, among the set of 
particulars to ‘choose’ from in the empirical world, one particular content ought to be 
regarded as an abstract first principle and not others.  I end the chapter by arguing that 
while the empirical program contains an inherent logical flaw, Hegel foreshadows the 
complex but necessary way in which the empirical must be situated properly within a 
philosophy of natural law.   
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The other prominent program that Hegel addresses in the Natural Law essay is 
centred on grounding an account of natural law in a priori concepts such as freedom or 
the I as such.  In order to understand the scope of the critique put forth by Hegel and the 
way in which the ‘thread’ found in the a priori program is taken up in Hegel’s account of 
natural law, we must take a more complicated path than the one employed in the first 
chapter.  This essay is written in the context of Hegel’s early philosophical works, where 
these works often respond to various parts of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.  Given the 
proximity between Fichte and Hegel, and given that the nuances of Hegel’s distinct 
position taken up in the Natural Law essay when addressing specific philosophical 
elements within Fichte’s system, this dissertation project endeavours to articulate points 
of contact between these two important philosophers that are especially relevant to the 
arguments found in the Natural Law essay. 
With the above in mind, Chapter Two explores the basic structure of the self-
positing I in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre and Hegel’s critique of the same found in the 
Difference essay and Faith and Knowledge.  This chapter begins with an exegetical 
account of key elements within Fichte’s account of what it means for the I to posit itself 
as laid out in Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo.  The focus of this section is to set up the 
foundation for the aspect of the system that Hegel focuses his attention on in the above 
works.  So, this section articulates the roles of feeling and the indeterminate in the genetic 
deduction of the self-positing I.  The next section articulates Hegel’s charge that the role 
of the indeterminate within Fichte’s system points to a problematic and narrow account 
of the I.  From Hegel’s perspective, the way that the indeterminate is incorporated into 
the genetic deduction of the I results in an account of the I that is incomplete, where the 
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relation of opposition between freedom and nature is fixed in a way that undermines the 
very task of philosophy that Fichte sought out to accomplish.  The conclusion of this 
chapter is that the path towards articulating the absolute identity of the I in a way that is 
not one-sided, Hegel argues, requires an account of the Absolute that is concerned with 
the point of absolute indifference.  Put differently, this chapter sets up the importance 
behind the notion of the point of absolute indifference in relation to the concrete reality of 
the community of human beings in the context of the Natural Law essay. 
To be sure, one familiar with the Wissenschaftslehre would likely state that the 
so-called problems associated with the indeterminate and nature raised in Chapter Two 
are in fact taken up explicitly in Fichte’s account of practical reason.  Fichte argues in the 
System of Ethics, for example, that the activity of the self-positing I in a broad sense 
involves positing a world that appears as a limitation on the I; furthermore, the 
fundamental drive of the I as such is to strive towards absolute self-sufficiency through 
practical actions carried out in the world.  Chapter Three focuses on this line of 
argumentation by Fichte and Hegel’s critique of the same found primarily in the 
Difference essay.  I begin by explicating the role that the concept of striving plays within 
Fichte’s system.  I then turn towards Hegel’s take on this part of the Wissenschaftslehre.  
I show that from Hegel’s perspective, the concept of striving is in fact a symptom of a 
deeper logical problem within Fichte’s system:  striving is meant to address the 
problematic relationship between the I as infinite and the I as finite; however, the notion 
of infinity employed by Fichte is already narrow and perpetuates what Hegel argues is a 
rigid opposition between the infinite and the finite.  I then explore Hegel’s charge that the 
moral and political philosophies within Fichte’s system turn out to be problematic 
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because they are rooted in an account of practical reason that is based on an incomplete 
synthesis of the Absolute.  This chapter ends by explicating what Hegel means by the 
need of philosophy to provide an account of the complete synthesis of the Absolute.  
With respect to the Natural Law essay, we shall see that the need for a complete synthesis 
is the logical driver behind the complex role that the empirical world has in a philosophy 
of natural law.   
Chapter Four returns to the Natural Law essay.  With the conclusions of the 
previous two chapters in hand, I turn towards Hegel’s critique of the second prominent 
program for formulating an account of natural law – a priorism.  This chapter begins with 
an argument for why the notion of an incomplete Absolute turns out to result in an 
account of natural law that is one-sided, where the program itself ensures that any 
account of natural law grounded in a priori concepts employs a problematic conception 
of infinity and of the relationship between the concept and the content, the universal and 
the particular.  The next section of this chapter reconstructs Hegel’s line of argumentation 
for why the program of a priorism produces immoralities and inconsistencies:  we shall 
see that since the program only conceives of the relation between the universal and the 
particular in terms of opposition, where particular content is taken up into the universal, 
the program is unable to offer any substantial justification for generating a law or duty 
based on one particular piece of content and not others.  Put differently, this chapter 
shows that the primary criticism put forth by Hegel in this section of the essay is that 
arbitrariness resides at the core of the program, and that arbitrariness turns out to 
undermine any claim that specific laws or duties are moral.  This chapter closes with an 
exploration of Hegel’s argument for why a positive unity, a unity that does not fix a 
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relation between the universal and the particular, is essential to an account of the reality 
of something like natural law.  We shall see that the proper ground for understanding 
what it means for a human community to be ‘lawful’ must comprehend the complete 
synthesis of the Absolute in the Idea of absolute ethical life.   
The focus of Chapter Five is Hegel’s Idea of absolute ethical life.  The chapter 
begins with Hegel’s argument for why a priorism is committed to the reality of the 
concept of compulsion or coercion as a primary means for the human community to 
organize itself in a lawful way.  Following Hegel’s line of reasoning, we quickly see that 
the Idea of freedom, freedom in its concreteness, reveals the non-reality of the concept of 
compulsion employed by natural law theories.  Instead, Hegel argues, we must recognize 
that the absoluteness of freedom, while immune to compulsion, is comprised of two 
aspects, the positive and the negative.  The next section articulates Hegel’s argument for 
why only the Idea of absolute ethical life is able to properly incorporate the realities of 
the positive and negative aspects of freedom.  Focusing first on the negative aspect of 
freedom, we then explore the complexities surrounding the reality of the individual as an 
absolute negativity.  We then turn towards Hegel’s account of the economy as a way of 
illustrating the way in which the freedom of the individual ‘collides’ with the freedom of 
the community.  This chapter closes by emphasizing two central parts of Hegel’s 
argument:  first, because of the dynamic relationship between the individual in her 
negative freedom and the community, determinate laws must always remain relative and 
fragile with respect to the reality of ethical life; second, ethical life itself is perpetually 
engaged in an on-going process of ‘navigating’ the collision of freedoms alluded to 
above.  The main conclusion of this chapter shows that the reality of ethical life takes the 
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shape of what Hegel argues is a tragic performance of self-sacrifice:  we learn here that 
the basic way in which the human community is actualized is through the dynamic 
process of constructing itself, maintaining itself, and tearing itself down.   
Chapter Six explores in more detail the reality of ethical life from the perspective 
of the individual.  The first section revisits the dynamic tension that resides within the 
core of ethical life.  Following Hegel’s argument, we see that the more concrete 
manifestation of ethical life is in the individual.  In more abstract terms, the complete 
synthesis of the Absolute, the unity between the universal and the particular, and the site 
where the positive and negative aspects of freedom intersect is in the ethical individual.  
The next section puts forth a broad framing of the reality of ethical life with an eye 
towards the everyday experiences of individuals within a community.  I emphasize here 
that ethical life is the basic framework that articulates why the basic mode of the 
community is to be in a state of concern with respect to the adequacy of its laws.  I then 
articulate why, for Hegel, an account of something like natural law culminates in the 
system of legislation of the community.  I emphasize that a distinctive feature of Hegel’s 
argument is the ‘rehabilitation’ of the empirical relative to his collocutors.  Whereas other 
philosophical accounts of natural law focus on the grounding principles that form a rigid 
framework, we see that ethical life, through its dynamic and concrete reality, is the way 
in which philosophy embraces the empirical.  This chapter reveals that, for Hegel, an 
account of the reality of a lawful community must be rooted in the dynamic collision 
between the negative absoluteness of the individual and the particular content of the 
empirical; in less abstract terms, we see here that the story of Absolute ethical life 
culminates in the role that history plays in the philosophical account, where history may 
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be understood as the concrete manifestation of the relation between freedom and nature.  
I also articulate another distinctive feature of Hegel’s account – the need for philosophy 
to honour necessity.  We will see here again the influence that the empirical has on the 
reality of absolute ethical life.   
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CHAPTER 1. THE PROGRAM OF EMPIRICISM AND HEGEL’S CRITIQUE 
 
1.1 Introduction: 
This chapter proceeds by following Hegel’s account of the program of empiricism 
with a focus on articulating its inadequacies as a method for deriving an account of 
natural law.  The general program of an account of natural law rooted in empiricism is 
the articulation of determinate content that is organized according to a principle that is 
itself rooted in the empirical world.  The aim of this chapter is to note both the 
ineliminable significance of the core of the empirical program and the inability of the 
program to bear the weight of that significance revealed on its own terms.  The 
conclusion of this chapter establishes the problematic logical space that invites thinking 
about the concept of absolute ethical life in order to overcome the seemingly opposed 
requirements that an account of natural law must hold together as determined by 
empiricism.  Importantly, this chapter not only foreshadows how the concept of absolute 
ethical life is essential to the philosophy of natural law, but also emphasizes how the first 
part of the Natural Law essay introduces the essential role of the empirical in an account 
of absolute ethical life. 
1.2 Hobbes’ Leviathan and the Empirical: 
Broadly, a philosophical account of natural law that is grounded in or framed by 
facts from the natural world falls under the program of empiricism as defined by Hegel in 
the opening section of the Natural Law essay.  In order to illustrate the extent of Hegel’s 
critique of drawing on the empirical for the purposes of formulating the ground of a 
15 
 
framework of natural law, this chapter begins with a brief articulation of Hobbes’ account 
of natural law as it is found in the Leviathan.  Hobbes’ account may function as a relevant 
example of the program of empiricism in action, not only because his employment of the 
empirical is on full display in his account of human nature, but also because the 
problematic way in which the empirical reverberates through more developed aspects of 
his account of natural law comes to the fore.   
Hobbes’ account of human relationships that grounds his political philosophy 
begins with two important empirical insights:  First, Hobbes states, we can observe that 
human beings are equal overall in terms of power, be it of the intellectual or physical 
kind.2  In other words, there is no natural imbalance of power among human beings.  Of 
course, power imbalances express themselves within human relationships in a myriad of 
ways.  However, these expressions of imbalances are not rooted in some kind of natural 
inequality among human beings.  Second, human beings are creatures of desire.  We have 
desires and are driven by the satisfaction of those desires.  However, since human beings 
are, for all intents and purposes, equal in terms of power, and since human beings may 
desire the same thing, the collision of desires does not immediately and naturally result in 
one human being winning out over the other.  Instead, Hobbes states, the collision of 
desires results in human beings becoming enemies.  The most important and organizing 
desire of the human being is the desire to preserve her own life, and since self-
preservation requires the satisfaction of desires through things in the world, collisions 
over things in the world result in challenges to self-preservation.  In other words, the fear 
 
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and 
Civil, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 76. 
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of the power of other human beings, especially when united as a force against one 
individual, turns out to be a primary shaping force of human existence.  The fear of the 
power of others turns out to legitimize actions taken for the sake of self-preservation.  
Furthermore, a human being has no desire to keep company with others unless she is able 
to hold those others in check due to her power “…to overawe them all.”3  With that 
power, her company may distort her value and her claim over the things that satisfy her 
desires.   
Accordingly, Hobbes argues, human nature results in three principles that cause 
conflict among human beings:  competition, diffidence, and glory.  The basic point here 
is that the human being, from an empirical standpoint, contains within itself a natural 
propensity for conflict given the immediate relation with others as potential competitors.  
Without a common power to overawe all human beings, they are likely to engage in 
these conflicts, where only their own deaths release them from their fear of others.  
Hobbes describes this basic condition that is a direct entailment of human nature, an 
inference from the passions, as a state of war – a war of all against all.4  Hobbes asks 
those who may be sceptical of his pessimistic description of human nature to turn towards 
experience:  Does not experience confirm that locks, arms, and so forth are rooted in the 
basic fear of the power of other human beings?  To be sure, while we may have located 
this power within human nature, human nature is not to blame.  Human nature is only to 
blame when it runs afoul of a law, and laws must be made, and agreed upon, by people.  
 
3 Hobbes, 77. 
4 Hobbes, 78. 
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In other words, human nature cannot determine in advance which passions may result in 
collisions with the law.   
Hobbes’ account of human nature and his vindication of human nature from 
sinning against the law in principle is rooted in an empirical analysis of what it means to 
be a human.  The natural facts of desire and self-preservation result in conflicts that 
cannot be determined as immoral or wrongful from the standpoint of human nature.  
Power and fear of that power turn out to be the primary persuading forces within the state 
of nature. 
Furthermore, Hobbes argues, notions of justice or rightness do not exist in the state 
of nature.  The significance behind this claim is that Hobbes’ account of natural law does 
not involve determinations of what is just or right independent from empirical conditions.  
In other words, the basic state of nature that underwrites and precedes conceptually a 
more developed political state contains no articulations of what is just, but merely 
observations about human nature.  Matters of justice must be developed in a way that is 
conditioned by the progress of society.  What constitutes justice is conditioned by the 
empirical, and aspects of human nature are taken to be the guiding principles of the 
development of a state that ends the war of all against all.  Just as humans desire due to 
the drive for self-preservation, just as humans fear others in the state of nature, humans 
also have natural propensities towards peace.  The fear of death, the hope for living 
contently – these aspects of human nature also influence the empirical development of a 
state of right. 
The articles of peace, or the set of laws that must be set up in order for fearful 
humans to leave the state of nature, are in direct response to the empirical facts that are 
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taken to be the essence of the human.  The first article, or law of nature, is that each 
human being desires self-preservation and has the basic right to self-preservation.  
Importantly, this law of nature is rooted in the basic desire to live, a desire that is so 
powerful, Hobbes argues, that it needs to be enshrined as a fundamental right.  I wish 
only to stress that while this article of peace is framed as a law, this law is nonetheless 
rooted in the empirical:  the basic desire of self-preservation has been elevated to be an 
explanatory principle for the development of a human community that moves beyond the 
state of nature. While Hobbes states that this law of nature is discovered by reason, the 
content of this law is not determined solely through the use of reason.  Rather, reason 
uncovers a framing principle within the empirical content of human nature:  Since the 
original position of the human being is in a state of war against all others, she has the 
right to use whatever is at her disposal for the sake of not succumbing to death as a 
casualty of this war.  Given that the content of what is just or right can only be 
determined among humans who have left the state of nature, there are no limits to the 
liberty of the human being in the state of nature in pursuing her self-preservation, 
including the belongings or bodies of others. 
An entailment of this first law of nature is that “…every man ought to endeavour 
peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may 
seek and use all helps and advantages of war.”5  Again, we can see the empirical content 
of human nature raised to the level of a principle in this entailment:  The basic desire for 
self-preservation and the original state of nature that the human being finds herself in are 
first principles in Hobbes’ account of natural law.  Reason reframes these empirical facts 
 
5 Hobbes, 80. 
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of human nature and elevates them to the level of organizing first principles.  The 
resulting account of natural law is therefore tethered to the empirical from the start.  
Furthermore, the account of natural law put forth here takes itself to be addressing the 
fundamental reality of conflict that is at the heart of the human relations.  All of the 
subsequent developments in this account of natural law are for the sake of addressing an 
empirical determination elevated to the status of an organizing principle.     
The second law of nature, which is derived from the first, is that human beings are 
willing to relinquish the right to all things for the sake of self-preservation when others 
are willing to do the same.  In other words, human beings are willing to limit the raw and 
unbridled liberty found in the state of nature to the point where the liberty allowed to 
herself is as much liberty as she would allow to others against herself.6  “To lay down a 
man’s right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the 
benefit of his own right to the same.”7  The human being may either simply renounce her 
basic right or transfer her right to another.  In either case, the divesting of her basic right 
is voluntary.  However, she cannot divest herself of the more basic right to self-
preservation, as this desire, and the right that legitimizes this desire, is at the core of her 
living relation to the world of others.   
A central feature of Hobbes’ account is that a social contract among humans must 
be determined in order to leave the state of nature.  Hobbes defines a contract as the 
mutual transferring of right.  The strength of the contract is to be embodied in the 
language that articulates the promise made by both parties.  However, words themselves 
 
6 Hobbes, 80. 
7 Hobbes, 81. 
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are often not enough to ensure that a contract is upheld by both parties, for one party may 
be tempted to break the contract given the limited force of words.  Two other forces help 
strengthen the contract:  fear of the consequence of breaking one’s word, and a pride in 
appearing not to break one’s word.  Of the two, the fear of consequences is the primary 
means of strengthening the obligation to the word of the contract.  Hobbes argues the fear 
of consequences may be rooted in the wrath of divine beings or in the power of those 
human beings offended by the breaking of the contract.  For our purposes, we need only 
focus on the fear of consequences related to other human beings – the power that, while 
not greater than that of divine beings, is much more common to the covenants made by 
humans.   
The fear of other human beings, prior to living in a civil society, can only be 
determined in moments of conflict:  in the state of nature, fear arises only in situations 
where one’s own strength is bested by another, where one becomes powerless relative to 
another.  Since the relative power of human beings cannot be assessed prior to conflict, 
the fear of consequences does not strengthen covenants made outside of civil society.  
Even in the state of nature, the performance of covenants is a matter of original justice; 
the problem is that the application of justice to those who break covenants in the state of 
nature turns out to be subject to the will of the human who is stronger.  In other words, 
there is no power in the state of nature that is greater than all those involved in the 
covenant.  Based on the principles of human nature rooted in empirical reality, original 
justice is hindered by the fact that the relationship between two human beings in the state 
of nature (involved in a covenant) is mediated by relative power.   
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Hobbes argues that while original justice is on the horizon in the state of nature, 
justice can only be achieved in a commonwealth.  Only when human beings come 
together and submit themselves to a common greater power – the commonwealth – is 
justice realizable.  “So that the nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants, 
but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power 
sufficient to compel men to keep them…”8  The role of civil power in Hobbes’ account is 
in direct response to the empirical conditions that are taken to be the ground of the human 
being’s relationships with others.  In other words, the sheer scope of power granted to the 
third party is legitimized by the empirical content of human nature elevated to the level of 
an organizing principle.   
Hobbes describes the final end of human beings is to get “…themselves out from 
that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent…to the natural passions 
of men where there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of 
punishments to the performance of their covenants…”9  Hobbes has used the empirical 
reality of human passions as the basis for a philosophical account of political life.  The 
resulting account of the Commonwealth appears to be structured around the reality and 
mediation of desires.  The desire for self-preservation, for example, reverberates 
throughout the account of the Commonwealth.  The importance of coercion through 
punishment, the absolute and natural right to self-defence in the face of death – these are 
conceptual entailments of Hobbes’ account of the political relation that is rooted in the 
original chaos of the state of nature. 
 
8 Hobbes, 89. 
9 Hobbes, 103. 
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The purpose of exploring the foundation of Hobbes’ political philosophy is merely 
to highlight the role of the empirical within his philosophy.  The basic shape of political 
life, for Hobbes, rests on the reality of coercion.  The natural fears of human beings carry 
over into the erection of the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth is able to use those 
fears to coerce all of its members in a way that, for Hobbes, results in the actualization of 
justice.  The logical space given to the role of coercion in the commonwealth is, 
according to Hegel’s line of argument, the result of taking the desire for self-preservation 
to be the basic principle that frames all human relationships.  While an account of natural 
law based on this empirical content may strive to present itself as absolute, the account 
must be recognized as relative and its organizing principle plagued with arbitrariness. 
 
1.3 Hegel’s Critique of the Empirical Program: 
With an example of an account of natural law rooted in the empirical in mind, we 
now turn towards Hegel’s critique in the Natural Law essay.  He begins by noting that the 
very possibility of a scientific account of natural law rooted in the empirical is 
problematic insofar as a scientific account of something implies a kind of unity, where 
determinates are organized around a principle.10  We might initially associate this 
scientific account of natural law as positive law, or law that is rooted in the empirical.  
From the perspective of the empirical, the stark and clean separation between 
determinacies according to an organizing principle is suspect.  Put differently, the 
 
10 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Natural Law: The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in 
Moral Philosophy, and Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law, trans. T. M. Knox, Works in Continental 
Philosophy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975), 58. 
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empirical denies the possibility of an organizing principle that runs through the 
determinate content with necessity.  At most, an empirical account of natural law may 
allow for a scientific procedure that has a certain form, but this form is not essential to the 
articulation of the content.11  If philosophy’s resources for putting forth an empirical 
account of natural law are determinacies from the world, then the problem becomes one 
of finding a way of giving a unified account where any starting point of the account lacks 
necessity.  If all terms within the empirical account of natural law are determinacies 
grounded in the world and taken from experience, then our organizing principle must 
itself be a determinacy.  An organic totality, Hegel argues, can only present a unity over 
the multiplicity if one determinacy within the multiplicity is elevated to the status of 
organizing principle.  “But the totality of the organic is precisely what cannot be thereby 
attained, and the remainder of the relation, excluded from the determinate aspect that was 
selected, falls under the dominion of this aspect which is elevated to be the essence and 
purpose of the relation.”12  Once a determinacy is elevated to the status of an organizing 
principle, the arbitrariness of the essence of the totality is put on display:  the totality that 
results from our scientific account of natural law based on the empirical is possible only if 
a certain determinacy is emphasized more than others.   
If we were to claim that our lives are ultimately organized around the satisfaction of 
natural desires, then we would be tempted to put forth an account that reveals how other 
determinacies in human life are directed towards, and unified by, the satisfaction of 
desire.  According to Hegel’s line of thinking, the posited essence of the resulting unity 
 
11 Hegel, 59–60. 
12 Hegel, 60. 
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that rises above a myriad of determinacies within human life – desire – is itself a 
determinacy that has merely been emphasized; no more substantive justification for 
emphasizing one determinacy over another is possible.  The entirety of the organic 
totality is suspect since its organizing principle is in fact a determinacy elevated to the 
status of principle merely through emphasis, or, what amounts to the same, arbitrary 
thinking.  There is no necessary connection between desire and property, for example.   
The elevation of a determinacy does not thereby imbue purpose or necessity to this 
selected determinacy.  As such, “…the whole organic relation is delimited and 
contaminated.”13  Efforts to ascertain the most essential determinacy that should unify the 
multiplicity are in vain, for there is no necessity inherent in multiplicity that would justify 
the elevation of one determinacy over others.  The “inner necessity” of the totality is 
missing.14  The necessity that appears throughout the organic totality is (a) merely formal, 
and (b) masks the lack of inner necessity within the totality.  Since the organizing 
principle must be a determinacy elevated to the status of principle, the resulting principle 
‘smuggles in’ content that is ultimately not absolute, but arbitrary.15  The appearance of 
necessity within the organic totality dissolves once we recognize that the organizing 
principle derives its essence from content that is itself lacking in necessity with respect to 
the multiplicity.  In other words, since necessity cannot be drawn from the relationship 
between one determinacy and the multiplicity, necessity must be brought in from 
‘outside’ of the totality.  The resulting totality that presents itself as necessary is tainted 
insofar as the necessity is external to the totality.  ‘Purpose’ or ‘essence’ within an 
 
13 Hegel, 60. 
14 Hegel, 60. 
15 Hegel, 61–62. 
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empirical account of natural law turns out to be an arbitrary point of emphasis 
masquerading as knowledge.16 
Hegel shows that since scientific empiricism produces an account of natural law 
that is rooted in an organic totality that is itself organized around a ‘tainted’ principle, the 
resulting account is problematic.  Given that no inner necessity is to be found in the 
multiplicity of determinacies, the elevation of a certain determinacy to the status of 
principle is arbitrary, for all determinacies are equal to each other.  The empirical world 
is chaotic insofar as a necessary principle within the multiplicity is not possible, and all 
determinacies within the multiplicity carry an equal weight.  If we were to put forth an 
account of natural law that is rooted in empiricism, we would find that the chaos within 
the physical world, a chaos that cannot be excluded or ignored within an organic totality, 
manifests itself in the world of natural law, the ethical world.  The next section articulates 
how the chaos of the empirical world manifests itself in an account of natural law that 
misrepresents a determinate content from the chaotic world of nature as a grounding and 
unifying principle. 
 
1.4 The Entailments of an Empirical Account of Natural Law: 
We have articulated Hegel’s argument for why an account of natural law rooted in 
the empirical is problematic.  While our primary aim is to explore the inadequacies of 
each program of natural law, a secondary aim now surfaces.  One aspect of the position 
that Hegel takes over the course of the Natural Law essay is that philosophy must ‘hold 
 
16 Hegel, 60. 
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together’ the empirical and the a priori in an account of natural law.  Chapters Five and 
Six delve into Hegel’s complex argument for why an account of natural law is organized 
around the concept of absolute ethical life.  Since later chapters explore Hegel’s argument 
for how philosophy accomplishes the difficult task of resolving the apparent conflict 
between the empirical and the a priori, we pause now to look more closely at the 
entailments of an account of natural law rooted in the empirical.  These entailments 
reveal to us the ‘chaotic’ power of the empirical and how that ‘chaotic’ power resurfaces, 
according to Hegel, in the relation between absolute ethical life and history. 
Hegel invokes the concept of the state of nature as a manifestation of the chaos 
within the empirical world in the world of law, the world of ethical thinking.  An 
empirical account of natural law ultimately commits us to grappling with the chaos of the 
physical world.  In the case of an account that invokes the state of nature, our account 
may absorb the chaos of the physical in the realm of the ethical, where the state of nature 
is the essence and destiny of the human being.  The appearance of rationality within our 
empirical account can be upheld only by maintaining a confusion of the arbitrariness of a 
relation among determinacies with a necessary relation.17  The elevation of one 
determinacy within the chaotic physical world results in a unity that lords over a set of 
determinacies and excludes other determinacies as inessential in relation to the grounding 
‘principle.’  These three elements – an elevated determinacy, a set of determinacies that 
are taken to be in a relationship to the elevated determinacy based on necessity, and the 
exclusion of the other determinacies – do not result in a totality that is absolute:  the 
exclusion of most determinacies for the sake of unifying some determinacies relative to 
 
17 Hegel, 63. 
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an elevated determinacy remains arbitrary and chaotic.  The empirical world is a world of 
the many, where the many relate to the many and where no inner necessity is present to 
bring about a one that unifies the many in an absolute sense.  The relation of many to the 
many without a one is a relation plagued with endless opposition and conflict as the 
ground of an account of natural law.   
An account of natural law that draws on empiricism transposes the endless 
opposition and conflict of the many of the physical world into the ethical world.  The 
immediate relation among human beings in this tainted ethical world is an endless 
struggle, a war of all against all.  The abandonment of the state of nature for the sake of 
an ethical harmony that ‘overcomes’ the war of all against all does not occur based on 
necessity, but on a presupposition of one determinacy grounding all others.  The 
problematic result of a natural account of law based on empiricism may be that the 
harmony of society that incorporates the state of nature is ultimately empty and lacks 
inner necessity – an insight that cannot be attained by empiricism.   
The unity brought forth by the determinacy raised to a principle only hovers over 
the multiplicity.  Put differently, the now-elevated determinacy cannot be ‘connected’ to 
the multiplicity in any significant way beyond the mere association of ‘one among 
others.’  Since no penetration of the multiplicity by the principle is possible, the unity 
based on empiricism is ultimately empty.18  Hegel describes the immediate conflict at the 
heart of an empirical account of natural law as the result of energies that are arbitrarily 
separated from each other.  These energies manifest themselves in, for example, the 
 
18 Hegel, 65–66. 
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opposition between the state of nature and the abstraction of the human man.  The point 
here is that the conflict between law and nature, and its distorted resolution in an 
empirical account of natural law, is rooted in the conceptual issue raised above – the 
problematic way empiricism elevates one determinacy over others.  “The separated 
energies of the ethical sphere must, in the state of nature or in the abstraction of man, be 
thought of as engaged in a war of mutual destruction.”19  The lack of inner necessity of 
the one perpetuates a conflict between that one and the empirical necessity of the many, 
where the many is to be subservient to the one.   
Broadly, empiricism cannot hold together opposed concepts, such as the state of 
nature and the state of law.  The opposition between these states is the result of elements 
of ethical life being fixed arbitrarily into a principle that cannot properly hold together 
these opposed concepts.  Once fixed, the concepts employed in the account are distorted, 
giving off the appearance of an absolute opposition between the states of law and nature.  
However, since the program of empiricism strives towards a unified totality, empiricism 
distorts these concepts and their opposition for the sake of putting forth a totality.  Thus, 
the distorted relations between these concepts are not internal to the concepts themselves 
but are the result of the program of empiricism itself.20 
Our focus in this chapter is not the exploration of whether there is tension between 
concepts employed by an empirical account of natural law that is immanent to their 
logical relation within that particular account. Instead, our focus is on the inability of any 
empirical program whatsoever to put forth an account of natural law that is free of fixing 
 
19 Hegel, 64. 
20 Hegel, 65. 
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a determinate content into a principle that is free of distortion.  Hegel’s claim is that the 
program of empiricism is in reality a program of distortion, where this distortion works 
its way into the ethical world based on an empirical account of natural law.  “The state of 
nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole state of law which is alien to individuals 
and therefore is single and particular (as well as the subject’s situation of absolute 
subjection under this supreme power), are the forms in which the fragmented moments of 
the organic ethical life are fixed as particular essences and thereby distorted…”21  Within 
this distortion arise many elements of an empirical account of natural law:  the chaos of 
the empirical world, the one that is opposed to the many, the tension the subject 
experiences of being pulled in the direction of the many and the one.  The opposition 
between the state of nature and the state of law is fixed, where the resulting totality 
maintains the relationship of conflict between these two elements.  In other words, the 
totality of the empirical account is committed to a non-identity between the state of 
nature and the state of law.  With this distortion fixed as foundational, the ‘absolute’ 
opposition between the fragmented parts of the ethical whole reverberates throughout this 
totality.  To be sure, these elements, in some shape or another, have a place within the 
organic ethical life, and later chapters will explore the conceptual challenge of unifying 
these elements.  However, the ethical meanings associated with these elements within an 
empirical account of natural law remain distorted.   
   
 
21 Hegel, 66. 
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1.5 Foreshadowing the Role of the Empirical in Absolute Ethical Life 
At this point in the essay, Hegel gestures towards the concept of the absolute 
ethical life revealing itself as a totality that is not fragmented or where the totality is not 
hamstrung by distortions:  “The absolute Idea of ethical life, on the other hand, contains 
both majesty [the state of law] and the state of nature as simply identical, since the former 
is nothing but absolute ethical nature; and in the realization of majesty there can be no 
thought of any loss of absolute freedom, which is what would have to be understood by 
‘natural freedom,’ or of any sacrifice of ethical nature.”22  The empirical account of 
natural law emphasizes the majesty, the state of law, as above the chaotic state of nature, 
where, under this lens, freedom is to be found in leaving the state of nature.  The state of 
nature, then, is there to be sacrificed for the sake of the other pole of the opposition – the 
majesty that is the state of law.  While an empirical account of natural law rightly reveals 
the elements of law and nature as integral to ethical life, this account, through fixing the 
opposition, fails to capture the identity between these elements.  “But the natural, which 
would have to be regarded in an ethical relation as something to be sacrificed, would 
itself not be ethical and so could least of all represent the ethical in its origin.”23  This 
sacrifice only makes sense if the state of nature were itself regarded as ethical.  However, 
the fixed opposition between the two states, and the arbitrary emphasis placed on the one 
state as rightful or superior, entails that the distorted state of nature is regarded as not 
ethical.   
 
22 Hegel, 66. 
23 Hegel, 66. 
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Hegel summarizes the basic problem inherent in the program of empiricism:  “We 
have accused scientific empiricism, so far as it is scientific, of the positive nullity and 
untruth of its principles, laws, etc., on the ground that it confers the negative absoluteness 
of the Concept on determinate features by means of the formal unity in which it places 
them, and it asserts them as existing positively, absolutely, and of themselves as end and 
destiny, principle, statute, duty, and law – forms that mean something absolute.”24  
However, the absoluteness of these assertions comes at the cost of a totality that 
announces itself through itself; instead, the totality is distorted by the perception of the 
Concept through the empirical lens, and the conferring of primacy of one facet over 
others is without inner necessity. 
The understanding, writes Hegel, is so eager to pounce on empiricism because the 
understanding is unable to grasp properly the problem within the empirical.25  At this 
point, the understanding may use the inconsistencies of empiricism as evidence of its 
ineptitude, where the understanding then posits its own set of fixed laws, held 
consistently throughout the totality.  In doing so, the understanding places intuition under 
these fixed laws.   
Hegel states that empiricism, despite its own inner problems, is “…right to 
complain that this [theory put forth by the understanding] is one-sided; and it is in its 
power, by means of completeness of the specific characteristics which it upholds, to force 
this theory (by citing instances) into a universality which is totality empty.”26  
Interestingly, inconsistency is not the death knell for empiricism.  I take Hegel to be 
 
24 Hegel, 67. 
25 Hegel, 68. 
26 Hegel, 68. 
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setting the stage for what it means to incorporate the truths of empiricism into an account 
of the Idea of absolute ethical life.  Here we already see that if we discard empiricism 
wholesale on grounds of its inconsistency and put forth an account that upholds 
consistency throughout the articulated totality, then, as we will see in Chapter Four, the 
result is another kind of empty universal, an account of ethical life that lacks content.   
 
1.6 Conclusion: 
We have established two conclusions that are relevant to the argument Hegel puts 
forth in the Natural Law essay.  First, the program of empiricism shipwrecks due to its 
inability to justify the first principle of an account.  Using Hobbes’ Leviathan to motivate 
our exploration of Hegel’s critique of empiricism, we see that no mechanism within the 
program is able to determine with necessity why, among a myriad of options, one 
determinate fact from the empirical world should be elevated to the status of principle.  
Following Hegel’s line of reasoning, we are now able to rule out the program of 
empiricism as adequate to the task of constructing a philosophy of natural law.  Second, 
the failure of the program of empiricism does not entail that the empirical should be 
excluded from an account of natural law.  We were introduced, if only briefly, to the 
challenge that the empirical raises against the a priori:  universals rooted in the a priori 
turn out to be devoid of content; the empirical, it seems, must be incorporated to an 
articulation of the reality of the lawful community in order to ‘ground’ the universal in 
the real.  The challenge put forth by the empirical towards the abstract realm of concepts 
demands a response.  To be sure, we will be exploring this challenge and Hegel’s 
response in a detailed way in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.  However, in order to prepare 
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ourselves to appreciate the extent of Hegel’s response, we must now shift our focus to an 
explication of some core elements within Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.   
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CHAPTER 2. FICHTE, HEGEL, AND THE INDETERMINATE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
Having established Hegel’s critique on the program of empiricism, the next step is 
to explore Hegel’s critique of the project of a priorism, of an account of natural law.  The 
basic framework of a priorism in relation to natural law is to posit a first principle that is 
grounded in an a priori concept of freedom, for example.  The conclusion that Hegel 
reaches with respect to his critique is that the concept of freedom employed by a priorism 
is merely the Concept of the Absolute, not the Idea of the Absolute.  Put differently, 
Hegel argues that the concept of freedom employed in the program is one-sided insofar as 
it conceives of the freedom of the individual and the community only in the abstract.  The 
extent of this critique, and its relation to the Idea of the Absolute that Hegel grounds his 
philosophy of natural law in, is the focus of several chapters in this project.  However, in 
order to appreciate the scope of Hegel’s critique, we must first turn towards the 
philosophical system that Hegel often responds to during this period of writing:  Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre.  To be sure, this project does not make any significant efforts to 
evaluate both the interpretation of Fichte’s work put forth by Hegel and the 
successfulness of the critique put forth.  While the criticisms of Fichte’s system may rest 
fundamentally on a disagreement about the scope of the general task of philosophy, 
Hegel’s criticisms nonetheless introduce two concepts that play prominent roles in the 
Natural Law essay:  the Idea of the Absolute, and the philosophy of striving.  By framing 
these two concepts within Hegel’s response to Fichte, we will be in a better position to 
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understand the complex accounts of the Absolute and the point of indifference put forth 
in the Natural Law essay.   
This part of the dissertation explores this important point of philosophical tension 
between the two philosophers in order to show how Hegel’s responses to Fichte manifest 
themselves in the Natural Law essay.  Accordingly, this project aims to first provide an 
exegetical account of relevant parts of the Wissenschaftslehre, as presented through some 
of Fichte’s works, and then present Hegel’s criticism of parts of the Wissenschaftslehre 
found in his early philosophical works.  In doing so, the ways in which the content of 
those philosophical criticisms are manifested in Hegel’s philosophy of natural law will be 
made clear.   
The focus of this chapter is on Hegel’s interpretation and critique of the roles of the 
check and the indeterminate in Fichte’s philosophical system.  Given the complexities 
and scope of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, this chapter focuses on the presentation of the 
Wissenschaftslehre found in the Nova Methodo.27  The main critique that is explored in 
this chapter is about the ‘incompleteness’ of the concept of the Absolute employed by 
Fichte.  The path that this chapter takes is as follows:  First, I open with some general but 
brief remarks about the project of philosophy that Hegel makes in the Difference essay.  
The purpose of these remarks is to show in broad strokes the importance that Hegel 
places on not only the Absolute, but more importantly on the need of philosophy to 
overcome opposition and rigid dualisms.  Next, I recapitulate part of the 
Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo, culminating in Fichte’s account of the roles of feeling 
 
27 While the language of the check is more prominent in other versions of the system, the foundation laid in 
the Nova Methodo also frames the discussion of the philosophy of striving in the next chapter.   
36 
 
and the check.  I begin by articulating the basic path that the genetic deduction must take 
in order to explain how self-consciousness constructs an intellectual intuition of itself 
through the positing of object and of the subject that is conscious of the object, 
emphasizing that the satisfaction of the real activity of the I in feeling is also the same 
logical moment where the subject of the ideal activity requires something that goes 
beyond the domain of feeling.  I end this section of the chapter by appealing to 
Breazeale’s interpretation of the check to account for the givenness of the indeterminate 
beyond and its relation to the ideal activity of the subject.  The conclusion of this section 
is that Fichte’s system seems to invoke the indeterminate, the facticity or sheer thereness 
that is beyond comprehension by the I, in order to posit itself at all.  The third section of 
this paper draws primarily on Hegel’s interpretation and criticism of the role of the 
indeterminate in Fichte’s system found in both the Difference essay and Faith and 
Knowledge.  I end this chapter by reemphasizing the philosophical concepts employed in 
Hegel’s responses, and gesture towards the role that those concepts have in the defining 
elements of Hegel’s account of ethical life and law.28 
2.2 Philosophy and the Absolute for Hegel: 
“The task of philosophy is to construct the Absolute for consciousness.”29 
In a very introductory sense, the Absolute for Hegel is what is the truth of reality.  
The problem is that philosophical systems often erect themselves in ways that are not so 
 
28 To be sure, one might argue that the criticisms by Hegel raised in this chapter are addressed in Fichte’s 
philosophy of striving, but Chapter Three is dedicated towards exploring Fichte’s philosophy of striving in 
relation to Hegel’s criticisms in more detail. 
29 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, 
trans. Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 94. 
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much concerned with the truth of reality, but rather with a kind of internal consistency 
based on a presupposition.  Hegel states that a dichotomy is the original source of the 
need for philosophy because the presence of a dichotomy is the presence of an opposition 
that is taken as definitive, as absolute.  From the perspective of simply describing reality, 
the dichotomy that is held to be the truth of reality represents a problematic assumption 
carried forward by the philosopher in her articulation of what is reality.  In short, the 
dichotomy and the supposed absolute opposition that results from the dichotomy is in fact 
evidence of the need of philosophy to prove said opposition to be merely relative and not 
absolute.  For Hegel, the goal of Reason is to erect a systematic account of reality that 
reaches the Absolute.  Various philosophical endeavours, various parts of the whole, are 
brought into line with each other; the limitations of these endeavours are nullified and 
reveal their connection to the Absolute.  “The sole interest of Reason is to suspend such 
rigid antitheses.”30  We should not take this to mean that Reason does not tolerate 
opposition.  Reason is capable of recognizing opposition as the vital life force behind the 
emergence of spirit as a living reality.  What Reason does not tolerate is the fixing of any 
given opposition as absolute.  “In the infinite activity of becoming and producing, Reason 
has united what was sundered [into an apparent absolute dichotomy] and it has reduced 
the absolute dichotomy to a relative one, one that is conditioned by the original 
identity.”31  Put differently, the program of Reason is to prove that any absolute 
opposition is merely an appearance and that any opposition is suspended in the wake of 
Reason.     
 
30 Hegel, 90. 
31 Hegel, 91. 
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With this introductory conception of Hegel’s Absolute in mind, we now turn 
towards Fichte’s initial employment of the concept of the Absolute in the 
Wissenschaftslehre.  The foundation of Fichte’s system, from Hegel’s perspective, and a 
focal point of Hegel’s critique is the intellectual intuition, the I = I, the I as such that is 
the identity of Subject-Object.  Philosophy, Fichte argues, must explain the opposition to 
an object that arises within ordinary consciousness while this experience of opposition is 
itself grounded in the pure I; the pure I is the unconditional that is the absolute foundation 
of consciousness as such.  If philosophy is able to show that ordinary consciousness is 
grounded in pure consciousness, then the opposition between ordinary consciousness and 
pure consciousness is no longer one of condition and conditioned; rather, ordinary 
consciousness would be grounded in pure consciousness, and this grounding could be 
revealed apodictically through the system of philosophy that begins with the pure I as its 
first principle.  Broadly, Fichte holds that one task of philosophy is to show how the 
absolute identity of the I = I is possible.  The remainder of this chapter explores the path 
that Fichte takes in response to this foundational task and Hegel’s response.     
Following Hegel’s line of reasoning, we will see that the highest synthesis within 
Fichte’s system, that the I as object must be equal to I as subject, is an incomplete 
synthesis insofar as this synthesis deviates from the principle of identity that grounds the 
system.  The incompleteness of the highest synthesis within Fichte’s system of 
philosophy, for Hegel, is evidence of an opposition that has not been suspended and 
appears as absolute.  With respect to the above introduction of the Absolute, if the 
philosophical system puts forth, or ‘enshrines’ a rigid dualism that cannot be made 
relative, then the system is not yet ‘complete.’  The need of philosophy to prove the non-
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absolute character of any dichotomy or opposition shows itself within Fichte’s systematic 
account of human reality, Hegel argues, by revealing the system’s nullification of itself 
through its own endeavour to construct itself as an absolute identity.  We begin by 
exploring the role of the Absolute in Fichte’s system.   
2.3 The Role of the Indeterminate in the Self-Positing of the I: 
The heart of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is found in the self-positing of the I.  In 
positing itself, the I is engaged in activity, the activity of itself as subject positing 
something for itself; but in positing itself, the I also reveals itself as an object, something 
that is for the subject.  So, one primary task of philosophy, for Fichte, is to articulate just 
how the I, in positing itself, arrives as the absolute identity between the I as subject and 
the I as object.  In other words, philosophy must articulate why these seemingly opposed 
aspects of the I, the subject and the object, are nevertheless rooted in the fundamental 
self-positing carried out by the I as such.  Fichte states the following with respect to the 
absoluteness of the relationship between the posited object and the positing subject:  “It is 
not learned; it is not derived from experience.  Instead, it [the identity] is what makes all 
learning and all experience possible in the first place.  The I is by no means a subject; 
instead, it is a subject-object.”32  Philosophy’s task is to show how this identity is, 
through a series of genetic deductions, the ground of consciousness in the everyday 
sense.  Importantly, in this act of self-positing, the I becomes immediately conscious of 
itself:  the intellectual intuition is the I’s immediate awareness of itself as subject-object 
in its own immediacy, and it is this intuition that grounds all further philosophical tasks.  
 
32 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Fichte: Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova 
Methodo (1796/99), trans. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 114. 
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The immediate positing of myself not only brings about the intuition of myself as subject-
object, but also the awareness that the act of self-positing is the act of moving away from 
a previous state of inactivity.  Put differently, we are only able to become aware of our 
activity in the fullest sense through the contrast between the act of self-positing and a 
state of the I that is passive.  However, we are only able to become aware of a state that is 
passive through the contrast between the passive and the active.  “Consequently, it was 
only by means of opposition that I was able to become clearly conscious of my activity 
and to obtain an intuition of it.”33  The question that drives the remainder of the 
philosophical task is how was this self-intuition constructed.   
To begin, we must explore the intellectual intuition that arises from the I’s positing 
of itself by itself.  Fichte argues that the intellectual intuition occurs, in part, through a 
kind of limitation.  In the act of self-positing, the I limits itself from positing anything 
else.  So, the consciousness of our own self-activity is also the consciousness of our own 
activity of limiting ourselves.  However, we cannot be conscious of our own self-limiting 
unless we are also conscious of the transition from the state of indeterminacy to the state 
of determinacy: indeterminacy is posited as opposed to a determinate condition.34  The 
activity of self-positing is the way in which the determinate is made present to 
consciousness, but this very same activity is also the way in which the indeterminate is 
made present as well.  Fichte argues that this opposition is best captured by stating that 
the activity of self-positing is the making present of ‘what is determinable.’35  An 
entailment of this relationship is that the activity of positing something as determinate, 
 
33 Fichte, 116. 
34 Fichte, 121. 
35 Fichte, 122. 
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where this something is the self, is necessarily bound with the activity of positing 
something that is between the determinate and the indeterminate – the determinable.   
The presence of the indeterminate later in the genetic deduction is what Hegel 
draws on for one of his main criticisms.  While one of Hegel’s main criticism of Fichte’s 
system is related to the role that the indeterminate plays in the I, we must continue to 
follow the path of Fichte’s argument in order to understand how the system ‘handles’ the 
indeterminate. 
The self-positing of the I as subject-object is now opposed to the activity of 
positing directed not at the I but at something else, something stable and passive – the 
Not-I.  Both of these activities, however, must occur in order for the intellectual intuition 
to be made present to consciousness.  Importantly, given the difference in the direction of 
the activity, the self-positing I finds itself ‘confronted’ by the Not-I.  The something that 
is stable and passive is, from the perspective of the self-positing I, necessary but not 
something that is the product of its own activity.   
Importantly, both the activity of self-positing and the activity of positing the Not-I 
are two sides of one basic activity.  With regard to the first act and the second act, the 
same activity ‘revealed’ in two different ways – as power and as intuition.  The activity 
as it occurs in the first act is revealed as an intellectual intuition – an inner intuition of 
power.  The same activity as it occurs in the second (but equally primary) act is revealed 
as an outer intuition – something that is related to the Not-I.  These two different 
activities amount to two different spheres residing in the consciousness:  the sphere of 
what is intended and the sphere of what is necessarily conjoined with the sphere of what 
is intended – the sphere of what is found.   
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In order to understand more fully the relationship between these spheres, we must 
remind ourselves that immediate consciousness, the ground of all activity, is something 
that never becomes an object to consciousness itself.  What this immediate consciousness 
posits can never be itself as it really is; rather it is the positing of itself, the positing of a 
subject, opposed to the positing of what is not itself, the positing of being.   Thus, from 
the same original intuition, two series arise:  the series of the I, of what is intended, and 
the series of the Not-I, of what is found.  These series are not merely linked in reflective 
thought.  Rather, Fichte states, these series cannot be separated, for they are one and the 
same:  when we describe our intuition of the I in terms of its activity, the I arises for us; 
when we describe our intuition in terms of its state of repose, the Not-I arises for us.36   
2.4 Halting the Activity of the I: 
The real activity, the sheer self-positing of the I, is a practical activity, for it is an 
accomplishment.  Furthermore, the activity of observing this practical activity – the I 
observing itself in its own practical activity – is the ideal activity.  It seems that the 
practical activity that is observed shows itself in the concept of absolute freedom, so the 
concept of absolute freedom is the act of self-intuition; these two aspects, the concept and 
the intuition, determine each other reciprocally.  The ideal activity is constrained only 
insofar as it occurs subsequent to the real activity.  Put differently, the ideal activity must 
be posited only in relation to a real activity, a production that ‘halts’ the ideal activity.  
Following Fichte’s line of argumentation, this something that is real that halts the ideal 
activity is X.  The ideal activity is the subject, and the real activity is the object.  What is 
 
36 Fichte, 132. 
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put into opposition with the ‘object’ that the self-positing I ‘confronts’ in the intellectual 
intuition is being as the cancellation of productive activity in the sphere of the real.  In 
this sense, the something that confronts the I wholly negates what is intended in the 
power of the I, at least initially.  The I intends to reveal itself to itself, but the self-
positing act of the I necessarily reveals the positing of the Not-I, the something that 
confronts the I, a being.  Being is the immediate negation of the productive activity of the 
I to become an object to itself in a complete sense.  So, we are moving towards a way of 
articulating the something = X that is real that halts the activity of the ideal activity, but 
we will come to understand this being as something more than merely what cancels 
activity. 
Since the focus of this explication is on how the indeterminate arises within the 
system, our focus now shifts to the ideal activity.  The ideal activity, the activity of the 
subject that observes the subject-object as an intuition, is an activity that is constrained in 
two ways:  first, this ideal activity is constrained insofar as it is ‘geared’ towards an X; an 
X exists for this ideal activity.  Second, not only does X exist for this ideal activity, but it 
exists in a determinate way.  In other words, the ideal activity is passive to the 
determinate X.  We do not know what the X is yet; rather, we are asserting that the ideal 
activity is so constituted to be passive towards something that halts its activity, something 
that is determinate.   
Since this activity is occurring within the same original act of self-positing, what 
binds the ideal activity to X must be grounded in that same original act of freedom.  In 
short, freedom binds the ideal activity to the something = X that constrains it.  This seems 
to be the place where goal-setting takes a more concrete shape:  in positing itself as self-
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positing, the ideal active power engages in an act of freedom only by positing a goal, 
what is intended; from the subjective aspect, this goal is not something entirely new or 
external to the I; rather, what is posited is a model of the I that the I itself posits for itself.  
The positing of the goal is the positing of a model where the I ‘is already that goal,’ it 
seems, in the ideal.  The real activity is found in the accomplishment of that goal.   
While the I is itself absolutely free and unconditioned, in positing its own freedom 
the I constructs for itself a goal that it must necessarily accomplish in order to have being.  
The goal is, for the I, the demand that something should be produced based on this goal.  
This model is not some structure that is external to the positing of the I.  Rather, the 
model of the I that must accompany acts of self-positing is merely a consequence of the I 
being a subject-object, an original synthetic unity where the ideal aspect and the real 
aspect of the practical activity are already united in principle.  “Free self-determination is 
intuitable only as a determination to become ‘something,’ of which the self-determining 
or practical power must possess a freely constructed concept.”37  The true character of the 
I lies in the identity between the practical power and the intellect which posits concepts 
‘about’ this practical power.38  The intuition that the I has about itself is an intuition of 
the movement from determinability to a determinacy; this intuition involves the synthesis 
of the ideal activity and the real activity.   
A problem arises:  the ideal activity is only related immediately to the real activity, 
where that real activity, as being, turned out to halt the activity of the ideal.  So, the ideal 
activity can only be related to the ‘higher level’ constraint in the form of the posited goal 
 
37 Fichte, 153. 
38 Fichte, 153. 
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indirectly.  The ideal activity must be constrained, but the constraint can only be 
‘constructed’ indirectly.  So, since the sole relation that the ideal activity has is to the real 
activity itself, the indirect constraint of the ideal activity must nevertheless come by way 
of the real activity.  Put differently, the relation between the ideal activity and the real 
activity reveals the absolute freedom of the I, but where this absolute freedom of the I 
manifests itself as the positing of a goal, an indirect constraint.   
When the I, through the real practical activity, makes the transition from the 
determinable to the determinate, the I engages in an act of absolute freedom.  The I 
chooses to make itself ‘one’ something that resides within the entire set of the 
determinable.  The I chooses its something out of the set of possible somethings.  The I 
never exhausts itself in its selection, for the I is infinitely divisible:  the I can choose to be 
more or less of the selected something.39  While the practical activity is not constrained in 
the sense of making its selection (the selection never exhausts the freedom of the 
selector), the practical activity is constrained insofar as it has to make its selection from 
whatever resides within the sphere of the determinable.  Importantly, what resides in the 
sphere of the determinable has no character of being ideal or real, or of being produced.  
Rather, the content of the sphere appears as given, not to the I as such, but only given to 
the choosing I.  If it were given to the I as such, then the I as such would be constrained, 
violating our starting principle.  The givenness of the sphere of the determinable as such 
is again dependent on its relationship to the halting of the practical activity.  
 
39 Fichte, 153. 
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In making its selection, the choosing I engages in a determinate activity, or action.  
In order for the choosing I to engage in an action, the I must be free to make the 
determinable into the determinate; in order for the choosing I to intuit the action, to intuit 
the determinate activity, the I must be constrained.  So, in order for the I to engage in a 
determinate activity, the freedom of the I must be unconstrained and constrained at the 
very same time.  How is it possible for the real activity of the I, the simple act of 
freedom, to be constrained and not constrained in the same moment?40 
In order to address this apparent tension, we need to explore the activity of setting a 
goal in more detail.  The I is only able to intuit itself as acting freely through the 
overcoming of some resistance.  The simple act of freedom is not intuitable by the 
choosing I directly; rather, that freedom is indirectly intuitable through the process of 
‘absorbing’ that resistance into the I.  Resistance reveals itself to be essential to the self-
positing activity of the I.41  In positing a goal, in making the transition from the 
determinable to the determinate, the I is free to make the selection from the sphere of the 
determinable.  But once the I has made its selection, the ‘shape’ that the determinate 
takes is no longer wholly dependent on the practical I; the parts of the manifold that 
become determinate become intuited by the ideal aspect of the practical I as a constraint 
on the activity.  In the construction of the concept, the practical I is free; in the ‘pursuit’ 
of the concept, in the action itself, the practical I is constrained and the subject that bears 
witness to the practical activity ‘in progress’ takes up the constraint on the practical I as 
constraint on itself.  In short, the practical activity of the I that expresses its freedom 
 
40 Fichte, 159. 
41 Fichte, 171. 
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necessarily involves the subjective I experiencing resistance; when a choice is made, a 
resistance is posited.  The real activity of the practical I is the uniting of freedom and 
resistance in the same action; the ideal activity of the practical I is the intuiting of this 
relationship between activity and non-activity.  Any experience, any activity of the 
practical I that is intuited by the subjective I, is grounded in the interaction between the I 
and the not-I, between the I’s positing of its own activity and the I’s positing of its own 
constraint on that very activity.  “The I is supposed to posit itself, but it can do this only 
by acting; acting, however, involves a relationship with the Not-I.”42  In self-positing, the 
practical I must posit the space of its own constraint, and this space of constraint is 
revealed as the Not-I.  For Fichte, the marker of Idealism is that it is not based on a 
duality, nor the positing of material as primary, nor the positing of the mental substance 
as primary; rather, idealism begins with the positing of the absolute union between the I 
and the Not-I.43   
The process of goal formation for the practical I begins not with an awareness of 
itself in this original act of intuiting; rather the awareness of the I to itself only comes 
when, from the sphere of the determinable (a manifold that is infinitely divisible), the 
practical activity of the I ‘selects what it wants’ from the sphere of the determinable.  In 
order for the I to posit itself, it must encounter resistance to its specific act of making the 
transition from the determinable to the determinate; the transition to the determinate is a 
transition to the specific.  What is in the sphere of the determinable and what is in the 
sphere of the determinate are similar.  The major difference between these spheres comes 
 
42 Fichte, 164. 
43 Fichte, 164. 
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down to the intuition that the intellect has:  in the sphere of the determinable, the intuition 
is of possibility; in the sphere of the determinate, the intuition is of boundedness, of 
constraint and necessity.  The transition from the determinable to the determinate seems 
to be ‘the making of a selection’ from the sphere of the determinable.  The act of making 
the selection necessarily constrains the freedom of the practical I to the determinate that 
‘emerges’ from the commitment made.  The act of making the selection entails that there 
must be something given in order for something to be chosen.  The act of choosing is also 
the submission to the given ‘constraints’ that articulate the particular choice.   
Again, since the sphere of the determinable is an infinitely divisible manifold, 
nothing within that sphere would ‘halt’ the activity of the practical I, so to speak.  That 
sphere on its own is insufficient to complete the subjective I coming to be aware of itself 
as something through its own action.  No clear determinations between the ‘beginning’ 
and the ‘end’ of the action could be discerned solely through the sphere of the 
determinable.  “In order to become conscious of myself, I have to act freely. But this is 
impossible apart from the construction of a concept of the action [in question], which is, 
in turn, impossible apart from a sphere of what is determinable; for, if I am to exercise a 
free choice, I must be presented with a manifold. [Mere] multiplicity, however, is 
[nothing more than] opposability. Consequently, if consciousness is to exist, everything 
in this manifold must not simply be opposed to everything else; for in this case it would 
be nothing at all. Instead, something positive has to be supposed.}”44  Without the sphere 
of the determinate, without the sphere of something given to halt the activity of the 
concept-forming I, the I could never have an intuition of itself as self-positing.  In 
 
44 Fichte, 170. 
49 
 
contrast to the infinitely divisible manifold of the sphere of the determinable, there must 
be a sphere made up of something not merely possible, but something indivisible and 
real.  The presence of the indivisible means that the activity of the I to ‘peruse’ the sphere 
of possibility is halted, for the I is confronted with something that is (relatively) 
impenetrable.   
The process of the activity that is making the transition from the determinable to 
the determinate involves both the expansion or expansive aspect of the practical activity 
of the I to posit an infinitely divisible manifold and the positing of the resistance to that 
very expansive aspect of the activity through the ‘halting power’ of the indivisible 
something.  The activity that has been constrained by the I itself through the ‘something’ 
that resists the practical I is now an activity that is suppressed, or an activity that is also a 
being.  Fichte’s deduction has shown that at the root of the activity of self-positing is the 
intuition of the union between two contradictory elements:  activity and being; expansion 
and resistance.  The intuition of this union is a something in the form of a drive, “a self-
engendering striving.”45  The drive is both the positing of activity in the form of striving 
and of constraint on that activity in the form of resistance. 
However, once the concept of the drive reveals itself in our genetic deduction, a 
new challenge arises:  while we have already established that the ‘activity’ of the action 
is grounded in the subject, we cannot claim that the ‘being’ of the action is also grounded 
in the subject.  If the being of the action were grounded in the subject, then the I would be 
unable to treat being as being, but as merely activity:  the drive would merely be yet 
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another way in which the I merely affects itself, with no action ‘attaining’ actuality in an 
objective sense.  Pure self-affection amounts to the sheer and complete coincidence of the 
ideal and real activities; such a coincidence, Fichte states, would amount to being the 
self-consciousness of God, an unlimited state that is the pure identity between subject and 
the object.46  However, in making the transition from the determinable to the determinate, 
the I intuits its own limitation, its limitedness.  What we are pursuing now is an account 
of how the I intuits itself as limited in a way that is not drawing on the subject alone.   
We are approaching the moment in the deduction where Hegel charges Fichte with 
failing to go beyond the subject in a way that sufficiently addresses its own task in the 
deduction.  Again, if the absolute identity of the I nevertheless posits a kind of absolute 
opposition between the I itself and what is beyond the I, the indeterminate, then said 
opposition is evidence from Hegel’s perspective of an incomplete synthesis of the 
Absolute. 
2.5 The Positive and Feeling 
Fichte states at this point in the deduction that the consciousness of intuition is 
insufficient to be the consciousness that accompanies the conscious awareness of the 
drive; put differently, the consciousness of the drive requires the consciousness of 
something original, something that precedes all acting.47  Since our focus has been on the 
consciousness of the intuition of practical activity of the I, this ‘shape’ of consciousness 
is not the one that must accompany the conscious awareness of the drive.  Put differently, 
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the ‘something original’ that must be prior to any action that the I takes must be 
‘available’ to the I as an immediate material consciousness.48  Here we see the change of 
focus from the being of the subject-object, the being that is also an activity, to the being 
of something real, a being that is positive and utterly opposed to activity.   
Fichte states that for such a consciousness, the ideal and real aspects of the I would 
coincide in the encounter with the positive, and the coincidence of the ideal and the real 
here must simply be an object for consciousness.  The result of this coincidence is an 
immediate consciousness of a feeling.  “A feeling is nothing more than an act of positing 
a determinate state of the I.”49  The immediate consciousness of a feeling differs from the 
immediate consciousness of the I’s own activity because there is no awareness of 
relationship between I and the Not-I here.  Rather, what is posited is not a state of self-
affection by the I; instead, what is posited is a state of affection – a feeling.  “Insofar as 
activity is present, the feeling is related to the I; but insofar as passivity is present, it is 
related to a Not-I - though this is discovered within the I.  In factual terms, feeling is what 
comes first and is original.”50 
Feelings are the elementary ‘states’ that populate the manifold of possible action 
for the I.  Prior to any action taken by the I, the manifold is populated by something 
positive, something that cannot be explained further.  A feeling is a ‘limit’ on 
consciousness because no further articulation of a feeling is possible.  In order for the I to 
select a possible action from the sphere of determinability, there must be multiple 
feelings, multiple ways in which the drive of the I may be affected.  Just as we begin by 
 
48 Fichte, 175. 
49 Fichte, 176. 
50 Fichte, 176. 
52 
 
positing the freedom of the I as absolute, so must we posit the feelings of the manifold as 
absolute.  The absoluteness of multiple feelings turns out to be the condition necessary 
for the absolute act of the I to make a choice; both freedom and feeling, themselves, 
cannot be grounded in more foundational structures.  Through an absolutely free act, the I 
is to make a commitment in the world, where the I does so by drawing from the manifold 
that the I is related to through feelings.   
A problem arises:  the ideal activity of the subject is to construct a concept of the 
goal from the manifold of feeling in order to ‘complete’ itself, but a feeling can never be 
an object for the ideal activity, and therefore there is no halting to the activity of the 
subject at this point.  The distinction between the ideal activity, the subject that has an 
intuition of the subject-object, and feeling is that the ideal activity requires something 
beyond itself in order to be complete.  Feeling just is the immediate and inseparable 
identity of the real and the ideal.  The ‘completion’ of the ideal activity requires an object 
that is independent of it.  The feeling is the limitation on the I, but on the I in terms of its 
real activity.  The feeling is the state of the I that is limited according to its being, to its 
real activity.  However, the limitation associated with the feeling does not enter into the 
‘domain’ of the ideal activity of the subject as intellect.  The ideal activity of the subject 
cannot be halted by a feeling because the limitation of the feeling does not penetrate and 
constrain the thinking I.  In short, the ideal activity of the I goes beyond the real activity 
of the I as feeling because the ideal activity is rooted in the unconditioned free act of 
thinking.   
While feelings are the ‘answer’ to the question posed earlier from the perspective 
of the real activity, feelings do not satisfy or halt the ideal activity of the subject.  The 
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problem seems to be that what is made present to the I in terms of feeling is not 
knowledge of the object; rather, the I simply feels itself.  If we were to claim that 
knowledge of the object is merely a copy or representation of the feeling of the object, 
then we would be in error:  feeling is never feeling of the object, but the feeling of the 
self.  So, while it appears that we obtain knowledge of objects through representations, 
these representations cannot originate solely from feelings. Given the reciprocal 
determination between striving and limitation, expansion and resistance, the presence of 
feelings to the I is also the occasion for the I as intellect to ‘go beyond’ feelings, to reflect 
upon the limitation that the I as intellect encounters.   
2.6 The Indeterminate from Hegel’s Perspective: 
Through our exploration of Fichte’s system, we have established that (1) the I is 
only able to come to have awareness of itself through the process of making the 
determinable determinate, and (2) underlying the process is the indeterminate that 
‘prompts’ the I to intuit its own limitations.  The result is that every determination of the I 
is rooted in the I, but where determinations of what the I posits as objective involves the 
determination of something undetermined.  For Hegel, the presence of the undetermined 
is the mark of the objective that is not simply grounded entirely in the subject as absolute.  
From the perspective of empirical consciousness, there is an undetermined, an X.  “[P]ure 
consciousness, since it is a positing of itself, can neither produce this X from itself nor 
conquer it; instead, it must presuppose it.”51  The I posits itself as being conditioned by a 
limitation, but the I also posits that this limitation is in itself grounded in something 
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undetermined.  In Fichte’s system, pure consciousness does not posit the X itself; rather, 
the absolute acts of the I as I posit the ‘space’ for an X; the content of the X remains 
undetermined; X amounts to an undetermined determined as such by an act of 
consciousness.  The issue before us now, then, is whether the theoretical faculty is 
capable of suspending the opposition between pure consciousness and empirical 
consciousness given the presence of the X.   
Before proceeding further, we must note the difference between pure consciousness 
producing X and presupposing X.  To be sure, Fichte’s system does not hold that pure 
consciousness produces X, for if that were the case, the idealism would be reduced to the 
domain of the subject and nothing more.  In order to incorporate objectivity within the 
idealism, Fichte’s system holds that while pure consciousness does not produce X, it does 
presuppose X.  The act of presupposing X is the determination made by consciousness 
that there is an undetermined, an X.  Pure consciousness ‘produces’ the need to go 
beyond feeling towards some object, but it does not ‘produce’ the content of the object; 
the determinations of the object beyond its transcendental structure are not made solely 
by pure consciousness.  In doing so, pure consciousness involves the positing of a sphere 
that is not immanent to consciousness; this positing of an undetermined sphere is an 
absolute act of the I, where that very act reveals (and ‘embraces’) the undetermined 
character of that sphere, the essential determination of the undetermined.   
In order to deduce the objective world from an act of absolute freedom, Hegel 
states, the positing of the objective world as opposing the subject must be understood as a 
limitation imposed on the subject, the divisible I, by itself.  In other words, while the 
positing of pure consciousness brings about the positing of a not-I, pure consciousness 
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also posits freely that the subject is limited by the essential undetermined something = X.  
Pure consciousness posits both the ‘role’ of the something = X in the actuality of 
consciousness and that the something = X limits the subject.  The positing of the 
limitation by consciousness itself maintains the free acts of consciousness as the sole 
ground for positing the objective world.  Absolute freedom is no longer one factor among 
others that produces the subject, the objective world, and the limitation of the subject 
imposed by the objective world.  These productions remain entirely grounded in free acts 
of pure consciousness.  The limitation imposed by the something = X is immanent to 
consciousness itself.  “The objects are only posited in order to explain this limitation; and 
the self-limiting of intelligence is the only real.”52  Pure consciousness brings about its 
own limitations through free acts, but these limitations are themselves incomprehensible 
insofar as these limits reflect the undetermined character of the something = X.  So, while 
the limitation of pure consciousness by the check is immanent, what must be encountered 
in order for the limitation to have reality remains an undetermined and incomprehensible 
fact that is, in an important sense, beyond the subject.   
2.7 The Problem of Appealing to the Incomprehensible: 
The check within Fichte’s system serves as the motivation for the self-positing of a 
limitation that halts the real activity of the I, resulting in feelings; but the check also 
serves as motivation for the positing of a something that is beyond the subject which halts 
the ideal activity.  Put differently, the I encounters an incomprehensible primitive fact, an 
indeterminate X, and this encounter serves two roles:  (1) the I encounters the 
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indeterminate as a limitation on itself, one that turns out to be accompanied by feelings of 
necessity that cannot be further penetrated by philosophical thinking; (2) in the very same 
encounter, the I turns back towards itself.  The incomprehensible primitive fact reveals 
both the I in its finitude, limited by what the I ultimately interprets as the world of being, 
and the I in its infinitude, expressed as infinite striving.   
From the deduction of the pure, self-positing I, the role of the check has been 
established as critical to the actualization of the I as a self-consciousness.  Hegel 
interprets the ‘roles’ of the check and the indeterminate in the following manner:  “The 
objective world supervenes upon pure knowledge as something alien that completes it.  It 
does this by way of an inference from there being something missing in the point of 
attachment to the necessity of what is missing, an inference from the incompleteness of 
the Absolute, which is itself just one part, to the other part that completes it.”53  Since the 
opposition to the activity of the I requires the ‘presence’ of the indeterminable, the 
structure of the I admits both of a ‘lacking’ within itself and a kind of fulfillment of that 
‘lacking’ in the indeterminable.  From Hegel’s perspective, Fichte’s I does not begin with 
the intuition of a complete Absolute.  Rather, the Absolute finds its completion through, 
in part, the productive activity of the I.  The I realizes itself as a kind of totality through 
an abstraction from what is alien and indeterminable.   
In Thinking Through the Wissenschaftslehre, Breazeale argues that while the check 
plays a role in the self-limitation of the I, more importantly, the check also serves as a 
kind of impetus for the I.  “For the intellect, the Anstoß is not so much a limit or check as 
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it is an impulse or stimulus, an occasion for further positing. Thus, even here in its initial 
occurrence, the term does not simply designate an obstacle to or check upon the activity 
of the I, but also something that impels or provokes further activity on the part of this 
same I—activities of self-determination (and hence of “self-limitation,” inasmuch as all 
determination involves limitation).”54  With respect to the ideal activity of the subject, the 
check is the summons towards a further positing.  The activity cannot be satisfied through 
the resistance encountered as feeling, and the I is provoked to address this dissatisfaction, 
this lacking.  “Even as the I posits itself as finite and determinate, however, it inevitably 
(at least according to Fichte) finds itself dissatisfied with this very determinacy and 
finitude, since the latter conflicts with its immediate practical awareness of—indeed 
insistence upon—its own lack of any essential determinacy.”55  Breazeale argues that the 
check is grounded in the incomprehensible, revealing a sheer givenness that is essential in 
the self-positing of the I:  without this sheer givenness of the incomprehensible, the I 
would not both encounter resistance and be provoked to go beyond that resistance.  The 
encounter with the incomprehensible by the I also is the encounter of its own finitude as a 
lacking that needs to be addressed, and through this encounter the finite I comes to have 
awareness of its own absoluteness as incomplete. 
From Hegel’s perspective, the problem seems to be that the insight of an 
incomplete Absolute, one that ‘moves towards’ its completion in the check, presupposes 
a kind of awareness or insight into a complete absolute.  Put differently, Hegel seems to 
be arguing that the insight into the deficient aspect of the Absolute, or the need for the 
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Absolute to find its completion in a part beyond itself, could only be possible given a 
prior insight into a complete Absolute:  the concept of the Absolute that actualizes itself 
as Absolute only through encountering the indeterminable is derivative of the concept of 
the Absolute that is complete in and of itself.  Hegel asks the following questions:  “Why 
does not this idea of the totality itself, the measure against which pure knowing shows 
itself to be incomplete, step forth as the Absolute?  Why is the Absolute [in Fichte] 
something that is recognized as being only a part and as deficient?”56  The essential role 
that the indeterminable plays in the actualization of self-consciousness, for Hegel, is akin 
to holding that the Absolute of the I encounters the indeterminable X as alien.  While 
Fichte’s system provides an account for how the I, through its own self-activity 
incorporates the encounter of the indeterminable into self-consciousness, the problem is 
that Fichte’s system begins with a conception of the Absolute that is incomplete or 
merely on the way to being Absolute.  The supposing of a relationship between the 
Absolute and the indeterminable is, from Hegel’s perspective, the smuggling in of an 
immediate opposition between the I and nature expressed in the logic of the check.  No 
philosophical justification is provided to show how the concept of totality is expressed as 
a totality that is limited by what is alien to that totality.  Rather, the opposition between 
the I on its way towards being Absolute and the indeterminable is rooted in a problematic 
inference of part to part, where no insight into the whole justifies what constitutes a part.   
Whereas we might describe dogmatism as the expression of the part that is the 
indeterminable holding superiority over the part that is the I, the deduction present within 
Fichte’s system is the expression of the reverse, what Hegel calls the flipping of the 
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signs.  “[T]he result of the abstraction [i.e., pure knowing] is directly but negatively 
connected with what it was abstracted from, and the latter is present in a negative form in 
the former.  In pure knowing, the world of sense is posited as a minus, the world of sense 
has been abstracted from, it has been negated.”57  The charge against Fichte is that the 
deduction determines the world of sense as connected to the alien indeterminate, and the 
account of the world of sense for the self that is grounded in the abstraction away from 
the indeterminate is therefore poisoned by the arbitrary assignment of the positive sign to 
the I, to pure knowing.  The relationship between the I and the world of being is rooted in 
the positing of what is positive and what is negative; a sufficient philosophical 
justification for this positing, Hegel argues, is not provided by Fichte, and yet the 
Absolute employed by Fichte operates as if this justification has in fact been provided.   
From Hegel’s perspective, treating the I as an Absolute that finds its completion in 
the encounter with the indeterminate amounts to the defining of a part against a part; the 
concept of the whole is not properly employed.  The idea of totality, Hegel argues, is 
present in the first principle of Fichte’s system insofar as the I posits itself absolutely, as 
an unconditioned activity of self-production.  Behind this first principle is the concept of 
a totality; underlying the activity of the self-positing pure I is the concept of an Absolute.  
But the self-positing of the pure I is accompanied by the absolute positing of the finite I 
and the absolute positing of the not-I.  Thus, the logical ‘tension’ between the I and the 
Not-I is revealed in the first principle of Fichte’s system.  The task of the I is, in the face 
of the tension between the I and the Not-I, to posit itself as an absolute identity.  “But 
precisely because something recognized as a part and as deficient is supposed to have 
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absolute truth and certainty, it is impossible that the entire progression should be 
totality.”58  I take Hegel to be claiming that since the first principle of Fichte’s system 
reveals, in the conjunction of absolute acts, that the pure I is a part, and that a genetic 
deduction moving from part to part cannot be a totality.  Interestingly, Hegel states that at 
the level of pure experience, a totality that ‘begins’ with a part is possible, for pure 
experience makes no immediate claim of, and has no recognition of itself as, being a part.  
Fichte’s system, however, reveals the I as a part and the indeterminate as a part.  The 
system of cognition is the transformation of the indeterminate that initially appears as a 
minus, as a something opposed to the self-positing I, into something that is a plus, the 
object.  “Fichte’s formal cognition, transforming the negatively given into something 
positive, does not begin with the whole, but proceeds from the part to other parts; so it 
cannot transcend its partiality either in presentational awareness generally or in 
cognition.”59  To be sure, Hegel is arguing that the absolute Idea must be present within 
Fichte’s system in some way:  the I in terms of its pure self-knowledge would not be able 
to recognize its own incompleteness without the presence of the absolute Idea.  However, 
the Idea is only present as a negative, as pointing towards the negativity of something 
else that is needed to complete the I.  “The abstraction from what is alien to the Ego was 
not a speculative abstraction, that is to say, the alien was not nullified.”60   
The hovering Idea of the Absolute, or what Fichte describes as the wavering of the 
Absolute in the productive imagination, is, from Hegel’s perspective, not the Idea of the 
Absolute proper, but the Idea of the Absolute insofar as it points to or reveals the 
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incompleteness of the subjective thinking.  In other words, the hovering of the Idea is the 
moment where the whole I is sundered into the subject and the object, but the sundering 
is formal or negative.  The sundering of the whole I into the subject and object is the 
putting forth of an opposition between the subject and object that cannot be overcome.  
Thus, the hovering of the Idea entails a starting point for thinking that is absolute but 
finite, and the ineliminable presence of the finitude of the I entails that a genuine 
cognition of the whole is not possible.  The incompleteness of the cognition on behalf of 
the I reveals the employment of the concept of the whole:  from the transcendental 
standpoint, the I has awareness of its incompleteness, and asserts its completeness to be 
in a union with what it posits as alien to it, where behind that positing of what is alien to 
the subject is the check, the primitive original fact that cannot be penetrated by thinking.  
The result of this thinking is that the totality becomes a set of finite thoughts or 
representations, and Nature must be understood only as a totality or a system because of 
its connection to the subject through a mutual lacking.  “[T]he system or rather – since a 
system [of Nature] is here unthinkable – the conglomerate of ideas necessary for ordinary 
consciousness appears first posited as a pure lack, and then linked up with the subject that 
lacks it, i.e., with the Ego.”61  What then becomes the dominating feature of our cognition 
of the whole is lack:  from either the side of the thinking subject or from the ‘content’ that 
is alien to the subject, the lack or the abstraction into the formal is what reveals itself as 
the ground of the cognition.  
The I as subject experiences the world as comprised of limitations that are rooted in 
the opposition between the real and the ideal, and these oppositions are never overcome 
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in the I as subject.  Put differently, Fichte’s system overcomes the opposition between the 
I and the not-I in abstract thinking.  From Hegel’s perspective, Fichte’s system “…turns 
the absolute thinking, the pure activity that is opposed to being, into the Absolute.  The 
overcoming of the opposition between the I and the not-I occurs only in abstract thinking, 
so the highest synthesis of Fichte’s system is relegated to and completed in an ‘Absolute’ 
that remains opposed to being.”62   
2.8 Conclusion: 
As a result of positing of the undetermined, pure consciousness makes its 
appearance as what Hegel calls defective.  The defective character of pure consciousness 
is its essential positing of the something = X that reveals the limitation of pure 
consciousness as the divisible I.  In other words, the defective character of pure 
consciousness crystalizes the possibility of deducing both the objective world and the 
subject that is limited by that world.  “The [I] posits an objective world because in 
positing itself it recognizes its own defectiveness, and consequently the absoluteness of 
pure consciousness falls away.”63  Another identity, Hegel states, is needed, one that both 
grasps pure consciousness and empirical consciousness and suspends the opposition 
between these two consciousnesses.   
While the freedom of pure consciousness has produced an identity between itself 
and empirical consciousness, this identity has purchase only in the abstraction of pure 
consciousness.  Furthermore, the I that is produced out of the free acts of pure 
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consciousness remains wrought with issues of finitude, incomprehensible limitations, and 
a freedom that is conditioned.  Hegel states that “[i]n the system freedom does not 
succeed in producing itself; the product does not correspond to the producing.”64  The 
acts of absolute freedom reveal the reality of consciousness as being conditioned by “an 
endless sequence of finitudes,”65  but where consciousness does not, as of yet, establish 
itself as a product of its own self-positing in a complete sense.  The object of pure 
consciousness is wholly itself, but the object of the theoretical faculty is pure 
consciousness as conditioned by something that has not been determined by the I.     
Idealism in general is organized around the fundamental position that the free acts 
of consciousness are enough to produce the objective world.  If, however, we are now 
claiming that the absolute freedom of consciousness is one factor among others that are 
involved in the production of the objective world and its relationship to the subject, then 
we are violating the fundamental tenant of idealism.  In other words, the role of the 
indeterminate in Fichte’s system is problematic, according to Hegel, insofar as the system 
‘accepts’ the indeterminate as an original and incomprehensible fact that is always 
opposed to the self-positing I.  Both the presence of the opposition and the need to view 
the opposition from the side of the subjective only entails that a point of absolute 
indifference cannot be achieved within the system.  We will revisit the role that the point 
of absolute indifference plays within the arguments found in the Natural Law essay in 
Chapter Five. 
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To be sure, the Wissenschaftslehre continues its program of articulating the 
absolute identity of the I = I, but it does so with the recognition of the limitations inherent 
in the theoretical faculty.  In order to assert the identity between pure consciousness in its 
acts with pure consciousness in its objectivity, we must go beyond the domain of the 
theoretical.  The transition to the practical faculty within Fichte’s system is necessary for 
pure consciousness as the divisible I to produce, through its own free acts in the objective 
world, an identity between itself and the divisible Not-I.  Put differently, the problem of 
halting the ideal activity of the subject requires us to explore the activity of setting a goal 
in more detail.  Chapter Three explores the relationship between the absolute identity of 
the I with itself and the philosophy of striving and the criticisms put forth by Hegel 
surrounding this part of the Fichte’s system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
CHAPTER 3. HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF FICHTE’S PHILOSOPHY OF STRIVING 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter explored several criticisms put forth by Hegel regarding 
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.  The focus of those criticisms was on the presence of the 
indeterminate within Fichte’s system.  Of course, for Fichte himself, the presence of the 
indeterminate does not entail the collapse of his philosophical system.  Rather, he argues, 
the presence of the indeterminate along with the way in which the resistance first appears 
to consciousness reveal not only the relative incompleteness of theoretical reason, but 
also the need for philosophy to turn towards practical reason in order to resolve some of 
the tensions that were made apparent in the previous chapter.  This chapter picks up the 
story of the Wissenschaftslehre found in the System of Ethics at the point where the need 
to turn towards practical reason is required to address the limitations of theoretical 
reason.   
We begin this chapter exploring why, for Fichte, practical reason is focused on 
addressing the tension between the fundamental drive of the pure I to posit itself as 
absolutely self-sufficient and the natural drive of the finite I to actualize itself in response 
to the limitations encountered in the world.  The focus of the explication of Fichte’s 
system here is how the concept of striving is employed within the system to address this 
fundamental tension:  striving is intended to mediate the relationship between the I as an 
infinite and absolute self-positing and the I as a finite being in nature.   
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Having established the central role that striving plays within Fichte’s system, this 
chapter then provides an account of a critique of the concept of striving put forth by 
Hegel in the Difference essay.  From Hegel’s perspective, the philosophical task of 
Fichte’s system is the construction of the absolute identity of the I = I.  This section 
focuses on a defence of Hegel’s claim that the concept of striving does not result in a 
complete synthesis.  We shall see that, for Hegel, the result of the deduction within 
Fichte’s system is a synthesis that fixes an opposition between the infinite and the finite 
to such a degree that the highest synthesis that can be accomplished by practical reason 
falls short of the philosophical task. 
To be sure, Hegel’s interpretation of the philosophy of striving is controversial, and 
this chapter does not intend to address whether Hegel’s interpretation is accurate or 
whether the criticism he puts forth is successful.  Instead, the focus of this chapter is to 
explore Hegel’s take on Fichte’s philosophy of striving in order to reveal the role that the 
point of absolute indifference plays within Hegel’s thinking.  This chapter closes with an 
examination of the point of absolute indifference both in terms of its impact on an 
account of natural law from a methodological perspective and in terms of its importance 
in reconceptualizing the relationship between freedom and nature. 
3.2 Fichte’s I as an Absolute Act of Willing: 
In order to explore the significance of Hegel’s criticism of Fichte’s philosophy of 
striving, we must first return to the thought of the I positing itself.  For Fichte, the 
substance we ascribe to the mere fact of consciousness is not passive reception.  The I as 
a substance can only be as an act of thinking or willing.  As discussed in the previous 
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chapter, the thinking consciousness only becomes objective, only becomes something 
‘actualized’ in conjunction with an act of counter-positing relative to some object that 
consciousness is directed towards.  From the standpoint of the philosopher, the only 
original way in which the I as substance can be found is as willing.  The act of willing 
presupposes necessarily an ‘outside’ that is external to the subject.  “[W]hat I will is 
never anything but a modification of an object that is actually supposed to exist outside of 
me.  All my willing is therefore conditioned by the perception of an object outside.”66  
The key part here is that willing is always objective, a manifestation of self-activity:  the 
act of willing is always directed towards the outside, and the origin of the concept of the 
outside is found in the real act of willing itself.  This is important insofar as it establishes 
the absoluteness of the willing.  We may abstract away from everything that is foreign to 
the willing, and in doing so we find the real act of willing (1) presupposes an outside to 
be modified but (2) that this act is nevertheless independent and absolute.   
Fichte uses the analogy of the compressed steel spring to articulate the absoluteness 
of willing.67  The compressed spring has within it a striving to push back against what 
presses on it, and so the ‘direction’ of this striving is outward.  Recall that the real act of 
willing presupposes within itself an outside that is to be modified by the act.  What we 
must focus our attention on now, says Fichte, is the proximate ground of the striving of 
the spring.68  We are not concerned with the conditions relating to the striving, but merely 
what is the proximate source of the striving outward.  For the spring, the striving is an 
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inner effect of the spring upon itself.  To be sure, the ground for the compression does not 
lie within the spring itself.  If we were to adopt the perspective of the steel spring, we 
would find that the willing of the spring occurs in a reciprocal interaction with the 
pressures exerted from without.  Similarly, the rational being, in order to determine itself 
as a willing, must take itself responding to an external ‘pressure;’ this is how willing 
appears to the rational being.  While the ground of the compression of the spring does in 
fact lie outside of the spring, the ground for the external pressure that confronts the 
rational being turns out to be, in an important sense, internal to the I.   
We are at this point only concerned with the spring itself, or the willing itself, and 
so we must abstract away from the external pressure on the spring, or the appearance of 
external pressure on the will.  If we abstract from this pressure, what remains of the 
spring is the inner tendency to strive outwards in the face of external pressure.  “[I]t is the 
inner tendency of the spring to determine itself to a counter-striving, understood as the 
genuine essence of elasticity and as the ultimate ground of all its appearances, just as 
soon as the conditions of their manifestation are present, a ground which cannot be 
explained any further.”69  The absolute character of the spring is to strive against 
pressure, and this striving is the ground of all its appearances in the world once that 
external pressure is present.  Our abstraction has revealed the ‘core’ of the spring, or what 
Fichte calls its “original tendency.”70 
While the I may change in its many manifestations, the substantial part of the I, the 
act of willing is fixed and enduring as an original tendency.  Since the act of willing 
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presupposes an outside that is modified through its acts, and since we are abstracting 
from anything beyond the ‘inner effect’ of the willing upon itself, our abstraction gives us 
the following result:  the willing self-consciousness’ inner effect is the “the tendency to 
determine itself absolutely, without any external impetus.”71  The self-activity of the I is 
purely for the sake of the I.  Awareness of the self-activity of the I must therefore come 
from the same I.  The I is the union of being and self-awareness, but where both of these 
are conditioned by the tendency towards absolute self-determination.   
Once the absoluteness of the acting I is brought under the concept, or is intuited by 
the intellect, then that real acting of the I, the tendency towards self-sufficiency, becomes 
freedom.  The intuition of the real acting that is brought before the intellect is the 
becoming for itself of the I, and the driving force behind this becoming is the concept, 
where the power of the concept brought to the fore is at the very core of freedom.  The I 
moves from an absolute that lacks force and self-awareness towards an absolute that has 
force and self-awareness, and it does so through its own self-activity, through its own 
intuition of itself.  While the resistance of the steel spring is conditioned by nature as an 
external force from without, the self-activity of the I ‘produces’ its own resistance and its 
own tendency to confront this resistance.  Therefore, only the intellect is capable of 
freedom, or capable of unconditioned self-activity for its own sake.  Since freedom is 
located within the ‘domain’ of the intellect, whatever the self-activity of the I is 
‘becoming,’ it must become that way via concepts, where these concepts are ultimately 
authored by the I. The resistance here posited by the I is the type that would halt the ideal 
activity of the subject explored in chapter two:  the positing of the need to go beyond the 
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limitation of feeling, makes its appearance in practical reason as the setting of goals.  In 
other words, it seems that what halts the activity of the ideal activity of the subject is, 
ultimately, the positing of an object that is associated with a goal.  Furthermore, the goal 
is ultimately related to the fundamental task of the I to express for itself what it is in itself 
– the expression of its self-sufficiency.  
We have established the ground of freedom as residing in the unconditioned self-
activity of the I as intellect, and we have also thereby established that there is no 
determination of the intellect, such as an essence or nature, that holds dominion over the 
intellect.  In order to be true to the unconditioned self-activity of the I, the ‘inner force’ of 
the intellect can only be understood as a power.  In short, the ‘being’ of the free intellect 
gives no clues to its actuality; only the free intellect, through its own activity, is merely a 
power, a power to determine its own actuality.  The goal at this point is to determine what 
it means for the I as subject to ‘hold’ the I as object, or to find out what turns out to be the 
objective expression of this inner power.  We must now explore how the I, in intuiting 
itself, comes to be aware for itself of its absolute tendency towards self-sufficiency.  
Fichte argues that the power of the I manifests itself as a grounding drive in relation 
to the I. The objective essence of the I is the unbreakable law of absolute self-activity for 
its own sake, and the subjective essence of the I is the drive that manifests itself in an 
effort to bring about a harmony between the subjective and the objective, to become for 
itself what it is in itself.  The I is unable to grasp itself purely as it is in and for itself.  
From Fichte’s perspective, the unthinkable unity is an “empty place” in the investigation 
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into human freedom.72  The reason why the ‘original’ unity of the I is unthinkable is 
because the unity is the subject-object, the absoluteness of the I, but thinking about this 
unity only takes place in terms of a subject that is different or distinguished from the 
object.  Since the ‘original’ unity of the I, the subject-object, is unthinkable, the 
absoluteness of the I, the tendency towards self-sufficiency, is thought by the I as apart 
from the substance of this self-activity.  In the separation brought about in the act of 
thinking, the I takes the absolute tendency of the I as the ground of the substance, “a 
drive that drives the substance.”73 
The drive is a determinate thinking, a thinking that is ‘produced’ according to the 
drive towards absolute self-activity.  We must be careful to note that the determinate 
thinking that is the result of the drive is not a thought that results from an object or a 
thought that is the necessary result of a prior act of thinking.  Instead, the determinate 
thinking related to the drive is a determination of the entire I, not just a ‘part’ of the I.  
Focusing on the form of this determinate thinking, the thought of the I “…is not 
conditioned by any other act of thinking, but itself conditions all other thinking.”74  The 
determinate thinking that is connected to the drive, then, is an immediate thinking, a 
thinking that is “determined absolutely through itself.”75  While we engage in all sorts of 
acts of thinking, the determinate thinking connected to the drive is the only thinking that 
accords with the essence of the I.  So, this determinate thinking is a kind of intellect 
intuition.  The manifestations of the drive, then, are not feelings, for that would mean the 
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drive operates according to the same ‘program’ as representations of objects; rather, the 
drive manifests in the intellect as thought.   
3.3 The Content of the Acts of Willing: 
Having established the form of the thoughts that are the manifestations of the 
absolute tendency towards self-sufficiency, Fichte moves on to explore the content of 
these thoughts.  The whole I cannot be grasped in thought as it really is; we can only 
grasp the I in thoughts showing how the subject determines the object and how the object 
determines the subject.  Our account of these two ‘pathways’ of the I must fill in for the 
ungraspable = X that is the entire I in its immediacy.  The first pathway is rooted in 
theoretical reason, where the subject is determined by the objective:  the content of the 
determinate thinking with respect to the subjective as determined by the object is an 
unbreakable law.  With respect to the pathway where the subject determines the object, 
thinking about the drive towards absolute self-sufficiency brings about a thought of “the 
unbreakable law of absolute self-activity” that the intellect gives to itself.76  The freedom 
of the I considered in the subjective reveals itself as a position of power, a power that is 
undetermined and could in principle be applied to anything.  So, in order for what is 
objective to be thought of as determined by what is subjective, the thought must be 
“conditioned by this subjective power…”77  The unbreakable law can only be given to the 
I if the I is free, and in the freedom of the I, the thought of the unbreakable law manifests 
itself.   
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The thought of self-sufficiency posited by the I, therefore, is categorical.  
Furthermore, the thought of self-sufficiency brings about the thought of the power of the 
I to bring about self-sufficiency, and the law that conditions the ‘deployment’ of this 
power.78  These thoughts are derived from thinking of the I as subject and the I as object, 
and the ‘unity’ constructed through reciprocal determination is how ordinary 
consciousness must think about itself given that it cannot grasp itself in its entirety in the 
immediate as the subject-object.   
In order for the reflecting I to become aware of a positive content of its own 
making, that positive content must be objective, and objectivity is only possible for the I 
that reflects on its own feelings.79  Fichte states that willing is directed towards some 
acting, but all acting is an acting upon some object.80  In willing its own freedom, the I is 
concerned with the act of self-determination; as a natural being, however, this act of self-
determination must involve an object, something perceptible.  Furthermore, acting upon 
objects in the world is only possible through the natural force of the I as a natural being.  
While the I is concerned with an act of self-determination, this act necessarily involves 
the natural world, the ‘home’ of objectivity for the I as a natural being.  The natural force 
of the I, then, turns out to be essential to the positing of the I’s freedom to itself 
objectively.81  
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The key development here is that, in the context of the I positing itself as active, the 
cause of the natural force is no longer unconscious nature, but the reflecting I.  This 
development is important insofar as it ensures that while the object of any act of willing 
is tied up in the world of objects, the positing of the I’s freedom to itself must not be 
under the ‘threat’ of being caused by nature.  All acts of willing turn out to be directed 
towards the world of objects, and the satisfaction of the natural drive is essential to all 
these acts.   
At this point in Fichte’s deduction, we must determine how can the I hold together 
the essential role of the natural drive in acts of willing all the while positing of the I’s 
freedom for itself in a way that retains the ‘purity’ of the I.  One might think that the 
satisfaction of the natural drive undermines the drive of the I to posit itself for its own 
sake.  Fichte argues that the essential role that the natural drive plays in all acts of willing 
does not annul or deny the drive towards the absolute.  “Although I find myself driven to 
do something that has its material ground solely within me, I never actually do anything 
nor can I ever do anything that is not demanded by the natural drive, because the latter 
exhausts the entire sphere of my possible acting.”82  The causality of the natural drive 
appears to be paramount, for all my acts of willing turn out to be empirical.  However, 
since we are focused on the I positing itself for its own sake, the causality of the pure 
drive must be given special accommodation.  In order to posit my own freedom to myself 
as an object, the causality of the natural drive is essential, but in order to posit my own 
freedom to myself at all, the causality of the pure drive is also essential.  So, we must 
understand how these two essential conditions of the I positing its own freedom to itself 
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as an object can be held together without contradiction.  The importance of holding these 
together without contradiction is essential to Fichte’s claim of absolute identity of the I:  
a contradiction would entail that the subjective and the objective could not ‘exist’ within 
the same I, within the same unthinkable unity.  The mark of an unresolvable contradiction 
between the subjective and the objective in the I positing itself as free would mean that 
the I as such that is the ground of the deduction could not be a unity.   
3.4 The Role of Infinite Striving in Practical Reasoning: 
The content of the willing I is rooted in the natural drive, and therefore every 
concept of an end that originates in the I must be directed towards some satisfaction of 
the natural drive.  The actual will is always conditioned by the natural drive.  The pure 
will, however, is ‘rooted’ simply in the pure drive, the drive towards absolute self-
sufficiency that originates in the I itself.  That the natural drive of the willing I is focused 
on the satisfaction brought about by the content of the willing does not mean that the pure 
drive also finds its satisfaction in the content of willing.  The natural drive finds its 
satisfaction in the content of actual willing; the pure drive finds its satisfaction in the 
willing that is directed solely towards the end of absolute self-sufficiency.  For Fichte, 
this apparent contradiction must be resolved in a way that satisfies both the natural and 
pure drives. 
Fichte argues that the resolution to this conflict is found in the intention of an 
action.  Willing freely means willing in a way that aims at complete independence from 
nature:  this is the freely chosen concept that aims at the satisfaction of the pure drive.  
Nothing inherent in the intention of the willing requires that the action based on this 
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concept is appropriate to the natural drive; instead, the natural drive is a limitation that 
the I confronts in any act of willing.  In other words, we are ‘condemned’ to carry out the 
action that aims at complete self-sufficiency within the ‘circuit’ of nature, but our 
condemnation to satisfy the natural drive in all our actual willing does not prove that the 
concept chosen by the I must be appropriate to the natural drive.  Instead, the limitation 
on our goal of absolute self-sufficiency brought about by the natural drive merely shows 
that the concept originating in the I that aims at self-sufficiency cannot find its 
satisfaction in any one action in the natural world.  While a singular action may satisfy 
the natural drive, no singular action may satisfy the pure drive.  If a singular action in the 
natural world would satisfy the pure drive, then the satisfaction of the pure drive would 
no longer be connected to the natural world by the necessity of the genetic derivation of 
the I, but limited absolutely by the natural world itself.  Therefore, we must conceive of 
the satisfaction of the pure drive only in the context of a series of actions, where the 
entire infinite series of actions aims at the absolute independence of the I.  The invoking 
of an entire series of actions as the resolution to a possible contradiction within the I turns 
out to be a primary point of contention for Hegel as we will see later in this chapter. 
Since the absolute independence of the I cannot be truly realized in the actual 
world, the series of actions that aims at the absolute independence of the I must be 
infinite.  No finite series of actions is capable of bringing about the satisfaction of the 
pure drive, for that finite series is always under the limitation revealed by the natural 
drive.  “Consequently, the final end of a rational being lies in infinity; it is certainly not 
an end that can ever be achieved, but it is one to which a rational being, in consequence 
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of its spiritual nature, is supposed to draw ceaselessly nearer and nearer.”83  The “ethical 
vocation” of the actual I is to strive infinitely towards absolute self-sufficiency, where 
any particular action has its ‘worth’ determined according to its place within the infinite 
series.84  For Fichte, the demand on the I is to fulfill its ethical vocation in every case:  
every action chosen by the I is subject to the demand of the pure drive, and in our striving 
towards our liberation from nature, we are never liberated from the demand of freedom as 
such.  The contradiction that arose in Fichte’s conception of the free I is resolved by 
placing the actual I under an infinite demand, and the I must strive endlessly towards this 
infinite goal utilizing content from the natural drive, but must not be beholden to any 
particular content.   
We must pause here to acknowledge the rigor and scope of Fichte’s conception of 
striving.  The structure of striving that is established by freedom as such entails that the 
actual I always finds itself under the demand of its ethical vocation:  there are no freely 
chosen actions that are not at least under the demand of the pure drive.  To be sure, the I 
may make choices that go against the pure drive, but the ‘reach’ of the demand exerted 
by the pure drive extends throughout all actions of the I.  Given that the satisfaction of the 
pure drive cannot be brought about in the finite world, the actual I finds itself subject to 
the formal demand of infinite striving.  Fichte states that not only must the actual I strive 
infinitely towards the goal of absolute self-sufficiency, the I is simultaneously dependent 
on the finite in its striving.85  The I must strive towards an unconditioned end, but can 
only do so in the conditioned, finite world.  For Fichte, this structure of freedom simply 
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reveals the divided nature of the I.  The I is comprised of two opposed aspects:   the finite 
and the infinite.  Given the structure of the I, Fichte argues, the ethical vocation of 
infinite striving is the only appropriate account of the I as subject becoming an object to 
itself.  The absolute identity between the I as subject and the I as object turns out to be a 
lifelong project, but one that does not reach a conclusion in the natural world.  For Fichte, 
identity remains a possibility for the I and identity continues to shape the projects of the I, 
but identity is never accomplished in the world by the finite I.   
3.5 Hegel and the Problem of Striving: 
Having established the role of striving within Fichte’s system, we now turn to 
Hegel’s interpretation and critique of the same.  The focus of this part of the chapter is on 
Hegel’s argument regarding the inability of the philosophy of striving to overcome the 
opposition between the infinite and finite within the I through practical action in the 
world.  Given the concept of identity that is at the heart of Fichte’s system, we shall then 
briefly explore why, for Hegel, this synthesis is incomplete and contributes to points of 
tension within Fichte’s moral and political thinking.   
The striving of the I as subject turns out to be the only path available to the I for 
addressing the demand placed on the finite I.  In pure consciousness, the product and the 
producing are identical, and this identity has reality.  So, the demand placed on the I as 
subject is appropriate insofar as this demand is in principle capable of being satisfied.  
This demand can be satisfied in the objective world because, according to the system, it 
has already been satisfied in the world of pure consciousness.  Furthermore, this demand 
should not be interpreted as a condition on freedom itself, for what is a demand for the I 
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as subject is already the case for the I as pure consciousness.  In other words, the rigorous 
demand on the I as subject has no place within the I as pure consciousness, for the task 
that motivates the demand on the I as subject has already been completed in pure 
consciousness.   
The I as subject that is opposed to the objective world is under the demand to 
produce itself as it already is – a free being that is not limited or conditioned by the 
objective world.  In order to address this rigorous demand on the I as subject, the subject 
must shape the objective world through its own free actions, thereby suspending the 
appearance of opposition and limitation in the objective world.  The subject makes what 
is not itself – the world – into itself through an infinite series of free actions that strive to 
turn the limitations of the undetermined into conditions of its own freedom.  By striving 
to bring comprehensibility to the incomprehensible through free actions in the objective 
world, the I as subject is on the trajectory to produce itself in the objective world as it 
really is in the world of pure consciousness.  Hegel’s interpretation of the philosophy of 
striving is that it is ultimately responding to the incomprehensible original fact. 
The defect of pure consciousness, Hegel argues, is the presence of the something = 
X that is opposed to the subject, where the something = X is incomprehensible.86  The 
presence of the undetermined within the opposition between the I as subject and the not-I 
as the incomprehensible limit means that pure consciousness is not yet in a position to 
assert an identity between itself as subject and itself as object.  While the practical faculty 
is the power of pure consciousness to overcome the apparent opposition between the I 
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and the not-I through the free actions of the I, the persistence of the opposition at this 
point in the deduction is due to the fact that the not-I appears to be determined by factors 
that go beyond the freedom of the I.  In other words, the incomprehensibility of the 
‘source’ of the not-I as limitation appears to undermine the original claim of the I as such 
to be absolutely free.  While the deduction has shown that the limiting ‘power’ of the not-
I is ultimately immanent to pure consciousness, more needs to be done in order to show 
that the presence of the limiting not-I does not ultimately undermine the freedom of the I 
as such.   
If the I were able to enter into a relationship with the not-I in such a way that the 
not-I were proven to be determined by the I, then the I as object would be equal to the I 
as subject.  In this context, the practical faculty is the power of the I to act on the not-I on 
the way towards suspending the incomprehensibility of the not-I in terms of its content.  
In other words, the practical faculty of the I has the goal of engendering a relationship 
between the I and the not-I, where the not-I is shown to be ultimately determined by the I.   
Hegel’s position is that a problem within Fichte’s deduction of practical reason 
arises at this point.  Recall that the overarching task of the deduction is to show the 
identity between the I as subject and the I as object.  For Fichte, the demand for identity 
between the I as subject and the I as object manifests itself in the practical faculty as an 
ought.  If the I as subject were capable of determining the I as object through its own 
actions, then the opposition between the I as subject and the I as object would be 
suspended.  However, the deduction has already proven that the opposition between the I 
as subject and the I as object is an absolute act of positing by the I as such.  Since the I as 
object cannot enter immediately into a relation of identity with the I as subject due to the 
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presence of the X, the ‘source’ of the incomprehensible, the I = I appears to be 
impossible.  “It is impossible for the Ego to reconstruct itself out of the opposition 
between subjectivity and the X that originates for it in a non-conscious producing, and so 
become one with its appearance.”87  The practical demand on the I as subject turns out to 
be a demand of striving infinitely towards an end that cannot be realized in principle.  
The I as subject and the I as object ought to be the same, but the I as subject is only able 
to prove that an identity between the two is on the horizon, but where reaching that 
horizon would be the self-destruction of the I.  While the unity or sameness between the I 
as subject and I as object occurs in pure thinking, this unity or sameness, from Hegel’s 
perspective, cannot be realized in the world.   
For Hegel, the presence of a demand that is satisfied in pure thinking but not in the 
world reveals a problem of identity within Fichte’s system.  At the outset, the task of the 
deduction was to show the absolute identity that operates within pure consciousness; 
now, however, “[p]ure consciousness no longer functions as absolute identity; in its 
highest dignity it is [now] opposed to the empirical consciousness.”88  Given the central 
role that the practical faculty occupies in Fichte’s system, the non-identity that turns out 
to be the aim of the faculty, revealed most clearly in the activity of striving, illuminates 
the “principle of non-identity” that permeates any developments or deductions that result 
from striving.89  The incorporation of non-identity into the system, for Hegel, brings 
about the shift in the system’s ‘focus’ from articulating absolute identity to finding 
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consistency in reflection.90  We shall see in the following that from Hegel’s perspective 
what motivates the concept of striving is the articulation of an absolute identity, but an 
identity that is consistent with the relationship between the infinite I as subject and the 
finite I as object.   
In order to unpack what for Hegel amounts to an identity that is formal and 
privileges the I as subject, we must explore the joining of the subjective I with the 
objective I:  the self-determination of finitude made by the subjective I is conditioned by 
the “Idea” of the objective I in its infinitude.91  Similarly, the objective I in its infinitude 
is determined by the “Idea” of the subjective I.  Put otherwise, the determinations made 
by both aspects of the I are reciprocal:  the subjective I receives the idea of infinity from 
the objective I, and the objective I receives the idea of finitude from the bounded 
existence of the subjective I.  “But since the subjective Ego does its determining 
according to the idea of infinity, it suspends the bounding once more.  While it makes the 
objective Ego finite in its infinity, it simultaneously makes it infinite in its finitude.”92  
For Hegel, the reciprocal determination does not suspend or reconcile the opposition 
between the subjective and the objective; instead, the opposition between the reality and 
the Idea persists.  The I as a whole consists of both real and ideal activity, but the union 
of these activities within the I remains partial.  “In the infinite progress of [the I’s] 
lengthened existence it endlessly produces more parts of itself, but it never produces itself 
in the eternity of intuiting itself as Subject-Object.”93  The presence of infinite striving 
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within Fichte’s conception of the I endures in the face of the reciprocal determination 
between the ideal, subjective I and the real, objective I.  The activity of the I, however, 
never produces itself in the concrete as a whole, but only itself as parts of an unrealizable 
whole.  In short, Hegel’s claim is that the actualization of the unity between the 
subjective and objective, the overarching task according to the system, turns out to be 
denied by that very system.   
While the problematic union between the subjective and the objective stated above 
is quite abstract, the claim made by Hegel is clarified through his analysis of the 
relationship between freedom and nature as a drive of the I.  Both freedom and drive have 
the I as such as their substance; in this respect, the I that thinks is the same as the I that 
feels.  To support this claim, Hegel draws on the following quote from Fichte:  “From the 
transcendental standpoint, my drive as natural being, and my tendency as pure spirit are 
the same basic drive, the drive that constitutes my being; but it is viewed from two 
distinct aspects…”94  The distinction between freedom and drive is ultimately based on 
appearance; freedom and drive are nevertheless rooted in the same basic drive of the I.  
However, the positing of the opposition between the subjective I and the objective I in 
practical reason reveals a distinction between freedom and nature, where one is the 
condition of the other:  the relation of different but equal in the transcendental standpoint 
has been replaced with a relation of one conditioning the other, one dominating the other.  
Nature determining itself turns out to be rooted in the thought that nature determines 
itself.  In other words, it seems to be the case that the essence of nature determines that 
nature determines itself.  Indeterminacy is the mark of the free being; the opposition 
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between nature and freedom is characterized along the line of determinacy; since nature 
is distinct from freedom, nature must not be indeterminate.  Nature is determined to 
determine itself in just one way.  Only a free being has the choice to determine itself in a 
certain way in relation to an opposition; but the free being may determine itself in another 
way in relation to the same opposition.  In short, the indeterminacy of the free being is 
made manifest in determination of itself that lacks necessity; for any determination made 
by the free being, another determination remains a real possibility.  For nature, it is 
determined to determine itself in only one way.   
Given this sharp distinction between nature and freedom, the resulting synthesis 
engenders the construction of an identity rooted in a dichotomy into totality.  “I, as 
intelligence, as the undetermined – and I who am driven, [I] as nature, as the determined, 
shall become the same through the raising of impulse into consciousness.”95  Within the I, 
then, is the ‘call’ for the identity between the undetermined and the determined.  The 
identity that results from this synthesis entails a distinction between the higher drive and 
the lower drive:  the higher drive is the I as subject that does the reflecting; the lower 
drive is the I as nature.  Furthermore, the lower drive is subservient to the higher drive.  
“This relation of subservience which one appearance of the self has to the other is to be 
the highest synthesis.”96  The problem, Hegel argues, is that the identity that is the 
starting point of the deduction – the I as subject and the I as object, where both are rooted 
in the same substance of the I as such – is not the same as the ‘identity’ that is the result 
of synthesizing freedom and nature at this later point in the deduction.  The equality 
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between the subject and object in the identity operative at the starting point has been 
replaced with an identity that holds the subject and object to be unequal.  “They stand in a 
relation of causality instead; one of them goes into servitude, and the sphere of necessity 
is subordinated to that of freedom.  Thus the end of the system is untrue to its beginning, 
the result is untrue to its principle.”97  The identity that is found in the highest synthesis in 
Fichte’s system is formal, Hegel argues, since the subject and object remain divided.    
Hegel summarizes the synthesis as follows:  The pure drive of the I aims at 
determining itself absolutely towards activity for the sake of activity.98  Again, the pure 
drive is focused on activity for activity’s sake because that is what, for Fichte’s I, is the 
ground for any activity whatsoever; since the essence of the I is absolute self-
determination through its own activity, the pure drive is the unending drive towards 
freedom, or activity as the sole path towards absolute self-determination.  But the pure 
drive is immediately confronted with the objective drive, or the I as object.  Since the 
objective drive is nevertheless within the I as such, the I as object reveals itself as a 
system of self-limitations posited by the I.  Freedom and nature, the pure drive and the 
objective drive, are to be united within the I, for the I as such is the source of all drives.  
A tension lingers within the union:  Fichte situates the pure drive as the fundamental 
drive towards absolute self-determination; but the synthesis of freedom and nature would 
be problematic insofar as the objective drive, nature, does not aim at self-determination, 
but self-limitation.  The infinity of the pure drive is preserved in the synthesis of freedom 
and nature only if final purpose of the objective activity is absolute freedom, or, what 
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amounts to the same, absolute independence from nature.  We have already determined 
that if the I as subject were equal to the I as object, the I would no longer be free.  
Fichte’s concept of infinite striving is introduced in order to overcome the tension that 
would arise in the sheer and immediate union of freedom and nature.  Infinite striving 
functions within Fichte’s system as a way of ‘overcoming’ the tension within the union of 
freedom and nature, but done in such a way that recognizes the impossibility of the 
actualization of the I = I.  While the final purpose of absolute independence from nature 
cannot be achieved, the I nevertheless strives towards absolute independence in an 
infinite series.  Each moment in the infinite series would then be understood as an 
actualization brought about by the I as subject that is on the way towards the end of 
absolute independence.  “Where one expects the supreme synthesis one finds always the 
same antithesis between a limited present and an infinity extraneous to it.”99  Hegel 
reminds us that at the outset of the deduction the synthesis to be carried out was the I = I, 
the I as an absolute totality.  “In the system, however, the [I] does not get that far, and it 
never will, once time is to be mixed in; the Ego is absolutely infected with a non-Ego, 
and can only ever posit itself as a quantum of Ego.”100 
The problematic path that the Fichtean I takes in realizing itself in the world 
involves the positing of the opposition between the infinite and the finite, and the 
resolution to this opposition is always on the horizon of practical action.  The continued 
positing of independence and dependence by the drives of the I entails a fixing of the 
drives at the level of the Concept.  In reflection, Hegel states, “…the intellect has 
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succeeded in fixing the rational as an absolute opposite in the form of an Idea.  For 
Reason itself nothing is left but the impotence of self-suspending requirements and the 
semblance of a formal mediation of nature and freedom by the intellect through the mere 
Idea of the suspension of the antitheses, the Idea of the independence of the [I] and the 
absolute determinacy of nature which is posited as something to be negated, something 
absolutely dependent.  But the antithesis itself has not vanished.  On the contrary, it has 
been made infinite; for as long as one of its terms has standing the other has too.”101  So, 
the positing of the infinite horizon that is essential to the I is, from Hegel’s perspective, 
positing of the opposition between freedom and nature that is fixed as absolute from the 
perspective of practical reason.   
3.6 Implications for Fichte’s Moral and Political Philosophy: 
Having established the presence of reflection at the highest synthesis in Fichte’s 
deduction, Hegel turns towards the implications of Fichte’s system as it pertains to 
political and moral philosophy.  We must track the impact that a persistent opposition 
within the synthesis of freedom and nature has on the deduction of rightful relations 
among free human beings.  For Hegel, the community of human beings within Fichte’s 
system is marked with an absolute separation of freedom and nature:  human beings are 
‘dualized’ in Fichte’s account insofar as, on the one hand, the human being is a free and 
rational being, but, on the other hand, the human being is matter in the world that can be 
treated like a thing among other things.   
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The problem, Hegel argues, is that the formal unity between freedom and nature 
within the individual, where freedom dominates nature, is empty of content.  Freedom 
can only prove its dominance over nature through the content that is provided by nature.  
Invoking the content of nature complicates the unity sought by the individual because 
nature provides an infinite number of possible points of action.  If the I is to have 
absolute causality with respect to the world, then the world of nature must be suspended 
by the I.  The content provided by nature is an infinite manifold; in order to suspend the 
world, in order to actualize its dominance over nature, the I must carry out an action 
whose content is drawn from nature; the manifold of nature, however, provides a myriad 
of possible actions, where each action may be understood as an absolute duty, an action 
that expresses the absolute causality of the I.  In other words, the I seeks to act according 
to an absolute duty, for only the absoluteness of the duty accords with the program of 
freedom having complete dominance over nature.  However, the manifold provided by 
nature contains duties that are opposed to one another.  “If the duties deduced [by the I] 
are absolute, they cannot collide.  Yet they collide necessarily because they are 
opposite.”102  To be sure, because the duties are absolute with respect to each other, the 
free individual may choose between them, but because the duties collide with one 
another, the individual must choose between them.  A tension arises in the necessity of 
the choice. Since each duty is absolute, there seems to be nothing available to the I to 
‘help make’ the choice from the perspective of the concept of duty itself; the criterion of 
a possible choice, with respect to the I as such, is simply that it be an absolute duty.   
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We must now turn to the preference of the individual as a possible mechanism for 
making a choice.  If the act of self-determination according to a duty is to occur, it 
appears that one duty must be preferred to the others, invoking the contingency of 
inclination into the process.  “If whim and the contingency of inclinations are excluded 
from the self-determination of freedom through the highest concept, then self-
determination now passes over into the contingency of insight and hence into sheer 
unawareness of what it is that decides a contingent insight.”103  Again, if whim and 
personal preference are not viable mechanisms for the I’s determining of itself, then the 
only possible mechanism left is contingent insight, where the I remains unaware of why 
one particular insight makes its appearance as contributing to the feeling of harmony.  
For Hegel, the problem with invoking insight in the process of making a choice for the 
sake of self-determination is that the contingency of the insight does not “…satisfy the 
ethical impulse which aims at necessity.”104  The presence of contingency within the 
process of moral decision making is counter to the intent of the process – self-
determination according to the concept of freedom.  Given that contingency and necessity 
are present ‘on the same level,’ the proof of the concept’s dominance over nature is 
undermined. 
Hegel emphasizes that within Fichte’s system, the turn towards the political 
involves a conception of freedom that turns out to be purely negative.  The highest 
synthesis within Fichte’s system is the deduction of the final purpose of freedom and the 
activity of the I that is essential to the realization of that purpose through an infinite series 
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of moments.  In Fichte’s political philosophy, the freedom of the rational being must be 
surrendered for the sake of the freedom of all rational members of the community.  “So 
freedom must suspend itself in order to be freedom.”105  The condition that the freedom 
of the individual must be surrendered for the sake of the freedom of all individuals in the 
community, for Hegel, means that freedom is a negative, an indeterminate.  As an 
individual in principle, the rational being is absolute indeterminateness; in order for that 
rational being to be a member of a community, the rational being must limit her freedom.  
In the face of others, the rational being is brought into synthesis with its finitude.  But, 
since freedom for the rational being in the context of others is always freedom limited, 
the opposition between the freedom of the individual and the community persists.  For 
Hegel, the problematic and incomplete synthesis of freedom and nature within Fichte’s 
system amounts to an opposition between freedom and the community that cannot be 
suspended in principle:  the negativity of freedom persists in the self-limitation carried 
out by the individual in the face of other individuals.  The free community in Fichte’s 
system is plagued with opposition:  all communal relations within Fichte’s are 
conditioned by the act of self-limitation, the very act which fortifies the opposition 
between the absolute indeterminateness of the individual and the relative determinateness 
of the community. 
Hegel refers to the state of the relationship between the free individual and the 
tyrannical community as one of “indigence and necessity.”106  The natural law of Fichte’s 
system results in a kind of poverty of the free individual insofar as the life of the 
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individual, a life that is free from necessary and limiting constructions erected by the 
community, is enclosed by the system of natural law in all its rigidity.  Hegel emphasizes 
the problematic aim of Fichte’s conception of the community in a particularly beautiful 
piece of prose:  “This community under the dominion of the intellect is not presented [by 
Fichte] as one that is bound to make it its supreme law to suspend this indigence of life in 
which it is placed by the intellect, and to suspend this endless determination and 
domination in the true infinity of a beautiful community where laws are made 
superfluous by customs, the excesses of an unsatisfied life by hallowed joys, and the 
crimes of oppressed forces by the possibility of activities directed towards great objects.  
But instead the lordship of the concept and the bondage of nature are made absolute and 
extended infinitely.”107  Within Fichte’s state the freedom of the individual is infinitely 
bounded insofar as anything under the purview of the state may be determined as an 
action against the law; the self-limitation of the freedom of the individual is confronted 
with the infinite bounding that may be brought about by the state and its laws.  The 
dualized reality of the I as both infinite and finite manifests itself in Fichte’s political 
philosophy insofar as the individual is both an infinite indeterminacy in itself and a finite 
determinacy with respect to her relationship with the state.  The latter half of this 
dissertation project explores what it means from Hegel’s perspective to explore the 
relationship between the individual and the state that is not based on the dualized I, and 
we shall see that the Idea of absolute ethical life addresses this issue explicitly.   
Finally, the way to address the shortcomings of Fichte’s pursuit of absolute identity 
is, from Hegel’s perspective, found in the notion of the point of absolute indifference.  
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Like the Idea of absolute ethical life, the point of absolute indifference will serve to 
ground an account of the reality of human freedom in a way that allows for the 
actualization of a concrete identity.  To be sure, the complexities surrounding the point of 
absolute indifference are explored in more detail later in this project.  For now, we need 
only concern ourselves with an introductory take on the importance of absolute 
indifference in relation to Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s philosophy.   
Fichte’s system begins with an absolute identity, the I = I.  As the deduction of the 
system is carried out, however, the principle of identity turns out to be not the principle of 
the system in its expression.  The principle of identity gives way to an entrenched and 
absolute opposition that reveals itself as the core practical reason.  The abandonment of 
the principle of identity means that the Subject-Object cannot be brought under the 
domain of an absolute intuition; instead, given the fixedness of the opposition between 
freedom and nature, the positing of the Subject-Object remains a subjective positing.  In 
order for an objective positing of the Subject-Object to be made actual, the opposition 
between the inside and the outside, between the I and the not-I, must be suspended; since 
practical reason is incapable of suspending this opposition, the positing of the Subject-
Object remains trapped within subjectivity.  “For absolute identity to be the principle of 
an entire system it is necessary that both subject and object be posited as Subject-Object.  
In Fichte’s system identity constitutes itself only as subjective Subject-Object.  [But] this 
subjective Subject-Object needs an objective Subject-Object to complete it, so that the 
Absolute presents itself in each of the two Subject-Objects, and finds itself perfected only 
in both together as the highest synthesis that nullifies both insofar as they are 
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opposed.”108  The highest synthesis between the subjective Subject-Object and the 
objective Subject-Object, then, occurs in the indifference point, for the indifference point 
is the explicit presence of the Absolute in both Subject-Objects.  In other words, the 
completion of the synthesis according to Hegel is not the suspension of subjectivity for 
the sake of the objective Subject-Object; rather, the complete synthesis reveals itself in 
the mutual positing of the Absolute in both the subjective and objective.  In this sense, the 
opposition between the subjective and the objective is suspended insofar as there is no 
more concern for where the positing of the Absolute resides, either in the subjective or 
the objective; while the opposition between the subjective and objective remains, the 
opposition is suspended insofar as both posit the Absolute.  From the perspective of the 
Absolute, there is no difference between the subjective positing or the objective positing.  
“As their point of absolute indifference, the Absolute encloses both, gives birth to both 
and is born of both.”109  The completion of the synthesis is not a simple nullification of 
the subjective or the objective; instead, the positing of the Absolute by both the 
subjective and objective brings about unity, but a unity that preserves and respects the 
differences.  “Hence, the Absolute itself is the identity of identity and non-identity; being 
opposed and being one are both together in it.”110 
3.7 Conclusion: 
Through an exploration of Fichte’s philosophy of striving and Hegel’s critique, we 
have uncovered another key element that plays a significant role in the Natural Law 
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essay.  While Hegel is aligned with Fichte insofar as the task of philosophy should be the 
construction of the Absolute for consciousness, Hegel’s position is that the completeness 
of the Absolute demands going beyond the domain of the intellect.  Put differently, this 
chapter introduces the need for philosophy to hold off on ascribing irrationality to the 
world of nature, where an absolute opposition between freedom and nature is fixed 
absolutely.  Instead, arriving at a complete synthesis of the Absolute requires us to 
rethink the terms of identity itself, where the point of absolute indifference becomes a 
central concern.  While this idea remains vague at this point in the project, Chapter Five 
delves into this complex Idea in more detail.  We now turn towards Hegel’s critique of 
the program of a priorism in general.   
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CHAPTER 4. THE PROGRAM OF A PRIORISM AND HEGEL’S CRITIQUE 
 
4.1 Introduction: 
Chapters Two and Three argued that with respect to Hegel’s account of natural law, 
the notions of the Absolute and the point of indifference are central to the philosophy.  In 
this chapter, we focus on Hegel’s critique of a priorism as a program for formulating an 
account of natural law.  Recall that the second problematic way in which an account of 
natural law is pursued is through the employment of a priori thinking.  The general 
program for an account of natural law that takes its foundation to be rooted in the a priori 
is to derive a system of natural law that is rooted in a principle that is independent from 
the world of determinate content.  To be sure, determinate content may be given a role at 
some point in the account, but, crucially, the foundation of an a priori account of natural 
law is a principle of thinking.  The account proceeds by deriving further elaborations 
from this first principle.  Our path towards understanding Hegel’s critique surrounding 
the program of a priorism requires a more detailed analysis of the concept of freedom 
employed in accounts of natural law rooted in the a priori.  Now that we have 
problematized infinity in the context of Fichte’s philosophy of striving, we turn to see 
how Hegel’s criticisms of the program of a priorism is centred primarily on the notions 
of infinity and the point of indifference.   
This chapter begins with an explication of Hegel’s claim that the program of a 
priorism, because of its inability to incorporate infinity properly, puts forth an account of 
the Absolute that is one-sided or incomplete.  Next, we turn towards Hegel’s difficult and 
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compact account of what it means to conceive of the Absolute as complete.  Here, we see 
that, whereas a priorism is concerned with constructing the unity where the one (the 
universal) lords over the many (the particular), an account of the Absolute that is 
complete must also incorporate the reality of the unity where the many lords over the one.  
The next section completes the criticism of a priorism by showing how the program 
results in a system of immorality precisely because a priorism is limited to 
‘understanding’ specification or the particular in terms of opposition.  The resulting laws 
and duties put forth contain within them an immoral core because a priorism perpetuates 
a kind of arbitrariness when elevating a particular content into the law or duty that is 
framed as a universal.  Finally, this chapter ends with an account of Hegel’s claim that a 
positive unity, a unity that does not suffer from immorality, incorporates the perception 
of pain (Schmerz) in order to ground the content in the present moment.  The conclusion 
of this chapter is that the shift towards a positive unity grounded in the ‘presentness’ of 
the feeling of pain is also the shift towards incorporating the empirical into an account of 
natural law in a distinct way philosophically.  
4.2 The Problem of Infinity: 
Hegel considers the opposition between a priorism and empiricism to be located 
most significantly in the concept of infinity.  Infinity is the core principle of a priorism.  
Acknowledging that a thorough discussion of infinity cannot take place at this point in 
the essay, Hegel asserts what he takes to be the essence of the concept.  Infinity is 
“…nothing but the unmediated opposite of itself.”111  The issue to be unpacked here is 
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why infinity, also described as the negatively absolute, is opposed to empiricism.  In 
order to do so, we must first note that as negatively absolute, infinity cannot be easily 
located in a concept.  Infinity is “…the abstraction of form which, as pure identity, is 
immediately pure non-identity or absolute opposition which, as pure ideality, is with 
equal immediacy pure reality; as the infinite, is the absolute finite; as the indeterminate, is 
absolute determinacy.”112  I take Hegel to be foreshadowing the problematic way in 
which the concept of infinity is employed in accounts of natural law rooted in a priorism.  
Since infinity is a principle of movement, the essence of infinity is found in the 
transitioning towards the contradictory, not in the contradictory itself.  In other words, 
infinity bears no burden, no point of rest, for infinity is itself simply the movement away 
from all rest.   
Hegel states that the only way to ‘work with’ the concept of infinity, the only way 
that the raw power of change itself can be checked, is to proceed empirically.113  
Accounts of natural law rooted in a priori thinking do not, and cannot, take up the 
concept of infinity correctly at their outset.  Instead, a priorism proceeds by fixing one 
pole of the relation between the infinite and the finite, and abstracting away from this 
now-fixed pole towards the other pole.  The result is that, for a priorism, two elements 
come to the foreground.  The first is that finitude is opposed to infinity, where this 
opposition takes the shape of the negation of the multiplicity, or the world of the finite.  
The second element is that the opposition between the finite and infinity takes the shape 
in a positive sense as a pure unity.  At the core of the program of a priorism is this 
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complex relationship between the finite and the infinite, where the transition between 
these poles gives shape to, on the one hand, infinity as a negation of the finite and, on the 
other hand, infinity as the positing of pure unity.  “[T]he absolute Concept thus 
constituted provides in this unity what has been called ‘pure reason.’  But once more the 
relation of this pure unity to the multiplicity of beings standing over against it is itself a 
double relationship, either the positive relationship of the existence of both or else the 
cancellation of both.”114  I take this portion of Hegel’s argument to be stating that the 
complex relationship between the finite and infinity that is at the heart of a priorism 
would ‘be complete’ in either utter unity or in utter cancellation.  “[T]his existence and 
this cancellation are both to be understood as only partial, for were the existence of the 
two absolute, they could not be related at all, while if the complete cancellation of both 
were settled, there would be no existence of either.”115  In other words, the program of a 
priorism seems to set up the need for some kind of completion, but denies the possibility 
of that completion and instead dwells within the realm of the partial.   
A priorism cannot posit both the world of the finite and infinity in an absolute 
sense, for the world of the finite as absolute would have no connection with the infinity 
as absolute.  But, as we have discussed above, a priorism is able to proceed only by 
opposing infinity to finitude.  Since the positing of the complete cancellation of both 
results in the existence of neither, the only remaining path for a priorism, Hegel argues, is 
to articulate the relation between finitude and infinity in ways that mistake the partial for 
the absolute.  In short, the core of a priorism turns out to be the confused positing of both 
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the partial existence and partial negation of both the finite and the infinite.  In order to 
grasp the significance of this statement and of Hegel’s argument for reframing the role of 
finitude in an account of natural law, we must proceed carefully.   
4.3 The Unity within A Priorism, or The Absolute as Incomplete: 
The positive (partial) relation between pure unity and finitude is theoretical reason.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, our focus is on the second (partial) relation, namely 
the negative relation between pure unity and finitude, defined as practical reason.  In 
practical reason, the negation of the opposition between pure unity and finitude is 
primary, and therefore the unity is more subsistent.  Practical reason asserts the demand 
for the world of the finite to conform to the principle through the negation of the 
opposition between them.  According to this philosophical lens, practical reason is 
primary insofar as it strives towards the negation of opposition, or strives towards 
completion, towards the overcoming of its partial existence; in doing so, practical reason 
makes its appearance in this program as real.116  So, a priorism must proceed by way of 
negating the many, the finite, for the sake of asserting the absoluteness of the one.  The 
subsistent unity has its existence in the negation of the many, where the many is taken as 
the irrational.  Tracking this thought allows us to grasp why, for a priorism, the many is 
something to be overcome.   
The pure unity that is the centrepiece of a priorism comes by way of the one that is 
abstracted from the many, but the program of a priorism itself is framing the strict 
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opposition between the one and the many, between the rational and the irrational.  “But 
this irrational many, since nature is posited in opposition to reason as pure unity, is 
irrational only because it is posited as the non-substantial abstraction of the many while 
reason is posited as the non-substantial abstraction of the one.”117  The pure unity of a 
priorism is the unity of the one and the many, where the one lords over the many.  But, 
Hegel writes, despite the lens that the understanding takes to the relationship between the 
finite and the infinite, the many is in itself a unity of the one and the many – a unity 
where the many lords over the one.118  The key point here is that the notion of absolute 
unity is not exclusive to the thinking that holds the abstract one over the many.  Since we 
have just determined that practical reason is real insofar as it has an eye towards 
completion, towards a pure unity, we find ourselves in a position where the reasoning that 
holds the many to lord over the one must also be real.  We will return to this complicated 
assertion by Hegel that the concept of unity employed by a priorism is one-sided and 
blind to the unity of the many over the one later in the chapter. 
Since, Hegel argues, the opposition within practical reasoning holds reality to be on 
the side of the multiplicity and the ideal to be on the side of unity, practical reasoning 
recognizes only a formal identity between the real and the ideal.  The identity between 
the real and ideal in a priorism does not come to have reality:  the difference between the 
real and the ideal cannot be overcome because this difference does not arise organically; 
instead, this difference is an opposition that is brought into the mix by way of the 
program of a priorism itself.  Completion within the philosophy of identity proceeds only 
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if the differences arise immanently within philosophical thinking.  Put differently, the 
philosophy of identity finds its completion in the absolute point of indifference that 
‘frames’ the opposition of the real and ideal.   
As we saw in Chapter Three, Fichte’s philosophical system of ethical thinking 
culminates in the principle of striving towards the absolutely independent I against the 
many.  In short, the free I reveals itself in its own striving to overcome the difference 
between itself as subject and the limitations and demands encountered in nature, and 
overcoming the difference amounts to the self satisfying its absolute demand towards 
self-sufficiency.  “This real [of practical reasoning] is essentially posited outside of 
reason, and practical reason resides only in its difference from it.  The essence of this 
practical reason is understood as a causal relation to the many – as an identity that is 
absolutely infected with a difference and does not go beyond appearance.”119  The 
overcoming of the difference between the finite I and the absolutely independent I is not 
possible, however, for the overcoming of the difference brings about the annihilation of 
the program of striving, or, what is the same, the free I itself.  For practical reasoning of 
this kind, the I is the absolute source of will that is charged with the task of engaging in 
causal relations with the indeterminable many for the sake of remaking the many 
according to the one principle.  The principle of the one does not penetrate the many 
beyond its appearance; the remaking of the many for the sake of the absolute I just is the 
highest task recognized by this system of philosophy.  Under this lens, practical 
reasoning moves towards its goal of absolute self-sufficiency by authoring the 
appearance of the many for the actualization of the absolutely free I – a task that is 
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stretched into infinity.  Thus the identity within practical reasoning between the real and 
the ideal is sundered by the very program of practical reasoning that is rooted in a 
priorism.  The necessity of the posited external for the sake of the program just is the 
fixing of the opposition between the one and the many.  The many is grounded in the 
incomprehensible, the irrational, the sheer thereness that cannot be incorporated into the 
one, but only ‘dominated’ by the one.  The partial completion of the Absolute renders the 
Absolute a non-Absolute – a relative identity of the understanding. 
4.4 The Absolute as Complete: 
The incomplete absolute employed by a priorism results in a distorted account of 
the reality of freedom.  Our attention now shifts to Hegel’s difficult account of the 
Absolute that is complete.  An Absolute that is brought to completion by philosophical 
thinking just is the absolute identity of the ideal and the real.  “The Absolute is known, 
according to its Idea, as this identity of differents whose determinate character is to be 
unity in the one case and multiplicity in the other.”120  What we must track here as we 
explore Hegel’s argument is the concept of a point of indifference as marker of an 
identity between the real and the ideal that is complete.  The pure unity of a priorism is 
the relation between the one and the many where the one lords over the many, and, since 
the program of a priorism is an abstraction of the one that is opposed to the many, a 
priorism does not consider the relation where the many lords over the one.  The assertion 
of the rational unity of the one is also the assertion of the irrationality of the many.  The 
incompleteness of this program of philosophical thinking is on display, according to 
 
120 Hegel, 73. 
103 
 
Hegel, in the denial of unity where the many is primary.  “Each of them, the unity and the 
multiplicity, whose identity is the Absolute, is itself a unity of one and many.”121  
Whereas Fichte’s Absolute resides in the unity of the one and the many, where the one is 
posited as primary and opposed to the many, the identity of the complete Absolute is in 
the unity of the unity of the one over the many with the unity of the many over the one.  
While we have explored the unity of the one over the many (which finds expression in 
Fichte’s practical reason), we need to examine the unity of the many over the one in more 
detail.  As we shall see later in this chapter, the unity of the many over the one and its 
relation to the Absolute is the point where the empirical is incorporated into Hegel’s 
account of natural law in a way that, ultimately, addresses the shortcomings of the 
program of a priorism.   
The unity of the many over the one is a unity that has the “ideal determinate 
character” of multiplicity.122  The term ‘nature’ is the expression of the ideal aspect of the 
unity of the many over the one.  The positive reality of differences, of innumerable finite 
relations, is the expression of the real aspect of this unity.  But the persistence of 
opposites within this unity entails only a relative identity.  On the one hand, the 
persistence of opposites within this unity manifests as a necessity of differences.  On the 
other hand, since this is an identity, the identity itself must be different than the 
differences within the persisting opposition.  The complication with this unity is that both 
the one and the many are primary through necessity.  There must be differences within 
nature, but nature itself must also be an identity that is not itself enveloped in the 
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oppositions.  Within this unity is a double relation where necessity takes the shape of the 
persistence of opposites in the many and the difference between the identity itself and 
what resides in the identity is also rooted in necessity.  “This double relation determines 
the twofold aspect of the necessity, or the appearance, of the Absolute.”123  While the 
unity whose ideal determinate character is one, the unity that is the focus of a priorism, is 
a one-fold relation, the unity whose ideal determinate character is multiplicity is a 
twofold relation.  “Since this twofold relation applies to the multiplicity, and provided we 
term ‘indifference’ the unity of the differents which stand on the other side and in which 
that reality or the many is superseded, then the Absolute is the unity of indifference and 
relation.”124  The unity of the Absolute is, in part, the supersession of the twofold relation 
explored above.  Thus, the Absolute reveals itself “…(i) as the unity of indifference and 
of the relation, or the relative identity, in which the many is primary and positive, and (ii) 
as the unity of indifference and of that relation in which the unity is primary and 
positive.”125  Again, the philosophical account rooted in a priorism contends that the 
absolute reveals itself as the identity between the real and the ideal but where rationality 
resides only in the ideal.  The fixing of the opposition between the real and the ideal, 
coupled with the endless striving of practical reason to bring about the ‘complete’ 
identity between the ideal and the real, entails that the real, the multiplicity, is a limitation 
on freedom that arises from the check of the indeterminable.  From this perspective, the 
only logical response to this limitation of the indeterminable is to work towards 
determining it according to the ideal.  The limitation on freedom is then taken as a central 
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thread for determining the ethical world.  The irrationality of nature is expressed in its 
‘revealed’ indeterminability; the task of freedom in this context is determining itself as 
free through the determining of nature according to freedom’s will.  Underlying the 
totality put forth by a priorism is freedom as freedom from the limitations of nature. 
However, because the twofold relation in the multiplicity shapes how the Absolute 
reveals its existence, we must recognize that the unity of indifference and the positive 
reality of the many differs from the unity of indifference and the positive reality of the 
one.  “The former is physical nature, the latter ethical nature.”126  Here, Hegel makes a 
crucial distinction within what was conceived of as simply nature from the perspective of 
a priorism.  Importantly, we may say that two ‘natures’ are at play:  (1) physical nature, 
or a unity that holds the positive reality of the many of the multiplicity as primary, and 
(2) ethical nature, or a unity that holds the positive reality of the one of the multiplicity as 
primary.  The absolute identity of the real and the ideal of the philosophy of the 
understanding is replaced here with a more complicated identity.   
Since both physical nature and ethical nature involve the unity of indifference and a 
relation, each nature therefore is the appearance of the oneness and indifference of 
freedom and necessity.127  Here we see the way Hegel brings freedom out of its strict 
opposition to nature:  Whereas a priorism takes freedom to be opposed to nature and a 
‘category’ employed by the subject when articulating her world, Hegel’s argument 
locates freedom in two places:  the ethical world and the physical world.  Since necessity 
is primary in physical nature, freedom does not announce itself in the foreground of the 
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relation between the many (as primary) and the one.  Instead, freedom expresses itself in 
its deferring to the necessity of nature.128  So conceived, freedom is never in absolute 
opposition with the necessity of nature.  In ethical nature, however, freedom makes its 
appearance in the relation because the unity is primary.  Here we see a freedom that is the 
result of the relation between freedom and necessity within ethical nature posited 
negatively.  In other words, it is necessary that freedom makes its appearance in ethical 
nature, but this underlying necessity does not hinder freedom’s appearance as a negative. 
4.5 A Closer Look at Ethical Nature: 
Hegel asks us to isolate this relative identity of ethical nature, the identity where 
freedom makes its appearance in relation to necessity as a posited negativity.  When 
isolated, this relative identity of ethical nature turns out to be occupying the same logical 
space as practical reason within a priorism.  In practical reason, freedom is taken to 
reveal itself as absolute causation originating in the subject that is opposed to the 
necessity of the indeterminable; freedom is taken to be the power to initiate a new causal 
series, where this initiation is independent from nature.  In this relative identity of ethical 
nature (now-isolated for the sake of argument), freedom occupies the same position.  In 
both cases, the necessity of nature is posited as the foil against which freedom reveals 
itself.  If we look at the Absolute from the perspective of this now-isolated relative 
identity of ethical nature, if we treat this identity between freedom and necessity as 
absolute, then the incompleteness of the Absolute reveals itself.  “As a result, this very 
freedom does not escape from difference; relation or relative identity is made the essence, 
 
128 Put differently, freedom freely moves itself to the background.  The necessity of nature makes its 
appearance as such through freedom’s decision to relent.   
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and the Absolute is conceived solely as negatively absolute or as infinity.”129  Just as the 
Absolute cannot make its appearance as free from difference in this relative identity of 
ethical nature, so too within practical reason is the appearance of the Absolute chained to 
a relative identity.  Hegel’s line of thinking is that since practical reason employs a 
conception of the Absolute that posits the fixed opposition between freedom and nature, 
the Absolute can only reveal itself in the negative, in infinity.  The fixed opposition 
entails that freedom is always contending with its difference from nature, and the 
overcoming of this difference only has existence in infinity or, what amounts to the same, 
the absolute abstraction of the one from the many.   
Fichte’s conception of the identity between the real and the ideal, then, is rooted in 
an incomplete conception of the Absolute and its various complex unities of indifference 
and relation.  Fichte’s philosophy of striving holds that the real and the ideal do not 
immediately correspond, for they are posited as being in a relation of opposition; the 
unity of the I is opposed to the multiplicity of indeterminate nature.  Since identity 
between the real and the ideal is the absolute demand placed on the I by the pure I, the I, 
through its own absolutely autonomous action, wills to bring about correspondence 
between the real and the ideal through the domination of the real by the ideal.  The fault 
of this philosophy is treating the negative absolute as the true Absolute.  The system of 
ethics that is rooted in what Hegel describes as the negative absolute of the philosophy of 
striving carries within itself the impossible task of achieving absolute independence 
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through moral action.  The conceptual terms that practical reason operates with, however, 
betrays the sheer impossibility of the task.   
4.6 The Problem of Elevating Content into the Universal: 
By introducing the problem within the program of a priorism, we have the path 
through which we can determine that the account of natural law rooted in a priorism is 
also problematic.  We are now finally in a position to better articulate Hegel’s critique of 
a science of morality rooted in the Concept.  Since we have determined practical reason 
to be occupying the same logical position as an isolated and relative identity of ethical 
nature, the a priorism that is operative within practical reason demands one system of 
morality.  Put differently, practical reason does not allow for a plurality of laws, for all 
laws are to be grounded in the one system.  The system of morality of practical reason 
sets up a strict division between what is rooted in the pure Concept and what is beyond 
the pure Concept.  The concepts of duty and law fall within the domain of practical 
reason because they are rooted in the pure Concept that is at the heart of a priorism.  
Whatever falls outside of the domain of the pure Concept is set in opposition to the 
Concept.  Since only the form of law and duty is rooted within practical reason, the 
content of these laws and duties cannot occupy the same logical space as their form.  The 
supreme principle of practical reason’s system of morality – the moral law – pertains only 
to the formation of the law.  In other words, practical reason is only able to determine 
whether the law is formed in a way that ‘fits with’ the logical demand of the moral law.   
Let us now take a closer look at Hegel’s critique of the limits of morality and the 
problem of incorporating content from the empirical world into the laws and duties 
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formulated by the moral system.  The specifics of a particular action must make their 
appearance only as the opposition to be abstracted from for the sake of internal 
consistency with its supreme principle.  “The absolute law of practical reason is to 
elevate that specification into the form of pure unity, and the expression of this 
specification taken up into this form is law.”130  Formulating the specification according 
to the form of the pure Concept bears out two possibilities according to Hegel.  The first 
possibility:  the specification, when formed into a law, cancels itself.  The law that is 
derived from the specification, when elevated into the universal, contains an internal 
contradiction resulting in the cancellation of the law itself.  Put differently, the maxim of 
the specification cannot be made into a universal law without contradiction, and therefore 
the maxim is not lawful from the perspective of the absoluteness of the moral law.  The 
second possibility:  the specification, when formed into a law, does not engender a 
contradiction.  In this case, the law is rendered absolute on the basis of the negative 
absoluteness of the moral law.  Put differently, the articulation of the specification 
rendered into a law is in terms of rights and duties where no internal contradiction arises.   
Hegel argues that the second possibility is only capable of producing laws that are 
empty of content.  The second possibility, the rendering of the maxim of a particular 
action as lawful according to the pure Concept, elevates the specification to the level of 
universality.  However, the elevation of the specification into universality and the 
reception of this universal by the pure Concept results, according to Hegel, in a merely 
analytic unity.  The content of the specification has been purified from the process of 
elevation; when the specification is universalized it is subsumed by the pure Concept.  
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“And when the unity is conferred on it is expressed in a sentence purely as it is, that 
sentence is analytic and tautological.”131  The faculty of practical reason aims to produce 
moral legislation that accords with the pure Concept, where the subject of this legislation 
is abstracted from the specifics of her situation.  According to Hegel, what we want from 
practical reason is the content of our rights and duties, but practical reason, because of its 
insistence on abstraction from the specific, cannot determine that content.  The faculty of 
practical reason ensures that our maxims are formulated in ways that accord with the pure 
Concept; but the very process of ensuring that our maxims fit the form of law entails that 
practical reason cannot tell us anything about the content of those laws.  Put differently, 
practical reason, because of its focus on the pure Concept, can tell us only whether our 
thinking conforms to the demands of the moral law, or whether our will is organized in a 
way that harmonizes with the good will.  We are supposed to be able to trust the results 
of practical reason because they are contained within the pure thinking of the rational 
being.  A declaration of consistency by practical reason should be taken as a declaration 
of certainty of the moral worth conferred on the action.  Ascertaining the validity of the 
form of our thinking is the essence of practical reasoning, and we can be certain that the 
results of practical reason are authored by ourselves and only ourselves.  However, if we 
were to introduce content into the mix, then practical reason would be forced to go 
beyond the realm of the concept of the will itself.   
The introduction of content puts practical reason in a difficult position, for it is no 
longer able to determine with certainty the moral worth of an action on the basis of 
abstract thinking alone.  The autonomy of the will gives way to the possibility of 
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heteronomy of the will on the basis of the reference to content, for the content is not 
under the control of the rational being in the same way as is its own thinking.  Following 
Hegel’s argument, the only way to maintain the autonomy of the will and certainty of the 
results of practical reasoning is to abstract away from the content in the most complete 
sense.  The law is concerned with some specific content, and the law put forth by 
practical reason is that content elevated to the level of the universal.  The moral 
significance behind the law put forth only holds insofar as the law is able to hold as 
universal legislation for all rational beings, and the process of elevating the specific into 
the universal is a necessary step in practical reasoning.   
However, the program of elevating content into the universal is incapable of 
determining which content should be elevated.  Any specific content is capable of being 
taken up into the universal, for the universal is in principle concerned with the 
formulation of the universal.  In order for pure practical thinking to be able to determine 
which content should be taken up into the universal, which content should be used as one 
key part of the law put forth, practical reason would need to show concern for the 
contingent and particular content.  But, in order to maintain its purity and its certainty of 
satisfying the demands of the moral law, practical reason cannot make definitive 
judgements about which content should be elevated.  In principle, any specific content 
could be elevated to the level of the universal.  “Every specific matter, however, is 
inherently particular, not universal; the opposite specific thing stands over against it [the 
particular content that is to be elevated], and it is specific only because there is this 
specific opposition.”132  The specific content is only so because of its relation of 
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opposition to other specific contents.  The specific content and its opposites are equally 
viable ‘candidates’ to be elevated to the universal.  At the outset, these specific contents 
are equivalent from the perspective of pure practical reasoning.  The contradiction 
associated with an elevated specific content reveals itself only after it has been taken up 
into the universal.  Hegel states that even when there appears to be only one specific 
content in ‘reality’ that could be elevated, practical reasoning must nevertheless remain 
open to the particular content that opposes the one that is ‘real.’  Even when the opposite 
cannot be posited in reality, the opposite can nevertheless be posited in thought.  And 
since the program of practical reason is in essence a kind of thinking, both the thought of 
the specific content and the thought of its opposite are viable candidates to be taken up 
into the universal by practical thinking. 
Hegel uses the example of property to illustrate his argument.  Suppose the specific 
content we are thinking about is property.  When elevated into the universal, this content 
becomes the following:  “property, if property is, must be property.”133  If we are 
legislating laws regarding the specific content of property, we must make sure that if 
there is property, we treat it as property.  Put differently, if we posit the content of 
property but treat it in a way that is as not-property, then those maxims which posit not-
property are not lawful.  The basic program of practical reason here is to posit some X 
and assert that maxims that treat X as not-X are unlawful.  Again, the aim of practical 
reason is consistency according to the pure Concept.  If property is to have moral 
significance, then whatever undermines property conceptually is inconsistent with 
property as a universal law.  However, a similar result can be reached if our specific 
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content at the outset of our thinking is the negation of property.  “But if we posit the 
opposite thing, negation of property, then the legislation of this same practical reason 
produces the tautology:  non-property is non-property.  If property is not to be, then 
whatever claims to be property must be cancelled.”134  The moral significance that is the 
product of practical reasoning is in the internal consistency of the chosen specification 
elevated to the level of the universal.  The demand for internal consistency ensures that 
the outputs of practical reason remain abstract from the content, and the significance of 
the law always remains opposed to the real.  Moral significance has not yet penetrated the 
specification itself, and thus the moral significance of any specific content is not 
addressed through pure practical reasoning.  Since the legislation of practical reason, in 
order to remain pure, cannot extend into the realm of the impure, practical reasoning is in 
no position to determine with certainty the moral significance of a specific content as 
opposed to other specific content.   
4.7 Pure Practical Reason and Immorality: 
We now turn towards Hegel’s claim that practical reasoning, and the system of 
morality grounded therein, in fact results in a system of immorality.  The problem of 
practical reasoning is that it is unable to justify wholly the elevation of one specificity 
over another.  Hegel further argues that this problem results in not simply a ‘principal of 
confusion’ but a principle of immorality.135  Pure practical reason aims to establish 
absolutes.  Since a specific content is only so in relation to other specific contents, only 
non-absolute relations are present at the level of the content.  If we turn to pure practical 
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reason to elevate the specific content, uniting the content with the form of pure unity, we 
must again determine whether a legitimate absolute has revealed itself.  For Hegel, the 
basic problem is that specific content is by definition without inherent necessity.  No 
necessity can be found at the level of the impure that demands a specific impurity to be 
elevated into the universal.  The program of practical reasoning is to abstract away from 
the impurity, and unite the elevated content with the form of pure unity.  However, the 
mark of impurity cannot be wholly annihilated through abstraction; the origin of the 
elevated content always remains impure.   
Immorality arises because practical reasoning takes something that is rooted in the 
impure and asserts that same thing as pure.  “But when a specific and individual thing is 
elevated to something inherently [necessary], absurdity and, in the moral sphere, 
immorality are posited.”136  The demand for the form of law has overshadowed 
determining whether the law, with its specific content, is in fact moral.  If we suppose 
that property exists, then pure practical reasoning states that we must treat what is 
property as property absolutely.  The absoluteness found in the product of practical 
reason is, Hegel argues, merely negative and formal.137  The absoluteness of the 
declaration of practical reason does not affect the specific content because that content 
must be treated as a hypothetical.  Therefore, practical reason is entangled in a confusion.  
“But by confusing absolute form with conditioned matter, the absoluteness of the form is 
imperceptibly smuggled into the unreal and conditioned character of the content…”138  
Practical reason is only warranted in asserting that the form of the assertion is absolute.  
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Given that the absoluteness of the content is smuggled from without and united through 
confusion with the specific content, any specific content may be made into a duty.  At the 
core of practical reason’s program is a decision made by the arbitrary will – this content 
and not that one.   
The ineliminable presence of the arbitrary will in the program of practical reason is 
in direct conflict with its claim to determine what is rightful absolutely.  Practical reason 
can only blindly annihilate the specific for the sake of the universal, but, despite these 
efforts by practical reason, the universal retreats more fully into the realm of formalism.  
In short, if practical reason annihilates the specific for the sake of asserting the universal, 
the assertion itself becomes arbitrary and immoral.  If practical reason were to seek to 
preserve the specific, then the universal drawn from the elevated content cannot be 
asserted absolutely.  The only unity that can be asserted by the practical reason of a 
priorism is a negative unity, one that asserts the complete supersession of the specific 
content for the sake of the tautological law put forth.   
Hegel’s position is that if we were to understand the thinking of unity to be more 
than merely asserting the universal through the annihilation of the specific, then our 
conception of unity would involve more than the purely negative.  Recall the two 
possible paths that the practical reason of a priorism may take:  either (1) practical reason 
wholly annihilates the specific for the sake of asserting the universal, or (2) practical 
reason seeks to preserve the specific thing and is then unable to assert a law that is 
absolute.  In the case of (1), practical reason certainly overcomes the difference initially 
posited by practical reason, but doing so only by abstracting away from all content.  
However, the resulting assertion is merely tautological, analytic, and makes no judgement 
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on the world.  The erasure of difference means there is no moral difference between the 
subject and the predicate because in the result of practical reasoning no difference is 
actually posited.  In the case of (2), the universality that is sought after by practical 
reason is endlessly undermined by the empirical multiplicity that remains opposed to the 
specific content.  In this case, any assertion of practical reason begets the need for a 
further assertion, and the law that is to be posited is entangled in an ever-growing web of 
assertions.  Either case puts on display the limitation of a practical reason that operates 
with a conception of unity that is purely negative.   
The primary concern that led us to this point in the argument is whether practical 
reason is capable of putting forth a moral claim that incorporates our experiences, our 
perceptions in a way that accords with the Concept.  The morality of the claim we are 
seeking is only preserved if the content involved in the thinking is not annihilated by an 
unrelenting demand for formal consistency according to the pure Concept, expressed here 
as the negative unity of pure practical reasoning.  If we introduce the demand for a 
certain form of thinking when dealing with our perceptions, we end annihilating the 
specific content, and the moral significance of the content fades into a confused attempt 
to turn the specific into the absolute.  Once possibility enters into our thinking, once we 
express the significance of the particular as opposed to others, and then seek to raise this 
contingent particularity into relations of opposition to others, the contingency of the now-
elevated content reveals itself as a relative universal masquerading as an absolute.   
117 
 
4.8 A Positive Unity Through Pain: 
Following Hegel’s line of reasoning, we have established that a unity put forth by 
the Concept results in a system that is unable to incorporate specification or content into 
its account.  We now turn to Hegel’s argument for an account of a system that 
incorporates specification properly.  Put otherwise, we now turn towards examining what 
it means for a unity to be grounded ultimately in the point of indifference.   
Recall that pure thinking left to its own devices cannot incorporate the content from 
perception in a way that is consistent and moral.  Taking the force of perception seriously 
in our thinking entails that we also take seriously the ‘presentness’ of the moral 
significance of the specific content. The immorality of the claim put forth by pure 
practical reasoning comes about by stripping the force of morality found in the 
presentness of the perception.  The task becomes how to maintain the force of perception 
alongside the force of morality in a way that results in a moral claim that does not 
annihilate the content nor cling to a false absolute.  The answer to this question is found 
in the reality of the positive unity of indifference.  The issue here, though, is that the 
inclusion of feeling in the experience of the free being results in an assertion that is 
beyond moral.   
The root of the positive unity, Hegel argues, is found in the feeling of pain.  “A 
pain is lifted by the force of perception from feeling, where it is something accidental and 
contingent, into unity and the shape of something objective and absolutely necessary.”139  
While the feeling is grounded in contingency, the pain transitions from feeling into a 
unity, where that positive unity maintains the necessity of the pain of the experience.  
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“By this immediate unity, which does not trouble at all about possibilities which formal 
unity entails, it [the pain] is maintained in its absolute presentness [absoluten 
Gegenwart].”140  The pain, the feeling that is brought to the foreground by the force of 
perception, enters into a unity that is not infected with possibility and maintains the force 
of the moment, the ‘weight’ of the specific content in its immediacy.  This pain is not 
relegated to the inner reality of the subject; rather, the force of perception reveals the pain 
in the immediate unity as objective.  “[The pain] is genuinely severed from the subject 
and made ideal in the fixed perception of this unity.”141  At the same time, however, this 
pain also reveals itself as contingent in the thinking of the subject.  “[W]hen compared by 
the unity of reflection with other specifications, or considered and rejected as a universal, 
this pain is in either case made contingent; as a result, the subject knows himself purely 
in his contingency and particularity, which knowledge is the sentimentality and the 
immorality of impotence.”142  The formalism associated with the negative unity of pure 
practical reasoning is replaced with the positive unity of the necessity of the feeling of 
pain in this moment coupled with the awareness in thought of the subject’s particular 
circumstance.   
Importantly, the knowledge that the subject has is not of the universal law, but of 
the immorality of doing nothing in response to this feeling.  I take this to be the point 
where the moral significance of the moment reveals itself in the intuition of conscience:  
the pain reveals itself as the ‘bite’ of conscience; it is up to the subject to act according to 
her conscience, where she has awareness that failing to act according to her conscience is 
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to be immoral.  Immorality is no longer something that is contained in the nebulous 
thinking of pure practical reasoning; rather, immorality is found in not responding to the 
presentness of the feeling of pain, to the objectivity of perception elevated into the 
positive unity.  The fixing in the positive unity is not a ‘decision’ of pure practical 
reasoning; instead, the fixing in the positive unity is rooted in perception itself, the 
presentness of the moment.   
Hegel puts forth a definition of a unity that is beholden to asserting the true 
indifference of the specific content that it subsumes.  The positive unity of perception is 
not the fixing of relations of opposition between the specific content; rather, the unity is 
“…their summation and objectification.”143  While possibilities fell under the concern of 
practical reasoning, overburdening it, the hypothetical has no place within this positive 
unity.  In order to posit a positive unity, the indifference must be united with the 
differences in a way that does not oppose what is possible with what is actual; there is no 
fixed opposition between the specific content that would push our thinking towards 
immorality.  Instead, all specific content is actual within this positive unity.  I take this 
claim to be important because if our thinking operates according to possibilities in 
relation to actualities, we cannot but fix a relation of opposition.  To be sure, the claim 
that all specific content is actual within the positive unity is striking, but we will now turn 
to make sense of why the positive unity must take this shape. 
The scope of possibility that infected all elevated content of the negative unity is 
now limited merely to the possibility of the subject to act or not act.  In the negative 
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unity, possibility is able to attach itself to the elevated content; in the positive unity, 
possibility is only able to attach itself to the knowledge of the subject.  The force of 
perception means that the feeling is fixed, where that feeling is itself a feeling without 
having to be in a relation to other feelings.  By this, I mean that the specific content that 
is to be elevated in practical reasoning is only so because of its relation to opposed 
content.  Here, the feeling is able to itself be a feeling without opposition.   
The significance of this development is that the moral expression that is rooted in 
the force of perception is grounded in a presentness, a ‘this.’  This expression results in 
what Hegel calls a living relation144 that is absolutely present, where the subject is under 
the force of ‘do this or do not do this.’  The possibility of other specific content that 
would undercut the significance of the ‘this’ that is present does not enter into the 
subject’s thinking, for the one possibility facing the subject is utterly separated from other 
possibilities by the ‘thisness’ of the pain.  
Let us return to the example of property that Hegel uses in this argument in order to 
understand how the force of perception enters into the account.  We have explored 
previously Hegel’s argument for why pure practical reasoning is only able to produce the 
expression ‘if property exists, then property must be taken as property.’  This expression 
is tautological insofar as, once expressed in terms of the universal, the unity is analytic:  
 
144 The term ‘living relation’ refers to the concrete ways in which freedoms come together as a particular 
community.  Particular content is endorsed by individuals as meaningful with respect to the project of self-
expression, and this content provides the basic terms of meaning that condition how individuals within a 
particular community engage in self-expression within the context of the community as a whole.  Living 
relations are rooted in history and vulnerable to change, just as is any concrete expression of freedom 
according to Hegel’s line of reasoning.  The history of a community of individuals is, in part, comprised of 
the ways in which the living relation is endorsed or challenged by the members of the community, those 
which are to be serviced by the terms and meanings set by the living relation.  In short, the living relation 
refers to the laws, customs, and institutions central to the concrete reality of the community. 
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the tautological expression that is based on the negative unity of formal thinking is 
‘another’s property entrusted to me is another’s property entrusted to me.’145  In contrast, 
the expression based on the unity of perception, the objectivity of perception united with 
the subject’s knowledge of her own contingency or particularity, takes the following 
shape:  ‘a property of someone else entrusted to me is the property of someone else 
entrusted to me, and nothing else.’146  The expression based on the negative unity of 
formalism is specific content made universal, but the process of universalizing the 
content leaves open the possibility of an expression that draws on a specific content that 
opposes the original one.  “On the other hand, the expression of perception contains a 
this, a living and absolute presentness, with which the possibility is itself absolutely 
linked, and whereby a possibility separated therefrom, or a ‘being other,’ is absolutely 
annihilated, because in such a possible ‘being other’ lies immorality.”147  The expression 
based on the positive unity of perception annihilates the possibility of others infecting the 
absoluteness of the expression.  When elevated, this feeling made objective preserves the 
subject’s knowledge that she has the power to act and that her expression of her action 
must not be mixed up in the program of formalism to abstract away from the presentness 
of the moment for the sake of a negative unity in thinking.  Put differently, whereas the 
negative unity views the presentness of the moment as an impurity that is to be stripped 
away for the sake of the universal, the positive unity that elevates the perception of the 
subject views the presentness of the moment as an anchor, a necessity of perception, and 
a reminder of the subject’s power to act.   
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To be sure, the expression based on the unity of perception does not take the shape 
of a general rule for any rational being.  The role and scope of general rules in the ethical 
world is fundamentally altered according to Hegel’s argument, and we will explore the 
ramifications of the argument in Chapter Six.   
4.9 Conclusion: 
The turn towards presentness is the turn towards the empirical:  the positive unity 
of perception is the unity of the positive content of experience with the negative content 
of the power of freedom or the knowledge of one’s own choice.  Here we see a glimpse 
of the role of the empirical in our thinking about ethics.  In this positive unity, the 
‘annihilating might of reason’ is held in check with the immediacy of feeling of pain of 
conscience.  An entailment of this thinking is that moral significance is reduced to the 
moment, where that moment is confronted with the freedom of the subject.  Laws and 
duties can no longer be expressed with reference to the rational being as such.  The fixed 
infinity employed by a priorism reveals itself as separated from the absolute.  A priorism 
turns out to be wedded to a unity that is produced only in relation to a multiplicity that is 
unending, an absolute finitude.  Here we see that a priorism shipwrecks, for the 
encroachment of finitude only further galvanizes a priorism in turning towards the 
annihilating power of reason.  The programmatic flaw shows itself in this moment, for 
the annihilating power of reason, so employed, only further perpetuates the problem of 
isolation that, according to Hegel, plagues pure practical reasoning. 
By introducing the positive in such a way, we limit the power of reason to proclaim 
the dominance of universals in evaluating a particular action.  Instead, the rightfulness of 
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the act is restricted to the moment wherein the free being finds herself.  Once we 
recognize the significant role of the empirical in our ethical thinking, we are no longer 
able to determine what is right according to universals; instead, rightfulness and history 
become intertwined, where the story of the rightfulness of the free being is extended into, 
and intimately linked with, the empirical world.  The good will offers us no real 
salvation.  Rather, we are left to our own devices, to our own stories of freedom 
articulated in history.  The salvation offered by the good will is replaced with a historical 
judgement, where what is judged is, in an important sense, rooted in the positive unity 
articulated above.  Here we can see the explanatory seeds for Hegel’s challenging claim 
that true justice is found only in intuition, a claim that will be explored in Chapter Six.  
However, in order to appreciate the nuance of Hegel’s position regarding justice, we must 
now turn to an articulation of the key elements that make up the Idea of absolute ethical 
life. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE ELEMENTS OF ABSOLUTE ETHICAL LIFE 
 
5.1 Introduction: 
The focus of this chapter is on what Hegel calls the Idea of absolute ethical life 
(absoluten Sittlichkeit).  A sustained and detailed unpacking of this important part of 
Hegel’s thinking provides us with the clearest path towards understanding the 
challenging but compelling claim of articulating natural law in a way that does justice to 
both aspects of the empirical and a priori programs should be preserved.  In order to gain 
insight into the Idea of absolute ethical life, our path begins with Hegel’s articulation of 
what he takes to be the problem found within Fichte’s concept of freedom.  We then 
move on to articulating just what Hegel means by the concept of absolute freedom.  The 
absoluteness of freedom, for Hegel, reveals two essential elements within the reality of 
freedom that turn out to be at the core of ethical life – the positive and the negative.  
Next, this chapter shows that the way in which the positive and negative manifest 
themselves is as a kind of fundamental and dynamic tension resides in the very core of 
ethical life.  I show that the reality of this tension has two entailments, which are central 
to Hegel’s argument:  (1) the ‘life’ of ethical life is made real through a performance that 
ultimately involves ethical life sacrificing a part of itself for the sake of its own growth, 
and (2) ethical life, through its own performance and growth, has a historical body.   
5.2 Freedom and the Problem of Absolute Oppositions: 
Focusing on Fichte’s account of a system of natural right grounded wholly in a 
system of human freedom, Hegel begins by noting that the primary task of such a system 
125 
 
is to compel individual wills to act in accordance with the general will.  The problem 
raised above is already surfacing:  such an account of communal life is already 
presupposing an opposition between the individual will and the general will.  Starting 
from the opposition between the will of the free individual and the general will, Fichte’s 
account proceeds by assuming that harmony between the individual will and the general 
will may be accomplished or brought about through compulsions on individual wills.  
“Oneness with the general will thus cannot be understood and posited as inner absolute 
majesty, but only as something which is to be brought about by an external relation or 
compulsion.”148  The starting point of the freedom of the individual is geared towards the 
development of a communal life that is made possible through supervision and 
compulsion of the general will.  The problem for Hegel is that if the unity between the 
individual will and the general will is an accomplishment, and if the method of achieving 
and maintaining that accomplishment is compulsion and supervision, then no transition 
from the real to the ideal is possible.  Since compulsion is an essential step in the series of 
moments meant to overcome the opposition between the individual will and the general 
will, there must be a starting point – a positive reality where the individual will is 
compelled to act in a certain way according the demands of the general will.149  This 
starting point, however, must be immanent to the system; otherwise the consistency of 
the system is under threat.   
The accomplishment of bringing the individual will under the sway of the general 
will must have a starting point, an original compulsion that is the supreme will.  Thus, 
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Hegel argues, three wills are at play:  (1) the will of the free individual that is opposed to 
the general will and is subject to the compulsion and supervision of the general will, (2) 
the general will that is the source of the compulsions, and (3) the supreme will that 
compels the compulsions.  The issue is that if the system is to be consistent in its 
derivation, then the ‘original’ compulsion of the supreme will must be immanent to the 
system.  Hegel reminds us that the supreme will is not just lording over the general will 
but also the individual will.  Put differently, the supreme will is the ground of both.  So, 
whatever compulsion is put forth by the supreme will, said compulsion must apply 
equally to the individual will and the general will.  For if the compulsion of the supreme 
will is applied unequally, then “…only one part, and not its opposite, is under 
compulsion, which ought not to happen.”150  We must investigate what it means for an 
‘original’ compulsion to be immanent to the system of freedom that is rooted in a 
priorism.   
The basic point is that an ethical order that is rooted in the apparent opposition 
between the individual will and the general will reveals its own nullity through its 
reliance on coercion, either in the form of the general will coercing the individual will or 
in the form of the individual wills coercing the general will.  “What this has shown is that 
the ethical order posited according to relations alone, or externality and coercion 
understood as a totality, is self-cancelling.”151  For Hegel, the problem resides in the 
unwarranted fixing of the relation of opposition between the individual will and the 
general will.  Under this system, the freedom of the individual completes itself, or 
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reaches its fullest expression according to the concept of universal freedom, under the 
compulsion and supervision of the general will.  Put differently, a relation that is external 
to the freedom of the individual is, according to a priorism, posited immediately 
alongside the individual within an account of the ethical order.   
5.3 The Absoluteness of Freedom: 
Hegel’s analysis of a system of right rooted in Fichte’s conception of human 
freedom emphasizes the importance of the concept of coercion to that system.  Coercion 
turns out to be the primary way of coming to an identity between the individual and 
general wills.  If, however, philosophy shows us that concept of freedom employed by 
the absolute Concept is inadequate, then the concept of coercion only has a grip on our 
thinking about right because of this underlying conceptual error in our thinking about 
freedom.  Our exploration of Hegel’s Idea of absolute freedom reveals:  (1) the concept 
of freedom employed in accounts of natural right rooted in the a priori program is 
inadequate, and (2) the concept of coercion, so central to the absolute Concept, is at odds 
with the absoluteness of freedom.  Let us first turn towards Hegel’s argument for the 
absoluteness of freedom.   
Suppose that we posit the concept of universal freedom for all, and suppose further 
that we posit the concept of original freedom of the individual.  The concept of universal 
freedom for all is, in this context, taken as absolute, as total.  The concept of original 
freedom is posited as finite, as limited.  Limited freedom, by definition, is not absolute.  
No amount of external influence or pressure on the individual could raise the individual 
to the ‘higher’ level of freedom, or bring the freedom of the individual into alignment 
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with absolute freedom.  The problem with this view of freedom, from Hegel’s 
perspective, is that freedom, conceived properly, cannot be limited by anything alien or 
external.  “But a freedom for which something is genuinely external and alien is no 
freedom; its essence and its formal definition is just that nothing is absolutely 
external.”152  Original freedom cannot be understood as being opposed by something 
external to it; freedom, even in the individual, is the power to be in a position to 
challenge or overcome limitation.153   
Suppose that a free being is presented with a choice, and, as a limited being, must 
make a choice between two opposed options.  If we were to understand freedom as 
something finite and limited, then we might be tempted to claim that the free being is 
forced to make a choice among limited options; in other words, the expression of 
freedom in this case comes from making the choice between the two opposed options, +A 
or -A.  Hegel describes this as empirical freedom, a freedom that is enveloped by the 
necessity of the empirical world.  The free being must turn either left or right, where each 
option appears independent from the other. 
Hegel argues that the true, hidden power of freedom is the negation of oppositions 
themselves.  When presented with an apparent opposition, the free being is always 
capable of overcoming the supposed opposition, of denying the reality of the opposition.  
The opposition presents itself as an external limiting force, and the free being is always 
 
152 Hegel, 89. 
153 The confrontation with an external limitation cannot penetrate to the core of original freedom because 
freedom could choose to incorporate that limitation into its very project.  In other words, freedom is able to 
transform any condition of limitation into a condition of being free.   
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capable of proving to itself that the limiting force is merely an appearance.154  We must 
now explore why the free being is capable of overcoming any apparent opposition, and 
why the freedom of the individual must be understood as not limited in an important 
sense.   
First, we must note that for the free being any specificity is, in its essence, linked to 
that which it is not.  Turning left, a specificity, cannot be wholly abstracted from turning 
not-left, for example.  The possibility of turning left makes implicit reference to not 
turning in other directions.  Suppose that the free being is confronted with the apparent 
opposition of turning left or turning right.  If she were to turn left, she is equally in the 
position of being subject to the (empirical) necessity of not turning right.  However, the 
free being is ‘connected’ to the concept of turning right since turning left and turning 
right necessarily have a relation to each other – a relation of opposition.  If freedom were 
simply an expression of choosing between specific options confronted in the empirical 
world, then freedom would never wholly escape necessity.  Freedom would always be 
limited by the empirical constraints of the oppositions that arise in determining a course 
of action.   
When the free being makes the choice of turning left, +A, the option of turning 
right, -A, is not annihilated.  Rather, -A remains as external to the free being.  Hegel 
argues that while in this case -A reveals itself as external to the free being, it is entirely 
possible for the free being to determine herself according to -A, which would result in +A 
 
154 Following Hegel’s line of thinking, freedom is always able to undermine the opposition that appears 
external to it, even if undermining means accepting and endorsing the opposition.  In doing so, the 
opposition is redressed by freedom as the product of its own expression. 
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remaining external.155  In short, the externality of -A is situational or relative.  While -A 
can be given the appearance of being external to the free being, freedom, if it is to be 
free, must be aware of the essential link between +A and -A.  The underlying power of 
freedom is to ensure that the choice between +A or -A is not final.  Given that freedom is 
capable of conceiving of both the externality of -A and the externality of +A, freedom has 
an underlying core understanding that the opposition between +A and -A is only relative 
and that it is entirely within the power of the absolutely free being to overcome the 
apparent opposition.   
Hegel’s point is that while it is true that the particular person is subject to empirical 
necessity, the true character of her freedom is to be found in the fact that she is always 
capable of remaining absolutely indifferent to any empirical necessity.  The absolute 
character of her freedom means that she is always able to take any empirical necessity 
and reveal that the necessity is an appearance relative to her freedom, or that the 
empirical necessity cannot make any absolute claims on her freedom.  The individual, as 
a finite being in the world of nature, is subject to an infinite number of specific 
limitations; however, no absolute limitation can be applied to the free being definitively.  
Through her freedom, the individual person is always able to ‘adopt’ a new stance 
towards any particular limitation and thereby cancel any external limitation on her 
freedom.  “[S]ince specific determinations are posited in him he is the absolute 
indifference of these determinations, and in this his ethical nature formally consists.”156  I 
wish to draw attention to two important points in this sentence.  The first is that since the 
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individual, as a finite experiencing being in the world, posits a specific determination, she 
is, from the transcendental standpoint, the author of this determination.  Given that the 
free being turns out to be the author of any specific determination by positing them as 
limitations spontaneously, the free being remains in a position of absolute indifference to 
any determination since the act of positing any specific determination undermines any 
appearance of absoluteness in a determination.  The second point raised in the quote 
above is that the ethical nature of the free being just is this power to remain in a position 
of indifference relative to any determination.  Put differently, the free being is, in 
principle, not confined to any apparent opposition, limitation, or set of choices; her 
ethical nature is to be always able to adopt the stance of ‘rejecting’ the absoluteness of 
any external affront to her freedom.  To be sure, the rejection may manifest itself in many 
ways, even as incorporating the limitation into the very conditions of expressing freedom; 
the key is that no limitation is impervious to the ability of freedom to dictate the terms of 
its own self-expression in the world, at least in principle.    
Given that Hegel has shown that coercion is itself an empty concept, we are in a 
position to understand what limitation looks like within Hegel’s system of freedom.  “But 
it is one thing to put specific limitations on the individual, under the form of infinity, and 
another to put them on him absolutely.”157  Absolute limitation on a free being entails that 
the free being is under the shadow of an external, an absolute constraint that lords over 
the life of that freedom.  However, specific limitations on the individual under the form 
of infinity are not absolute, and may be cancelled by the individual through her own 
freedom.  Whatever specific limitations enter into the context of the free being must be 
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posited by that very same free being.  Since limitations cannot be posited on absolute 
freedom externally, and since limitations do occur, those limitations only have 
significance or efficacy if the free being herself is the one positing those limitations.  
While this point may seem similar to the Fichtean position that coercion is legitimated by 
the fact that the coerced individual posits limitations on her freedom herself, the supreme 
will is nevertheless the formal absolute that lords over the free individual:  the free being 
is under the absolute demand put forth by the concept of freedom itself.  In other words, 
the kind of limitation employed in a system of rights that maintains the fixed opposition 
between freedom and nature maintains its legitimacy in the face of said opposition 
through unlimited force of the supreme will that is external to the free being.  
The self-positing of limitations by the free being means that the free being is 
ultimately and absolutely indifferent to the limitations that confronts her:  the free being 
is always in a position either to respond by internalizing those limitations through 
respecting them or disrespecting them or to ignore them.  That the free being is required 
to posit these specific limitations at all in order for these limitations to have any sort of 
‘impact’ on the free being always leaves open the possibility of the free being to not posit 
them.  Limitations that are not posited by the free being have no reality.  “[S]ince specific 
determinations are posited in him he is the absolute indifference of these determinations, 
and in this his ethical nature formally consists.”158  Indifference is at the root of any 
external because any external turns out to be posited by the free being, and the original 
position of the free being is one of indifference with respect to any external.   
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5.4 Indifference and Endorsement: 
Hegel’s line of reasoning is that by categorizing this original position as 
indifference we preserve the absoluteness of freedom in reality – a substantial 
absoluteness.  Since the root of any external is indifference, ethical life, as the substance 
of free beings, takes on a striking shape.  No external is absolute, for the absolute lies in 
the positing power of the free being; therefore, a group of free beings may develop 
different relations to the external, where the stability of the external is something that 
must be continually affirmed by the free beings who reside in an original indifference 
relative to any external.  “So too, individuals generally being different, whether from 
themselves or from something other, and having a bearing on something external, this 
externality itself is indifferent and a living relation (i.e. organization), and herein, since 
totality occurs only in an organization, consists the positive element in ethical life.”159  
Importantly, the significance of the absolute free being’s relation to the external is that 
the external is merely the vitalized organization or living relation that free beings 
‘endorse’ through their internalization of what is posited; while the external is not 
vitalized in principle, the internalization of the external by free beings amounts to giving 
the external its appearance as a substantial limitation on the free beings.  Thus, the 
institutions, the set of externals that have been vitalized through the implicit and explicit 
actions of free beings, is the positive content of ethical life.  The community, then, has its 
content through the positing or vitalizing of externals, freely giving significance and 
power to those externals.   
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The supreme will cannot be the root of substantial living relations because the 
supreme will is only capable of generating a formal relation, a negative relation.  The 
formal relation put forth by the absolute Concept is not concerned with content because 
this system of natural right is an ideality.  In other words, by employing a concept of 
human freedom that does not incorporate the absoluteness of freedom in both positive 
and negative senses, the absolute Concept ‘mistakes’ the ideality of the system as its 
reality.   
In contrast, a substantial relation is living precisely because the vitalizing force is 
rooted in the indifference of the free beings.  This substantial relation changes only 
because free beings, in their presentness, confer the appearance of limitation.  The system 
of philosophy which requires a supreme will, a supreme concept to be the organizing 
force among free beings, fails to recognize that within each free being is the power of 
producing a living organization.  We will see that one culminating point within Hegel’s 
account of natural law is that the mediation of the living relation is always a self-
mediation, a substantial and historical self-mediation. 
Given that the position of absolute indifference of the free being is the ground of 
ethical life, and given that the living relation among free beings involves the communal 
assertion or endorsement of limitations, a further analysis of the content of ethical life is 
needed.  The positive content of ethical life is the result of free beings occupying an 
original position of indifference and then endorsing something.  Through the acts of 
endorsing carried out in the world, the way in which the community grapples with its 
own freedom manifests an external appearance.  Communities have shapes, differences, 
135 
 
and historical changes because the free beings in those communities are merely wielding 
their essential power to either vitalize, annihilate, or remain indifferent to their world.   
For example, sitting in this chair in a public space with other free beings has a 
reality for me and others only because we implicitly and explicitly endorse the power of 
this public space continually to be a mediator or limiting force on ourselves.  Since we 
are beings who are absolutely free, it is always possible that we may stop endorsing this 
particular content; it is always possible that the totality that is our organization changes 
because we change our living relation.  This public space may become a site of conflict, 
which, for Hegel, amounts to a struggle of endorsement between peoples about how to 
organize this content in terms of freedom.  Another possibility is that this public space 
may simply be abandoned, where all of its vitality is drained.  The existential fact of 
occupying a space of indifference opens up the possibility of a community organizing 
itself not in accordance with a concept that is absolutely limiting; rather, the community 
organizes itself according it owns history of living relations and endorsements of what 
externals hold meaning.  Put differently, the positive content of ethical life is wholly 
authored by that community, where that content becomes a substantial aspect of the self-
expression of the free beings in the community.   
5.5 Death, the Community, and the Freedom of the Individual: 
To be sure, the endorsement of positive ethical content by free beings does not 
entail that the position of indifference that the absolutely free being occupies has been 
eliminated.  Rather, the indifference of the individual retains its philosophical 
significance even in the context of a vibrant totality.  The individual may be posited as a 
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member of the community, where the now-endorsed external appears to be the root of her 
ethical life, but nevertheless, the core of the individual is an infinity, a purely negative 
absoluteness.160  Hegel’s argument is that this power of canceling, this power of freedom 
to always occupy a position of absolute indifference relative to any specific 
determination, grounds any account of ethical life.  I take Hegel to be drawing our 
attention to the idea that the free being, in living out her existence in the world with other 
free beings, is never absolutely dominated by any limitation.  Therefore, limitations 
appearing in the world are nonetheless ‘revisable.’  The organization of the world for free 
beings is never finalized, and remains a living, dynamic totality, or what Hegel describes 
as the positive element in ethical life.  The positive element of ethical life is in a perpetual 
state of negotiation or dialogue, and emphasis should be placed on the ‘living’ aspect of 
the living relation.  Importantly, we may then say that a ‘dead’ relation is in reality a 
spiritual grave, a reminder of the vitality that once flowed through the content.     
Every instance of an individual, through her freedom, endorsing some determinate 
content gives vitality or legitimacy to the endorsed determinacy.  However, each 
individual within the community is an absolute negativity, an absolutely free being that is 
always capable of occupying a stance of indifference relative to any determinations.  The 
absolutely free being is always capable of affirming its absolute independence through 
death, through the negation of all determinacies that aspire to have sway over her 
freedom.   
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The individual is an absolute singularity insofar as her freedom is both negative and 
absolute:  her freedom is negative insofar as she actualizes her freedom by denying the 
positive reality of some determination; her freedom is absolute insofar as her ability to 
deny the positive reality of some determination is unlimited relative to herself.  In other 
words, the freedom of the individual is negative, absolute, and pure:  the individual is in 
principle capable of expressing her freedom as utterly independent of external pressures 
or forces.  Hegel argues that the pure freedom of the individual makes its appearance as 
death:  the individual is always able to reject the pressures of any external determinations 
through her ability to kill herself.  “This negatively absolute, pure freedom, appears as 
death; and by his ability to die the subject proves himself free and entirely above all 
coercion.”161  The individual’s power to bring about her own death reveals the sheer 
absoluteness of the power of the individual to deny the ‘absolute’ reality of any external 
limitation.  Put otherwise, for any given set of determinations, limitations, or choices, no 
matter how strongly they appear as fixed, no matter how binding they appear to her life, 
the individual is always able to prove herself to be beyond these appearances through her 
ability to die.   
Death, then, reveals the individual to be an infinite pure concept, one that cannot be 
overridden by the positive totality of ethical life.  Since the individual expresses her pure 
and negatively absolute freedom through the possibility of death, the individual is an 
infinite singularity.  Put differently, the appearance of freedom as death, coupled with the 
fact that only the individual may ‘die for herself,’ means that death isolates the individual 
as an absolute singularity that is able to rise above any relation between herself and the 
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external world.  In this light, Hegel states that death is the absolute subjugator (absolute 
Bezwingung).162  The philosophical significance of the absolute subjugation brought 
about in death is pure individuality:  the absolute subjugation of death is also the absolute 
liberation from all determinacies.  Death is the evidence of the possibility of absolute 
liberation brought about by the individual, a liberation that is always possible no matter 
how ‘entrenched’ the individual appears to be in the living relation of the community.  
The negative absoluteness of the individual expressed in relation to death, the absolute 
Lord, reveals that human freedom finds its absolute expression in the position of 
indifference that may be adopted freely.  The key is that “…the moment of the negatively 
absolute or infinity…is a moment of the Absolute itself and must be exhibited in absolute 
ethical life.”163  The canceling of both +A and -A by the free being turns out to appear as 
the “completely equal positing” of both sides of the determination or, what amounts to 
the same, the positing of absolute indifference of the individual relative to the supposedly 
absolute opposition between determinacies.164    
Hegel’s emphasis on death as the most explicit appearance of the pure freedom of 
the individual shows us that the individual is a concept that is always on the trajectory to 
reveal itself in the context of a community.  While death is the appearance of the pure 
freedom of the individual, death also plays a central role in the individual’s affirmation of 
her relationship to her community.  It is through the possibility of death that the 
individual continually reaffirms her membership to a people:  the positive ethical content 
of a people is the result of a community of individuals continually choosing a 
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determination, a difference over the absolute indifference that shows itself in death.  In 
endorsing an external limitation, the free being is showing to herself and others that, in 
the face of her absolute and utter independence, she internalizes the determination, 
thereby affirming its influence on her freedom as a substantial external.  In essence, the 
individual is never capable of submitting herself wholly to the universal will because the 
fact of her death, something that cannot be submitted to others, reveals her absolute 
freedom.  Death, then, is similar to the supreme will insofar as it is the ultimate limitation 
on freedom.  However, the supreme will of the absolute Concept can only ever manifest 
itself as a formal, lifeless limitation; in contrast, death is a limitation that is intimately 
connected with the living relations of the free being.   
While the positive element of ethical life consists in the living relation among free 
beings in the finite world, the negative element of ethical life comes into view when we 
focus our attention on the indifference of the single individual.  The individuality of the 
free being is expressed by way of having the power to cancel any appearance of 
limitation or determination, what Hegel describes as “purely negative absoluteness.”165  
Since the positive content of an ethical community holds meaning through the continual 
endorsement of free individuals within that community, said content is always vulnerable 
to be not being endorsed.  In other words, at the heart of the positive content of ethical 
life is a dynamic vital force rooted in the freedom of individuals.  Taking the absolute 
freedom of individuals seriously reveals the raw and dynamic vitalizing force of 
individuals that may infuse a particular content with life or may just as easily pronounce 
a particular content as dead, as no longer having ethical significance.  In this sense, Hegel 
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holds the power of the individual to be the driving force behind any changes within a 
community and the community itself.   
5.6 Absolute Ethical Life: 
Absolute ethical life, then, is the expression of both the positive and negative 
elements discussed above.  On the one hand, the positive principle of absolute ethical life 
is the living totality, the organization, a people; on the other hand, the negative principle 
is the infinity of the individual, the subjugating of any apparent difference through 
abstraction.  “[T]he individual proves his unity with the people unmistakeably through 
the danger of death alone.”166  Given that the people is a living relation, ‘alive’ insofar as 
determinations and limitations are not fixed, and given that the individual expresses her 
freedom through the canceling of determinations, through her ability to undermine the 
fixed appearance of any determination, the individual proves herself to be a member of 
the people through her unrelenting power to be an individual.  Furthermore, peoples take 
up the position of individuals in relation to other peoples.  In short, the positive and 
negative elements of ethical life find their expression in the relation between individuals 
and the people, and between a people and other peoples.167   
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167 Hegel makes the claim at this point in the essay that war is just an example of an expression of ethical 
life between peoples, where individuals and peoples are reacquainted with the danger of death; war 
challenges the living relation, forcing a people to think about whether determinations or institutions are 
fixed.  A continual peace among peoples would entail that the living relation among peoples would be 
habituated to the problematic point of appearing to be an external limit on freedom that ‘just is.’  War is the 
courage of an individual people to challenge the fixity of a living relation, either within the state, or among 
other peoples.  In other words, war is the expression of the absolute ethical life insofar as war calls for the 
subjugation of ‘hardened’ determinations within a people.  Freedom is spiritual movement, and the 
hardening of institutions impedes the movement of spirit.  War is the bringing to the foreground the ethical 
principles that underlie the institutions and determinations of a people, both challenged and reaffirmed 
through conflict.  What Hegel’s account of war reveals to us is that the spiritual function of war accords 
with absolute ethical life.  To be sure, war from the perspective of individuals or peoples may be 
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5.7 The Case Study of Economics:  
In a particularly challenging portion of the text, Hegel argues that the ethical 
principles of absolute ethical life reveal themselves in parts of human reality, such as in 
economic life.  The system of needs is the term Hegel uses to describe the mode of 
economic life that accords with the free human being living in a society.  The economy is 
the organization of individual needs and enjoyments, brought together into one single 
common institution – the market.  The market turns out to be “the system of universal 
mutual dependence in relation to physical needs and work and the amassing of wealth for 
these needs.”168  While the economy appears as a totality that dominates the community, 
a positive reality that individuals ought to subject themselves to, Hegel’s point is that 
since the system of needs is based on the negativity and infinity of those participating in 
the market, it follows that the people, as a whole, regard the economy as a something that 
is to be dominated by the people, and not as something that dominates the people.  In 
other words, the negative principle of the economy must remain at the foreground.  “In 
order to prevent this system from becoming a self-constituting and independent power, it 
is not enough to set up the propositions that every one has a right to live, that in a people 
the commonweal has to see to it that every citizen shall have a sufficiency, and that there 
be perfect security and ease of gain.”169  The striking claim being made here is that since 
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the economy, as an ethical concept, involves the negative element of ethical life in a 
substantial way, the economy must not be treated as an independent, external power, nor 
as a self-constituting organization.   
From Hegel’s perspective, propositions that would ensure that members of the 
economy are not subject to changes within the market have the unintended effect of 
hardening the institution of the economy, of limiting the power of the negative to pervade 
the system as a whole.  Such propositions would result in a system that entrenches itself 
within the living relation in a fixed way.  Hegel holds that “the ethical whole 
must…preserve in this system the awareness of its inner nullity, and impede both its 
burgeoning in point of quantity, and the development of ever greater difference and 
inequality for which its nature strives.”170  Impeding quantity and the development of 
inequality are both ways in which the ethical whole, the living relation, restrains the 
economic system in terms of its striving towards a kind of totality.   
Hegel uses the example of the growth of property within a state to illustrate his 
point:  if the system of property were to increase in quantity, the state would also have to 
increase expenditures and taxes in order to ‘support’ the growth; increases in taxes, 
however, turns out to make the acquisition and maintenance of property more difficult, 
effectively checking the growth of the system of property.  The focus here is not on the 
particular means through which the processes and system within the living relation are 
checked; rather, the focus here is on the ‘negotiating’ power of the ethical whole to 
ensure that no system excludes either the negative or positive principle of freedom in any 
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aspect of the living relation.  Broadly, if any particular system were to present itself as a 
totality, the ethical whole responds in such a way as to prove itself to be the only real 
totality.  The ethical whole permits the growth of the economy, it seems, just to the point 
where the negative aspect announces itself as being in tension with the (now) 
independent economic system.  In other words, rupture is an essential trajectory of 
economic life, as the event of rupturing is a direct entailment of absolute ethical life. 
The living relation of the economic system is an expression of reality, but also of 
extremes. Since this living relation contains a kind of identity made up of determinacies 
that oppose one another, an ideality is present.  I take Hegel to be emphasizing that while 
the reality of economic life is, in part, the positive element of needs and the objects that 
address those needs, the system itself cannot be absolute.  The living relation, the unity of 
the opposed needs and objects of needs, has a ‘reality’ as well, but this reality is not a 
positive one; rather, the identity of the living relation being a whole in spite of its inner 
oppositions and differences is the work of ideality.  The positive relation of possession, 
when properly recognized as residing in the living relation of the system of needs a 
whole, turns out to be a relation of property.  In other words, the ideality that is in the 
background of the positive aspects of the economic system is the impetus or ground for 
relations that cannot be articulated absolutely by the needs and the objects of those needs.  
Law is present in the economic system because law just is the recognition of the 
insufficiency of the positive aspect to articulate itself as a whole.  While the positive 
element attempts to show itself as universal, differences and oppositions come to the 
foreground; only through the ideal relation that maintains an identity in the face of these 
differences is a universal possible.   
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In the context of the Absolute, the ideal unity that maintains an identity in the 
context of opposition has reality as a kind of external and formal equality.171  Hegel’s 
position is that since the reality of the economic system is, in part, made up of 
determinate needs and objects of those needs, then whatever unity that arises must 
preserve the essential role that determinacies play in the reality of the living relation.  
However, unity is not possible through these determinacies alone.  Thus, there must be an 
ideal identity that announces itself as a whole.  The living relation, then, must be one that 
announces itself as a whole while at the same time preserving the essential differences 
within the relation itself.  Hegel’s claim is that given these constraints on the expression 
of the living relation, the ideality of the living relation can only announce itself as 
“external and formal equality.”172  A science of this system, then, is locked into 
determining issues of differences in quantity.  In other words, since the unity of the living 
economic relation takes the shape of external and formal equality, the science of the 
relation must incorporate those very terms into its articulation.  A scientific analysis of 
this living relation must be concerned with differences in equality that occur within the 
system:  the identity that subjugates the differences within the system shapes the ‘aim’ of 
the science.  The economic science is therefore committed to making something that is 
determinate, individual, and living, into something that is objective, external, and lifeless 
– something that is capable of being a unit that can be compared to others units.  The 
superficial character of this identity in reality is a direct response to the persisting reality 
of differences and oppositions in the living relation.   
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The limits of the science of this aspect of ethical life are (1) calculations that 
involve fixed determinations, and (2) encountering endless contradictions among the 
fixed determinacies.  Economic decisions made in the face of these limits turn out to be 
accomplished by fixing a single determinacy, and then measuring other parts of the 
system according to that (arbitrarily) fixed element.  In short, no absolute is found 
‘internal’ to the science; rather, the science fixes and clings to determinacies in order to 
make any ‘scientific’ claim whatsoever.  Justice that is appropriate to ethical life, a justice 
that is total, requires that no determinacy is fixed and treated as absolute in the 
articulation of the living relation.  “True total justice is actual only in immediate ethical 
perception which subjugates the determinacies posited as absolute, and seizes only the 
whole.”173  Unpacking part of this sentence reveals a key aspect of Hegel’s account of 
ethical life:  true justice is only found in the ‘perception’ or ‘stance’ of the ethical 
member of the community, one who recognizes that the truth of freedom is the 
subjugation of determinacies in the context of the whole.  Put differently, an essential 
aspect of the point of view that is concerned with justice is the recognition of the 
changeable and unfixed quality of all determinations.  Traditions, historical 
determinations, relative contexts – the stance of true justice recognizes the limited role 
that such determinations play in ethical life, and seeks to overcome these determinations.  
We will return to the important issue of justice within ethical life in Chapter Six. 
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5.8 Laws and Duties: 
The economy is an example of an institution that shows the limitation of the 
concepts of rights and laws.  While rules within the institution may appear as absolute, 
the formal indifference that appears in the context of a sea of difference and opposition 
entails that these rules themselves are empty in the context of absolute ethical life. In the 
fixed reality of the science of the system of needs, these rules and duties appear to be 
governing and absolute; but, in reality, the system of needs is merely a sphere, a part of a 
whole, and the science of the same is also limited.  What is limited cannot itself appear as 
the absolute.   
With the case study of the economy in hand, we are in a better position to follow 
Hegel’s argument for why true justice cannot come about through law. Since human 
reality is comprised of tension and difference between the formal (negative) and the 
determinacies (positive), and since laws themselves arise out of this very ground, there 
can be no ideal or perfect legislation that would ‘solve’ or ‘put to an end’ the animating 
tension of the living relation.  Again, we should not expect to ‘hit upon’ through 
experience or through divine insight the legislation that will ensure that the economy, or 
any lawful institution within a community, operates in such a way as to protect and 
preserve social harmony for all future times.  Perfect legislation is impossible, just as true 
justice is impossible in the context of determinate laws.174  A law that is absolute would 
have to be unlimited and indeterminate; however, such a law would then have to be used 
to measure determinacies.  Hegel’s position is that such a measurement is impossible.  No 
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indeterminacy is capable of measuring or tracking determinacies, just as no determinacy 
is capable of standing in for an indeterminate absolute.   
Just as indeterminate laws cannot be taken as appropriate measures for 
determinacies, it is also the case, Hegel argues, that a set of determinacies cannot 
actualize true justice.  For every piece of legislation enacted, for every duty or rule that is 
to be followed, there arises more specification, more determination.  The growth of 
determinate laws entails the growth of more distinctions that would then have to be 
brought under determinate laws.  In short, an infinite number of perspectives and 
determinacies would have to be accounted for, and therefore no set of determinate 
legislation is capable of ‘completing’ the task.  The absoluteness of any (specific) law 
could not be respected, for it is always vulnerable to being altered based on further or 
future distinctions and specifications that arise in the process of forming a unity in the 
concrete.   
We have already determined the basic program that results in the impossibility of 
perfect legislation at work:  The positive content of a people is always vulnerable to the 
challenges of the negative absoluteness of individuals.  The power of freedom to 
annihilate any opposition entails that no laws can be put forth that would quell this 
power.  To be sure, the argument being made here is not that humans are ultimately 
lawless; rather, the argument put forth by Hegel is that freedom finds its expression in the 
world through reflecting on its history, or through looking for ‘better’ laws.   
A political philosophy that is based on an abstract social contract, or on the concept 
of freedom, is merely addressing the formal character of the individual’s absolute 
freedom.  Here, the unity of a people resides in the abstract thought of equality of 
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individuals through mutual submission.  What is fixed here is the empty thought that the 
law governing the abstract unity of individuals reaches all the way to the core of the 
individual:  a unity in thought is taken to be sufficient for a unity in reality.  “The 
persistence of the notion that, in this sphere of human affairs, inherently absolute and 
specific law and duty are possible results from the formal indifference, or the negative 
absolute, which has its place and is indeed implicit only in the fixed reality of this sphere.  
But as implicit it is empty; in other words, there is nothing absolute in it except just pure 
abstraction, the utterly vacuous thought of unity.”175  Fixing laws or duties with the intent 
to actualize a community of free beings that accords with the concept of freedom is an 
empty thought because the actualization of a community of free beings requires no fixed 
spheres of influence.  Instead, the claim being made by Hegel is that the concrete reality 
of the free being is the interplay between positive and the negative, between the positive 
content and the formal negativity that the free being continually navigates.  The ethical 
life of an individual just is the navigation of the changing spiritual landscape within and 
without her community.   
Recognizing the nullity of a unity grounded in abstract laws entails a limitation on 
how we are to view justice.  We can no longer view true justice as a possibility that arises 
from a determinacy of law or from the absolute Concept.  Just as the transition from the 
abstract to the concrete reveals the nullity of a unity grounded solely in the abstract, the 
same transition reveals the impossibility of justice through law.  The problem is one of 
measure:  it is not possible to use an infinite ruler (a law) to determine absolutely whether 
justice in the concrete, in the particular has been carried out.  At this point, the difference 
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between the infinite and the finite has not been reconciled, and therefore neither is an 
appropriate measure of the other.  Since the judge must play a role in the development 
and employment of legislation, it is impossible for that legislation to be ‘free’ of 
particularity; put differently, the presence of the judge reveals the non-absolute character 
of concrete laws.176  The hope for perfect legislation or for true justice arising out of a set 
of concrete laws, according to Hegel, is an empty hope.  Concrete situations can never be 
settled by determinate laws, for any determinacy is vulnerable to further determinacies:  
in reality, determinate laws cannot fully articulate the concrete situation.  Furthermore, 
the growing determinations of laws cannot be understood as approximating a goal, for we 
have already encountered the nullity of such a goal.  In short, the absoluteness of the 
concept of law cannot gain a foothold in the concrete world.   
Reconciliation between the abstract determinations of law and concrete situations 
seems to be found in the concretization of a unity that recognizes the non-absoluteness of 
determinations of law.  “[I]n order that the One, the judicial view of law and judgment, 
may become organized and a genuine unity and whole within the multiplicity, it is 
absolutely necessary that every single one of the specifications of law be modified (i.e. be 
partly cancelled precisely as an absolute, self-existent specification of that for which it 
claims to be the law), and hence, that its absoluteness be not respected.”177  A unity that 
respects the absoluteness of determinations of law cannot also assert the meaningful 
application of those laws in concrete situations, for that would amount to measuring the 
finite against the infinite.  Given that some perspective, some human being is necessarily 
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involved in judging a law to be applicable to a concrete situation, laws can never be 
applied purely; the judge is, in this respect, a representation of the lack of respect that 
must be maintained towards the absoluteness of laws. 
From this portion of the essay, we begin to see the limitation of law in the context 
of an ethical community.  The concrete unity must, Hegel states, take up a negative 
attitude towards a system of determinate laws.  Put differently, a community must 
maintain a fundamental awareness of the limitations of law.  To be sure, the organization 
of a people involves determinations of law by the people; but as a concrete organization, 
the people need a healthy scepticism towards the law in order to ward off the fixing of 
any determination as final.  The complex relationship that the people have with the 
system of law is never one of indifference.  This may suggest that the people themselves 
cannot take a stance of indifference; rather the stance of indifference occurs at the level 
of spirit.  The absolute character of absolute ethical life does not entail the end of tension 
between within ethical life; instead, the reality of the absolute ethical life from the 
perspective of the community is an unsettled and dynamic life. 
5.9 The Tragic Performance of Ethical Life: 
Let us now consider the way in which the dynamic aspect of ethical life is 
actualized.  On the one hand, absolute ethical life is hostile towards the living relation:  
the living relation appears as fixed, and the negative aspect of the absolute occupies a 
position that is an abstraction from the positive living relation.  On the other hand, 
absolute ethical life has a positive element that exists in the world and therefore submits 
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to the living relation as it exists and accepts it as real.178  Broadly, Hegel’s position is that 
the negative absolute turns out to engage in two kinds of relation to absolute ethical life.  
The first relation turns out to be the existence of two constitutive dynamic cycles that 
affect the living relation.  The first cycle is ‘eternal restlessness,’ where the negative 
aspect remains hostile to the positive aspect and seeks to consume the positive aspect 
(which is itself, nonetheless) in order to bring about a new organization.  The second 
dynamic cycle is ‘eternal cancellation,’ where the negative seeks to cancel the appearance 
of difference.  One possible way to interpret this section is that these dynamic cycles 
operate on both the shape and the content of the living relation, where the negative 
absolute reveals itself as being in tension with both ‘sides’ of the living relation.  The 
second relation is one where what has been cancelled is preserved.  In cancelling, the 
negative absolute posits something to be cancelled – the real.   
The major entailment here is that there is a limit to the cancelling power of the 
negative insofar as it cannot wholly overcome the real, since the real must be posited in 
order for the negative to have a relation in the first place.  In short, the negative absolute 
must come to recognize its relationship with the real, even if it is a hostile one.179  
Conversely, individuality can never be wholly cancelled, and the living relation must 
always be dealing with indifference and individuality.  No positive ethical life, no real 
living relation could be so dominant as to overcome or eradicate individuality.  
Furthermore, the individual is the site of the negative and the positive – both are ‘real’ to 
the individual even if both are not ‘real’ from the perspective of the living relation.  No 
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institutions, laws, customs could ‘take care’ of the hostility towards the living relation 
that the individual is capable of actualizing in the world.  Put differently, there is no 
preventative measure that the positive ethical life could take that would prevent 
hostility.180  
Fixed laws cannot be the definitive ground of an ethical community because the 
actualization of those laws, the making concrete of any law, breeds only further tensions 
and issues, such as the need for more and more laws or the need for a judge to ‘make a 
decision’ about the laws.  Thus, a system of laws is an essential but inadequate aspect of 
ethical life, specifically as the source of positive content endorsed by the community.  
Again, the dialogue within the community that produces this positive content is between 
members of that community; negativity plays a role in the dialogue by shaping the 
positive content of the community through its challenge towards that very content.  
However, the decree of a system of law does not bring about an end to the dialogue:  
Hegel’s argument shows that even the most ‘refined’ or ‘thoughtful’ system of laws 
endorsed by a community runs into a problem of actualization; any fixed determinacy 
within an ethical community is challenged.  While the ethical life of the community may 
seem to be settled, endorsed, and vibrant, from the perspective of absolute ethical life 
such a system of laws is a fixed determinacy that is nevertheless a challenge to the 
negativity within ethical life.   
Principles within an ethical community that are ‘made absolute’ reveal themselves 
in the world as externalities that exclude negative treatments or, in other words, exclude 
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the ability of the free being to express themselves through possession or self-sufficiency.  
However, we should not take Hegel to be claiming that since there can be no absolute, 
fixed principles, then a basic kind of relativism dominates the living relation.  The 
underlying trajectory of the living relation is the actualization of freedom in the world, or 
of the absolute ethical life, both in terms of its positive and negative elements.  So, if we 
were to suppose that a particular principle within the living relation has become fixed, we 
are ‘warranted’ on the ground of freedom to challenge the fixedness of the principle.   
Let us revisit the power of the negative in terms of its place within absolute ethical 
life and how that power manifests itself in the reality of ethical life from the perspective 
of the people.  From the perspective of absolute ethical life, the negative manifests itself 
as hostile to any system of fixed determinations.  From the perspective of the people, the 
negative manifests itself in (not absolute) ethical life as the formal and abstract unity that 
is under the dominion of the system of laws, a kind of submission to the reality of the 
system.  Importantly, in neither case is ethical life indifferent to the system of laws:  In 
other words, in both cases the system of laws presents itself as a kind of opposition that 
needs to be ‘dealt with,’ either through an attempt to endorse that system of laws through 
negating the system itself or through submitting to the laws.181   
Yet both of these relations, the one of hostility towards the laws and the one of 
submission, must nevertheless be as one when absorbed into indifference itself.  By 
invoking the point of indifference here, I take Hegel to be referring to the ‘highest form’ 
of absolute ethical life, one that has overcome or sublated the oppositions mentioned 
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above.  “This means that the absolute ethical order must organize itself completely as 
shape, since relation is the abstraction of the aspect of shape.”182  In relation, opposition 
remains at the foreground, for the boundary between one is used as the marker for its 
relation to the other and vice versa.  In contrast, shape is both the acknowledgement and 
acceptance of boundaries brought together into a unity, a oneness that related to itself 
through itself or as something that gives itself its own shape.  “Though becoming wholly 
indifferent in the shape, the relation does not lose its nature of relation.  It remains a 
relation of organic to inorganic nature.”183  Shape engenders indifference insofar as 
boundaries between opposites become contours of the one whole, meaning that the shape 
is (internally) indifferent.  However, the absorption of the opposed relations into the 
shape of ethical life does not wholly annihilate the moments of bounded relations.  The 
relation between the positive and negative, between the fixed and the undetermined, 
between the inorganic and organic is nevertheless ‘alive’ within the shape.  Importantly, 
the concrete external reality of the shape as a oneness does not thereby entail that the 
internal reality of that shape has been settled; like an organism, the shape is a one that is 
composed of oppositions and differences.   
5.10 Ethical life and its Historical Body: 
Given that the living relation remains at the core of absolute ethical life, we turn 
now to understand how the logic of the relation is carried out in the concrete.  In one 
respect, the relation as ideal is the primary.  “[T]he relation is, strictly speaking, in the 
shape and in indifference; and the eternal restlessness of the concept or of infinity is in 
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part the organization itself, self-consuming and surrendering the purely quantitative and 
the appearance of life, in order that it might rise eternally, its own seed-corn, from its 
ashes to new youth.”184  In this respect, the process of self-organization is the process of 
continually ‘working on’ its appearance through consuming that very appearance for the 
sake of announcing itself as an indifference:  the life of an ethical community is not 
located in its appearance; rather, its life is expressed in its efforts to maintain itself in the 
face of its ‘ever-decaying’ appearance. Since any settled appearance is an anathema to 
indifference, ethical life as a self-organizing shape proves its indifference by consuming 
its own appearance.  Ethical life as shape “…eternally cancels its outward difference, 
and, feeding on and producing the inorganic, it calls forth from indifference a difference 
or relation to an inorganic nature, and in turn cancels that relation and consumes that 
nature as it consumes itself.”185  The relation as ideal within the now-shaped ethical life 
cancels outward difference, and in doing so, summons a difference from the indifference 
as the inorganic.  We will be returning to Hegel’s conception of inorganic nature in 
absolute ethical life later in Chapter Six.  For now, we need only note that within ethical 
life as shape the ideal relation is a process of self-organization through self-consumption.  
Thus, the life of the ethical shape is one of internal strife and unending overcoming for 
the sake of the living shape itself.   
So, ethical life is tragic insofar as its living performance involves making itself 
objective, sacrificing itself in the face of this objectivity, and then remaking itself out of 
the cleansing awareness of the right of the inorganic.  Put differently, the ‘body’ of 
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ethical life develops in the world as a kind of unfolding of itself in relation to its own 
perspective of itself, where the boundaries between the organic and the inorganic are 
actualized in a living relation.  Perhaps another way to phrase the point is that the living 
part of the totality recognizes that it cannot infuse the inorganic with life, and that the 
refusal of the organic to ‘not get over’ the death of the inorganic would amount to an 
opposition between the organic and the inorganic that could not be overcome.  The 
organic reasserts its vitality through the recognition of the inorganic’s right to be dead, 
thereby framing the inorganic in a way that affirms the organic’s power to maintain itself 
as alive. 
Importantly, Hegel argues, the tragic performance of ethical life brings about a 
perspective on the Divine.186  Ethical life’s mastery of itself in the face of its own death 
through its own self-sacrifice turns out to be something like a reflection of the Divine in 
the living spirit of the people.  The body of ethical life is formed through its own 
performances, where these performances are always implicitly reflecting the on the 
Divine, but also where these performances give the ethical life its own body, its own 
history.  The performance of Absolute ethical life does not bring about the Absolute 
itself; instead, the living body that is cast in the Divine light of the Absolute is a 
perspective on the Absolute.  The ethical community does not come to a position of 
absolute knowing; the ethical community does not become satisfied with itself, but 
remains concerned with the yonder, the continually renewed urge to maintain its living 
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body.  A people is never settled; a culture is never finished; from the perspective of the 
ethical community, the Divine is never immanent.   
The Divine is nonetheless immanent within the ethical community, but only from 
the perspective of the philosopher.  Tragedies within the ethical community turn out to be 
moments within the history of that community that reaffirm the immanence of the 
Divine; every tragedy within the community is at the same time a moment for the 
performance of reconciliation.  “Tragedy consists in this, that ethical nature segregates its 
inorganic nature (in order not to become embroiled in it), as a fate, and places it outside 
of itself; and by acknowledging this fate in the struggle against it, ethical nature is 
reconciled with the Divine being as the unity of both.”187  The tarrying with opposition 
within ethical life is essential to its reconciliation and its unity with the Divine.  The 
struggle of the ethical community against its fate is the actualization of its living body 
through the tragic performances:  the life of the community is always defined against its 
struggles, against the dead, inorganic aspects that threatened to sunder the community as 
a living reality. 
5.11 Conclusion: 
The Idea of absolute ethical life has been established as the proper ground for 
articulating the reality of human freedom.  Importantly, absolute ethical life actualizes 
itself through performance of mediating the dynamic and essential tension between the 
positive and negative elements of freedom.  Hegel’s position is we must consider history 
in our account of ethical life because the organic growth of ethical life in carried out in 
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the real as a kind of performance.  The empirical has been given a role in a philosophy of 
natural law; however, the empirical must be taken up as part of the on-going and dynamic 
relation between what ethical life determines as the organic and the inorganic.  The next 
chapter explores the performance of ethical life in more concrete terms and how we 
should articulate the role of the individual in that very performance.   
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CHAPTER 6. ETHICAL LIFE, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND JUSTICE 
 
6.1 Introduction: 
The logic of absolute ethical life reveals the necessary and essential role that the 
tension between the positive and negative elements plays in the actualization of 
community.  The unfolding of the Idea of absolute ethical life occurs through the 
dynamic vitalizing force of free individuals organized around a principle.  In order to 
determine just what a philosophy of natural law entails given the Idea of absolute ethical 
life, we must delve further into the way in which the ethical life of a people manifests 
itself.  While the previous chapter articulates the logic of this unfolding in a broad sense, 
where the tragedy of spirit is made clear, we must now engage in a closer examination of 
the means whereby these tensions and tragedies are expressed.  Put differently, individual 
members of the community play essential roles in expressing both the positive and 
negative elements within the living relation, but more specificity surrounding these roles 
is required.  In order to understand Hegel’s provocative conclusions surrounding a 
philosophy of natural law, we must now turn to an examination of ethical life in actuality.   
We have established that, thus far, Hegel’s Idea of ethical life is the vitalized and 
dynamic history of positive ethical content of the community contrasted with the negative 
absoluteness of the individual.  Hegel’s argument shows that not only is this relationship 
between the positive and negative an ongoing and essential aspect of ethical life, but 
ethical life has a point of view on itself or has an awareness of this movement.  In order 
to put ourselves in a position to determine the distinctive shape of an account of natural 
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law, we must examination further the way in which ethical life unfolds in reality.  We 
shall see that the tensions and dynamism within the living history of ethical life turn out 
to be the foundation for a philosophy of natural law.  The conclusion of this chapter 
explores Hegel’s argument for the dissolving of the distinction between morality and a 
system of law from the perspective of absolute ethical life. 
6.2 Individuality within Ethical Life: 
Recall that within absolute ethical life is the tendency towards the point of absolute 
indifference.  Every expression of freedom within the context of the community carries 
within it the possibility of causing a reverberation throughout the community.  In order to 
explore this part of Hegel’s argument in a more nuanced way, we first turn towards the 
general tendency within absolute ethical life to prove to itself that any difference that 
arises is merely apparent.   
In an introductory sense, the logic of absolute ethical life is set up to handle the 
ongoing wave of differences that confront the community by proving that any given 
difference is not absolute.  The actions of individuals, events in the world of nature, 
changes in the political landscape – all of these events impact the way in which the 
community expresses itself as a living relation.  From the perspective of the living 
relation in its ideality, the arising of difference is a kind of challenge to the absoluteness 
of the ethical totality and needs to be cancelled.  This cancellation is carried out for the 
sake of the returning to the point of indifference within ethical life.  However, the process 
of cancellation is also the process of positing that which is cancelled.  Since indifference 
makes its appearance through the cancellation of difference, the being of difference is 
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posited through this very cancellation.  “In other words, the cancelling posits something 
that it cancels, the real; and so there would be an actuality and difference which ethical 
life cannot surmount.”188  Since individuality, Hegel argues, cannot cleanse itself of 
difference in order to be absorbed into the absolute indifference, the being of difference 
manifests itself in the individual.189  Put differently, the very positing of the absolute 
indifference that arises from the cancellation of difference affirms the actuality of 
individuality or, what amounts to the same, the actuality of a difference that has not been 
sublated.  Individuality within ethical life is the site of the problematic supersession of 
difference, a supersession that is also an affirmation.     
The separations between the negative and the positive, between the universal and 
the real, between the finite and the infinite – these separations are apparent to 
consciousness, but, from the perspective of the Absolute, these separations are in fact 
evidence of the underlying unity.  The challenge before us then is to properly articulate 
both the unity of the real and the ideal in consciousness while at the same time capturing 
the problematic way in which that unity is actualized for the individual consciousness.  
We must track the underlying unity in our description of the reality of the free individual, 
but our description must nevertheless retain the alienation that is constitutive of the life of 
the free individual.   
In order to better unpack the relationship between the Absolute and the individual 
spirit that is alienated from the Absolute, Hegel employs the analogy of the mineral to 
better illustrate his argument.  “The most perfect mineral displays the nature of the whole 
 
188 Hegel, 99. 
189 Hegel, 99. 
162 
 
in each part that is broken from a lump…”190  Similarly, the free individual, in its 
counterfeit independence, displays the whole that is implicit.  “…but [the mineral’s] ideal 
form is separateness, whether as the inner form of the fragment or the outer form of 
crystallization.”191  The mineral is similar to the free individual, for the consciousness 
that is the free individual exists, ideally, as separate, despite its unity with the whole in 
the real.  The fragment of mineral has an existence in its separation from the whole, but 
this separation does not annihilate its unity with the whole.  The reality of the mineral as 
a whole necessarily leaves open the space for the fragmentation of the lump from the 
whole; in this separation, however, the lump is always implicitly referencing the whole, 
just as it is in the nature of the mineral as a whole to have existence in fragments.192   
The individual ethical life is the living negativity of the subject, the infinite 
abstraction of freedom actualized.  Real absolute ethical life is the living totality, the 
people, the reality of the absolute ethical life as indifferent.  What needs to be determined 
now is the relationship between individual ethical life and real absolute ethical life.  Real 
absolute ethical life, Hegel reminds us, is united in itself and comprehends infinity in an 
absolute sense; furthermore, given the absolute character of this real ethical life, 
individuality as the “supreme abstraction”  nevertheless ‘falls under’ the domain of the 
real absolute ethical life.193  However, we must keep in mind that individuality is the 
focal point of real absolute ethical life.  So, the ethical life of the individual is, in an 
important sense, the ‘best’ expression of the reality of the real absolute ethical life; the 
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individual ethical life is “…one pulse beat of the whole system and is itself the whole 
system.”194  Real absolute ethical life is the foundation of individual ethical life, but 
individual ethical life is where the free spirit as subject may come to know herself in a 
concrete sense.   
To be sure, while we are describing the intimate connection between the real 
absolute ethical life and individual ethical life in such a way as to showcase the 
accomplished reality of individual ethical life, we must be careful not to claim that 
individual ethical life is just a mirror of the real absolute ethical life.  In other words, the 
real absolute ethical life does not mirror itself as such in the individual.  Real absolute 
ethical life is the Idea that comprehends infinity (the absolute Concept) through itself as 
the abstraction from the absolute Idea.  Pure individuality, then, is merely the real 
absolute ethical life viewed from the highest abstraction.  Viewed from the side of the 
particular, the concrete, real absolute ethical life is ethical life of the community.  
Importantly, both the individual and the community are grounded in the real absolute 
ethical life.  Our analysis of Hegel’s Idea of freedom has shown that the individual is the 
community and the community is the individual, insofar as both are ‘viewpoints’ on the 
real absolute ethical life.  “[T]he ethical life of the individual is one pulse beat of the 
whole system and is itself the whole system.”195  If we were to claim that the individual is 
a discrete member of a group of individuals, then we would be replacing the pulse of the 
system as a whole with an abstract way of defining the relationship between the 
individual and the community.  Nature is not simply the set of particular things in nature, 
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and nature is not simply the abstract set of rules that lord over any particular thing; we 
cannot separate a thing from nature and keep its essence in tact; we must view the thing 
as a concrete expression of the whole of nature.  We must view the individual and the 
ethical life of the community in the same way; to abstract one from the other would be to 
undermine the reality of both.   
Given the above, the person and the people are reciprocal determinations.  
However, we must recognize, Hegel argues, that the positive is logically prior to the 
negative:  the spirit of the people is prior to the freedom of the individual.  If the 
individual were utterly self-sufficient, then that individual would be unable to relate to 
the state as a part to the whole.  Since the individual in isolation is not self-sufficient in 
this strong sense, then she must be a part that is united with the whole, the state.  If the 
individual were prior to the state, then the individual would have no place in or use for 
communal life, and therefore the concept of the free individual would collapse into that 
of the beast or the God.196  The human being, however, is an individual only because the 
people is prior, and thus the spirit of the people that is the mark of the positive in spirit 
that logically precedes the mark of the negative.  
The result, Hegel argues, is that within reality, where objective ethical life resides, 
is a division “…into one part which is absorbed absolutely into indifference, and another 
wherein the real as such subsists and thus is relatively identical, and carries in itself only 
the reflection of absolute ethical life.”197  The key part here is that the reality of objective 
ethical life is in part rooted in individuality, where the reality of individuality is a 
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reflection of ethical life.  The posited individuality contains not only a reflection of 
ethical life itself, but also a relative identity with ethical life in its process of positing the 
ideal and the real:  the freedom of the individual is nevertheless bound up with absolute 
ethical life and its program of achieving indifference.  The existence of the absolute is 
necessary, but the existence of the problematic relationship between the absolute and the 
finite, between the divine ethical life and the free individual, is also necessary.  The 
reality of ethical life, the reality of the living organic totality, is the expression of the 
harmonization between the real and the ideal; but the reality of ethical life is also the 
reality of the freedom of the individual, where the free individual, the spiritual but mortal 
being, cannot completely unify itself with the absolute due to its empirical consciousness.  
Put differently, the free individual necessarily exists as a point of view, as taking up the 
world through its consciousness, and this inner separation between the world and the 
empirical consciousness of the same is constitutive of the life of the free individual.  To 
be an individual is to have an empirical point of view, and the very presence of a point of 
view, of an inner private space that is grounded in finitude of the individual, entails that a 
unity between the free individual and the absolute is not possible.   
But we are not to conclude that the individual remains utterly severed from the 
living spirit, from the absolute ethical life, for the free individual as spirit “…enjoys a 
view of the Absolute, as it were, as alien.”198  The alienation of the free individual from 
the ethical life is not total or absolute, but one that bears an implicit relation.  Enacting, or 
living out, its alienation, the free individual implicitly communes with the absolute 
ethical life.  In other words, the alienation of the free individual from ethical life is in fact 
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its participation in the living Spirit behind the back of the individual.  Religion turns out 
to be the avenue where the consciousness of the free individual is wholly united with the 
Absolute, but only in its ideal sense.  God, then, is for the free individual a necessary 
result of the separation between the real and the ideal for the finite spirit:  religion is the 
finite spirit’s explicit communion with the Absolute, but only with the Absolute in the 
ideal.  The implicit communion with the Absolute by the free individual among free 
individuals is the positivity, the ethical organization, that is always the backdrop of the 
free individual.  Each free individual is an implicit participant and maker of the ethical 
organization; here we see something like the ethical significance of the people in the face 
of the free individual.  There is no person without a people; there is no people without a 
person. 
The actuality of ethical life is not in the universal but in the finite, in the real.  Since 
the actuality of ethical life is tied to the real, the divine within the ethical – the absolute 
harmony between the real and the ideal – is not possible.  The very attempt of ethical life 
to take up the finite into harmony with the ideal in order to express its inner divinity 
reveals the impossibility of raising the finite to the level of the infinite.  Instead, the 
ethical life that struggles with the finite in its attempts to realize itself as it truly is 
expresses the divinity with ethical life in a distorted way.  The distortion of the divine 
within the concrete life of ethical life amounts to moments within human history, and in a 
very broad sense the history of a people may be viewed as the process of transitioning 
from a distortion to a clearer expression of the Absolute.  Ethical life in the concrete turns 
out to be an ‘internally complete’ perspective on absolute ethical life.  This is important 
insofar as we do not want to hold that concrete ethical life is merely an approximation on 
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absolute ethical life in the sense that the concrete is always approaching the absolute.  
Rather, an entailment of Hegel’s argument seems to be that ethical life, while never 
complete in relation to the absolute, nevertheless attains satisfaction in its historical 
moment.  Ethical life does not bring about unity within itself, within its struggles:  the 
‘best’ that ethical life can do in the face of the finite is a semblance of unity understood as 
a “…counterfeit negative independence – i.e. as freedom of the individual.”199  I take this 
to mean that the freedom of the individual, while an expression of the inability of ethical 
life to bring its divinity into the real, is the highest expression of ethical life.  The real 
essence of ethical life is expressed in the freedom of the individual, and the life of ethical 
life is always concerned with the concrete reality of the freedom of the individual; an 
affront to this freedom is an affront to concrete reality of ethical life.  So, the trajectory of 
the ethical life is, ultimately, grounded in the realization of the freedom of the individual.  
However, we should not interpret this statement as claiming that the individual is more 
substantial than the living relation, the community of others.  Rather, the most concrete 
place where ethical life manifests itself is in the individual. 
Our motivation for going down this philosophical path is to take the absoluteness of 
freedom seriously, where the relationship between positivity, negativity, and indifference 
is given the conceptual space to organize itself according to its inner logic.  The concrete 
reality of the free individual culminates in both the ‘power’ of the individual to be 
embedded in the ethical life of her people and the ‘power’ of the individual to re-evaluate 
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her embeddedness to the point where she may decide to divorce herself from her people, 
her ethical home.   
6.3 Ethical Life in a More Concrete Sense: 
Given what we have established about the structure of ethical life, and given that 
expression of the free individual is at the very core of ethical life, both as its site of 
actualization and as its project, we are now in a position to explore the dynamic way in 
which individuals participate in a community.  The task now is to sort out the relation 
between the essence of the individual and her reality within her community, or between 
absolute ethical life (as a free being) and relative ethical life (the historical way in which 
the community of free beings emerges).   
The underlying torrent of relations is expressed in ethical life through the process 
of positing, negating, and reconciling.  “This is nothing else but the performance, on the 
ethical plane, of the tragedy which the Absolute eternally enacts with itself, but eternally 
giving birth to itself into objectivity, submitting in this objectivity to suffering and death, 
and rising from its ashes into glory.”200  There are three parts within the performance that 
need to ‘fit’ together:  the negative attitude within the absolute, the positive realm of the 
absolute in the shape of the practical, and the Absolute in its fullest sense.  “Thus there is 
posited a relation of absolute ethical life, which would reside entirely within individuals 
and be their essence, to relative ethical life which is equally real in individuals.”201  For 
Hegel, the opposition between the negative attitude and the practical realm brings forth 
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conflict and tension that drives the living relation that is the community.  This section 
focuses on the second core part of Hegel’s account of the practical realm within ethical 
life, namely that from the perspective of absolute ethical life the internal strife of the 
community just is the actualization of its reality.  
The following is an account of the dynamic internal to ethical life, where effort has 
been made to use language that less abstract.  Broadly, absolute ethical life is a process of 
self-renewal through self-articulation, and the spirit of a people is ultimately expressed in 
its history.  Positive laws, or laws put forth by the community that form the backdrop of 
(relative) justice, turn out to be the result of genuine effort on behalf of persons within a 
people.  But for every determinate law put forth by members of the community, the 
consuming flame of the universal is stoked in other individuals within the same 
community.  At its most benign, the negativity of ethical life embodied in the conviction 
of the individual prompts dialogue between the people and its individuals, a re-evaluation 
of the positive law.  At its most destructive, that same negativity inserts a wedge that 
ultimately sunders a community.  While determinate laws show themselves as markers of 
the community, determinate laws also turn out to be sites where the community needs to 
call into question whether these laws are in tune with the life of a people. 
Consider the dynamic relationship between the positive and negative elements of 
freedom, and their impact on the laws of the community.  Per the positive element, the 
community is always engaged in vitalizing objects and rules in the community as lawful.  
Per the negative element, since the members of the community retain the absolute power 
to negate any structure of meaning, the laws of the community are never settled.  As 
shown in Chapter Four, a ‘perfect’ system of law is impossible.  Recall that the reason 
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why such a system is impossible, Hegel argues, is due to the structure of our freedom and 
not because we simply have not yet hit upon perfection through our skills in reasoning.  
As individuals participating in the community, individuals always retain the ‘final’ power 
to affirm or deny the grip that the law has on them, and since the reality of laws is 
necessarily tethered to the free activity of individuals, laws are inherently fragile.   
Our freedom is structured in a way that finds its expression in the laws and customs 
of the community – we are necessarily concerned with laws, customs, networks of 
meaning.  However, the content of our concern is always fragile.  Since freedom in the 
community is made manifest through affirmations and negations, the community always 
remains in a state of ongoing debate with respect to how it understands itself through its 
own laws, customs, and so forth.  Through our daily participation in the community, we 
each affirm the meaning or reality structured by the laws of the community, and we each 
affirm (implicitly or otherwise) the legitimacy or illegitimacy of actions carried out by 
members of the community in the present or the past. 
Now that we have established the fundamental tension that animates the lawful 
community, we may take a closer look at the ‘life cycle’ of the laws.  The birth of laws in 
general is the product of free beings (even though they may not take themselves as free) 
coming together to vitalize a shared network of meaning.  What grounds the community 
of free beings is a shared principle, a shared perspective on how to express themselves in 
the world.  Laws that are birthed in already ongoing community are similar in structure:  
the new laws are culmination of efforts within the community to have a new path of self-
expression recognized as legitimate by others.  The birth of a law then, in part, is the 
announcement by the community of a new limitation that is to be held as meaningful in 
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the community’s expression of how freedom should take place.  Importantly, there is no 
great divide between laws or customs in this regard:  the point of significance is found in 
how free beings continually vitalize the new limitation or condition even though they 
could always do otherwise.   
The life of a law is centred around its role as a condition of self-expression.  Each 
individual is radically free, and yet, despite each individual’s power to negate the claim 
that the law has on their life, each individual invests the law with their vital energy.  The 
life of the law is related to the experience of home – a grounding network of meaning that 
one uses as a base of operations, so to speak.  The ‘living laws’ are pathways towards, or 
enablers of, the individual’s efforts to express herself in a way that accords with the 
community.  The stop sign is a condition setup by the community that helps me navigate 
the network of shared meaning in a way that allows me to voluntarily participate with 
others and to express myself using terms that are recognized by others.  Again, I always 
retain the power to express myself in a way that is not recognized by others, and always 
retain the ability to free myself from the network of meaning.  Hegel’s point is that while 
I do not make the choice to enter into this network of meaning, as a free being, I always 
am capable of denying part or all of that network.   
But what occurs when a law reveals itself as no longer an enabler of self-expression 
by members of the community?  What happens if the law comes to be viewed as an 
obstacle to, or as dissonant with, the shared network of meaning?  Of course, such a 
possibility, for Hegel, always remains in the background because the life of a law is 
dependent on its continued vitalization through the actions of free beings.  Furthermore, 
the death of a law is inevitable given that freedom is historical, or that the ways in which 
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freedom expresses itself changes.  Laws that were ‘enablers of self-expression’ in the past 
may come to be viewed as ‘disablers’ in the present.  Recall that the vitality of a law is 
always tethered to the activity of individuals.  Within a community, individuals inevitably 
come to see certain laws as obstacles to their self-expression, and, depending on the 
strength of the movement, these laws may be drained of their vitality, or laws that are 
now interpreted as no longer legitimate paths of self-expression.   
When alive, the laws enable the growth of the community; when dead, these same 
laws turn out to be the site that spurns new growth.  What is dead is put to rest, and what 
rises out of the ashes of the dead is new life, and the death of a law summons the 
community to make new commitments. 
So, what grounds our debates around the relevance of certain laws is the tragic 
structure whereby the community consumes a part of itself for the sake of its further 
growth.  Remember that all particular laws are works of free beings expressing 
themselves in the world; but, since laws are always being checked against the absolute 
power of individuals, laws are fragile.  The upside of fragile laws is that no laws can be 
taken as absolute in the community, the community is always on the trajectory towards 
debating laws (whether it wants to or not).  The downside of fragile laws is that the death 
of a law is the death of a perspective, a certain structure of meaning that was once alive, 
and was once a part of the community.  The community, in putting forth new laws, turns 
out to consume what was itself, so that the community may be born again, so to speak.  
The tragedy of the community, according to Hegel, is that the process of self-
consumption for the sake of organic growth is the basic mode of communal life for free 
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beings.  In other words, the community is a process of continual self-overcoming; 
conflict, tension, debate, alienation – these are essential aspects of communal life. 
Our role in the community is to participate in the on-going dialogue taking place in 
the community.  Our role is to engage with others to show that a particular law is dead 
and a hindrance on self-expression or to show that that same law is alive and the nay-
sayers are in the wrong.  Of course, the dialogue around the rightness or wrongness of a 
law is never clear.  Nevertheless, our role in the community is essential:  each of us are 
stakeholders in the network of meaning of the community, and the growth of the 
community, the birth of new ways of self-expression, the death of laws that turn out to be 
oppressive, are all rooted in our participation in the community itself.  We may work 
towards asserting the rightness of the community; we may work towards convincing the 
community to adopt a change in its network of meaning; we may leave the community.  
Not only is tragedy found in the structure of the human community insofar as its growth 
necessitates the overcoming or consumption of human effort, but tragedy may be found 
in the efforts of individual members of the community to adopt a change in the shared 
network.  The rejection of the change amounts to the rejection of the human effort.  In all 
cases, the life of the community depends on the ‘consumption’ of human effort.   
6.4 Justice in Light of the Dynamics of Ethical Life: 
In order for truth and reality to be attained in an account of justice, we must turn to 
the reality of absolute ethical life.  “The absolute and clear unity of ethical life is absolute 
and living in virtue of the fact that neither a single sphere nor the subsistence of spheres 
in general can be fixed – that on the contrary, while ethical life eternally protracts them, 
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at the same time it absolutely collapses and cancels them, and enjoys itself in 
undeveloped unity and clarity.”202  The plastic power of absolute ethical life to move 
between the spheres or to collapse the spheres comes from absolute ethical life’s security 
of its own inner life and indivisibility.  Through its self-induced instability, absolute 
ethical life is always able to remain indifferent to the movements and tensions inherent in 
the relation of moments.203  Here again we see indifference as the mark of the absolute:  
without its drive to return to a point of indifference, ethical life would be submerged in 
one moment and lose its sense of self.  Hegel references the living animal in order to 
illustrate the point:  the health of an animal is determined by its perpetual indifference to 
the assertions of its moments; the death of the animal comes about when a part asserts 
itself as the centre in the face of the whole or other parts; the liver that asserts itself as the 
ruling organ brings about the death in the animal.204   
Recall that it is the inorganic positivity that ethical life takes as an obstacle to its 
actuality as a living totality.  When a sphere, or a principle of a particular sphere, 
encroaches on another sphere, that encroaching sphere becomes more positive.  An 
intrusion of a principle that is external to a particular sphere opens up the possibility of 
the invading sphere subjugating other spheres.  Put differently, the life of a sphere of 
freedom within ethical life left unchecked may, from the perspective of the whole, 
overstep its bounds.  The result is that the invasive principle warps the actuality of other 
spheres.  Hegel uses the example of what happens if the principle of external justice that 
is the mark of civil society, the principle of civil law, of property and security, invades 
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the constitutional law of the sphere of the state; the result would be “an inferior relation 
as the contractual one” forcing itself into actuality of the state as ethical life.  The 
contractual relationship – a matter between finite individuals – running amok in the 
institutions and ethos of a community would bring about the destruction of the majesty of 
the ethical totality, where the lifeblood of that totality is a relation among individuals that 
exceeds the basic contractual one that dominates the sphere of civil society.   
Given the essential but problematic reality of law, of human relationships governed 
by customs or rules, justice is not a state that is attained by the community.  Instead, true 
ethical justice makes its appearance only in the intuition of the individual.  For the 
individual who asserts herself as representing the ethos of people, for the individual who 
is convinced she is grounded in the spirit of the people through conscientious behaviour – 
this individual is, Hegel argues, the site where true justice is made concrete.  In other 
words, true ethical justice resides only in the intuition of the spiritual individual, where 
the individual takes it upon herself to promote the reality of her people as she experiences 
it.  With respect to the discussion on the economy in Chapter Five, the reason why 
economic justice is merely a semblance of justice is because true justice only comes 
about through the complete synthesis of the empirical with the formal, the universal idea 
that is the ground of the ethical life, and this synthesis only finds completion in the 
individual.  True justice, then, is intimately connected with the perception of the 
individual as a moment in the history of the spirit. 
Whether a way of life is ethical depends on the reality of the people:  if a nation 
organizes itself truly around a particular system, and vitally permeates this system, then 
the laws of the nation is an ethos, an ethical reality.  The question of whether the feudal 
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system is ethical, Hegel says, is one that cannot be determined by reason alone.205  If a 
nation organizes itself in such a way that the feudal system permeates fully the reality of 
the people, then the feudal system is one possible shape of ethical life actualized and is 
therefore necessary, just, and ethical in that moment of history.  Hegel raises the example 
of the feudal system to help unpack the claim being made:  Serfdom would be ethical and 
just in a particular moment of history because the serfs wholly inhabit their role, or where 
the serfs “cannot feel and enjoy the image of divinity in [their] own being” but hold that 
feeling to be located in the lords.206  In this sense the justness of a shape of ethical life is 
dependent on the degree to which that shape of ethical life is taken as ethos by a nation.  
What we may now call the injustices of the feudal system are only apparent because of 
the inner movement of ethical life, the reshaping of ethical life through its own history; in 
other words, our recognition of the injustices of a past shape of ethical life is only 
possible by reading the history of ethical life to find the moment in history where a 
particular ethos weakened and was replaced by another ethos.  It is this fundamental 
vulnerability of justice to the ethos of a moment in history that reveals most clearly the 
relativity of justice according to the determinate laws of a people.   
If, however, we were to assert that the justice for a community is independent of its 
ethos, then this principle of justice would be fixed, without vitality, and disconnected 
from the self-articulation of ethical life.  In other words, since we have determined that 
any expression of freedom cannot be excised from the empirical and that the freedom of a 
people can only be expressed through a problematic and tension-filled relationship with 
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the empirical, we must therefore assert that justice in the shape of laws within the 
community is relative justice.  Universal law cannot articulate the life of the community; 
positive law is inadequate to the task of expressing the vital energy that is immanent to 
the community.   
Formal natural law and the jurisprudence rooted in the empirical are two essential 
moments in the expression of justice within ethical life:  the unity of these two moments 
cannot be the conflation of one into the other, or the subsuming of one under the other.  
Rather, absolute ethical life induces its own instability through the dynamic tension 
between the individual and the people, where this continual instability is the point of 
indifference where the truth of each sphere is realized.  The individual is both the site 
where true justice enters into the community and the site where the tension between form 
and content is realized.  The work of the individual is the binding of the content to the 
principle or the stripping of the principle from the content. 
From the perspective of the individual, law is an unresolved issue, one that involves 
the constant assertions of justice and injustice on the basis of ideas and facts.  The ethical 
individual is called upon to participate in the laws of the community as a vigilant 
‘stakeholder.’  from the perspective of absolute ethical life, the instability that results in 
the continual and ‘painful’ tensions between the positive and the negative, between the 
principle and the content, between the individual and the people, just is the true reality of 
ethos of the people.  This instability buried deep within the living relation, in an 
important sense, is the heart of the living relation, vitalizing organs within the community 
with the spiritual and vitalizing efforts of individual members of the community. 
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6.5 The Shape of Ethical Life: 
Following Hegel’s argument, we have established that an account of natural law 
within the context of absolute ethical life culminates in the ethos of a people.  The ethos 
of a people is the concrete manifestation of the organic (immanent) and historical 
organization of a community based on a shared system of legislation that is in a state of 
perpetual evaluation.  The ethos of a people, then, is a kind of identity between the 
particular, the contingencies or historical responses to the appearance of tension between 
necessity and freedom, and the universal, the concern that the absolute ethical life of the 
individual has towards its own realization.  We now turn towards an articulation of what 
is the reality of the sheer identity between the particular and the universal.  We shall see 
that the identity of ethical life is the shape that the living relation takes, where this living 
relation roots itself in the empirical through what Hegel describes as the ‘honouring of 
necessity.’207 
Hegel argues that through the notion of individuality or shape, the identity of 
ethical life is revealed.  Ethical life as shape expresses the union between the particular, 
the necessary, and the relation that is carried within ethical life.  “Like everything living, 
ethical life is a sheer identity of universal and particular, and for that reason is an 
individuality and a shape.”208  Since ethical life as an individual shape identifies itself 
with or incorporates the particularities of its reality, ethical life retains its freedom in this 
identity.  The conditions of apparent limitation are not external and particular to the 
reality of ethical life; rather, as shape, as the sheer identity between the universal and the 
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particular, the conditions of limitation are taken up by ethical life as the way in which its 
vitality is made real.  “And this ethical life, which reflection may consider to be 
particularity, is not something positive, or opposed to the living individual which is 
thereby tied to chance and necessity, but is alive.”209  The particularities that ‘afflict’ the 
individual ethical life are not conditions of limitation that are to be overcome.  One might 
argue that Fichte’s philosophical system is committed to interpreting the particularities 
and necessities that the community of free beings encounters as summons to continue the 
program of striving:  practical reason, expressions of freedom in the world, must 
ultimately be grounded in the pure drive of the I towards self-sufficiency.  To be sure, 
answering the summons does not mean destroying the limitation, but asserting a new 
narrative that proves to the free community that the limitation is not final or absolute.  
From Hegel’s perspective, the problem with the demand to continually reassert the 
primacy of the free individual as such is that the particularities and necessity can never be 
truly incorporated into the reality of the free community in a way that preserves their 
‘significance’ within the concretization of ethical life.  The particular and the necessary – 
these make up the inorganic sides of the living ethical life.  “This side is its inorganic 
nature, though it has attached that side organically to itself in shape and individuality.”210  
The inorganic is a condition of expression for the organic, but the inorganic is 
incorporated into the organic in a more substantial way than in Fichte’s system:  While 
the difference between asserting a narrative that incorporates the particular into the 
overall project of striving and recognizing the particular as the condition upon which 
ethical life is made real may appear to be slight, the implications for taking up the 
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particular into ethical life organically are revealing of Hegel’s overall ‘treatment’ of the 
empirical in the essay.   
In order to illustrate the role of the particular in articulating the individual shape of 
ethical life, Hegel uses the example of climate.  The climate of a people is rooted in a 
necessity:  the necessities of the location determine the climate, where we can understand 
climate to be the result of a long chain of necessary “links.”211  To be sure, we can 
understand the climate from a scientific point of view or from a historical point of view, 
but, Hegel argues, the truth of climate for the people takes on a different meaning.  Put 
differently, neither science nor history can reveal to us the role that climate has in the 
ethical life of a people.  The people have organized themselves organically in a way to 
hold the specific character of the climate in its ‘presentness’ as a foothold into reality.  
“For the ethical vitality of the people lies precisely in the fact that the people has a shape 
in which a specific character is present – though not as something positive…but as 
something absolutely united with universality and animated by it.”212  The subtle but 
important difference between an account of the empirical rooted in a priorism and an 
account of the empirical that is rooted in absolute ethical life is that the empirical is not 
relegated to the status of accident relative to the primacy of the I as such.  “And this 
aspect is very important also, partly in order to recognize how philosophy learns to honor 
necessity; partly because this aspect is a whole, and only a narrow view sees merely the 
individual detail and rejects it as accidental; and partly also because this aspect cancels 
the view of the individual and accidental by showing that it does not inherently hinder 
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life, but that life, on the contrary, by letting the individual and accidental persist as they 
are of necessity, removes them from this necessity and permeates and vitalizes them.”213   
The ethical life of a people incorporates the ‘accidental’ fact of climate into the 
necessity of the actualization of the people.  Put differently, the necessity of the climate is 
not present from the perspective of the reflective individual, but ethical life, in asserting 
itself as a shape of the Idea, revalues these apparent (from the perspective of the 
individual) accidental characteristics into necessities for the sake of ethical life’s own 
self-expression.  In this way, the accidental or the individual does not hinder the life of 
the people, “…but that life, on the contrary, by letting the individual and accidental 
persist as they are of necessity [within a long chain of necessity of causation it seems], 
removes them from this necessity and permeates and vitalizes them.”214  The necessity of 
the inorganic is, through the work of ethical life, replaced with the necessity of the 
organic.  From the perspective of the animal, water is not something dead, but something 
that is necessary for its life; similarly, the climate of a people is not something positive, 
but something that turns out to be a necessity for the life of the people as determined by 
the life of the people.  The inorganic, the particular that may appear as a limitation on the 
expression of the people in the world, is attached to the organic, the living relation, 
through the efforts of members of the community immanent to the organic itself. 
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6.6 The Trajectory of Ethical Life: 
Recall that the ethical individual is the presentation of the ethical totality in the 
individual, and the nation, the ethical life of the people, is the foundation of the person.  
Given the tension inherent in the living relation, the relationship between the individual 
and the nation is not static.  The freedom of the individual and the freedom of the nation 
may harmonize in moments in history, but it is also possible that the individual and the 
nation grow apart.  The tragedy of spirit is that the ethos of a nation is always on a 
trajectory towards ossification, hardening, or being fixed as absolute.  Moments in history 
may result in a particular individual coming to the fore, or a wave of nationalism 
sweeping through the state.  Whatever the case may be, the perpetual motion of ethical 
life is the flowing of vitality into new parts that are organized around the whole, and the 
flowing of life out of old parts, what is spiritually dead.   
Once a feature of a sphere has been fixed through its spiritual death, this feature 
appears as absolute.  The laws of a nation fall out of step with its ethos since the ethos of 
the people is challenged by the presence of the inorganic.  In the face of the absolute, 
ethical life, through the movement of ethical individuals, overcomes the apparent 
absoluteness of the feature.  “When ethos and law were on, the specific feature was not 
anything positive.  But if the whole does not advance in step with the growth of the 
individual, law and ethos separate; the living unity binding the members together is 
weakened and there is no longer any absolute cohesion and necessity in the present life of 
the whole.”215  The separation of law and ethos means that the ethical individual can no 
longer be taken as an ‘agent’ of his people.  Put differently, the necessity that is historical 
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production of ethical life no longer fully encapsulates and grounds the individual.  In this 
moment of tension, of disharmony between the law and the ethos, the ethical individual 
may no longer be the site of the expression of the people.  The history of the nation and 
the history of the individual would no longer be ‘one.’  
If we were to insist that scientific empiricism is the method of the philosophy of 
natural law, then we would be at a loss in these inevitable moments of disharmony 
between the individual and the nation.  In the context of the separation between the law 
and the ethos, the individual turns out to have no true ground in the present.216  The story 
of the nation, the history of necessities that demarcate the life of a people are, in the 
moment of disharmony, no longer in a position to demarcate the life of the individual.  
The sole avenue available to empiricism at this point is to attempt to explain the present 
according to the past.  In disharmony, the laws of the present lack truth, and an empirical 
account of the truth of these laws must turn to the past; the result would be a justification 
of the present context – the death of a part of the whole of ethical life – relies on a past 
context where that part is vitalized by the ethos of a people.  The negative absoluteness of 
absolute ethical life resurfaces in these moments of separation and disharmony.  The 
severance of the individual from the whole is the actualization of the negative element in 
ethical life, where this negative element is devoid of the positive truths that animated 
ethical life throughout its history.   
The nuanced position put forth by Hegel reveals to us that the necessity within 
ethical life which results in the positive truth of a people in no way encapsulates or 
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excludes the negative element within ethical life from the perspective of the absolute.  
The necessity that is the mark of historical (empirical) accounts of a nation is to be 
understood within the context of spirit, the context of ethical life, where this content 
makes up the living body of the people.  The role that empiricism plays in natural law is 
the illumination of the vitality of the spirit through its historical content.  Where 
formalism would take this content to be contingent, to be dead and lacking truth, 
empiricism shows us the positive element within ethical life, where the truth resides in 
terms of a necessity that has been properly comprehended by philosophy.  However, we 
have also learned that the relationship between the individual and the whole is one that 
may dissolve, where the ethicality of the individual falls out of step with the now-
hardened parts of the individual’s nation.  In other words, the possibility of separation 
between the law and the ethos reveals the need to comprehend the individual outside of 
historical truths.  Instead, the individual, in her withdrawal from the dead parts of the 
present whole, can only be understood through the concept of the negative absoluteness 
of freedom, the negative element within absolute ethical life.   
The necessity of the positive element in ethical life is bound to the aspect of the 
Idea that the ethical life embodies, but is never congruent with, absolute spirit itself.  Put 
differently, it is impossible for a set of necessities in the world to align with absolute 
spirit, and this impossibility is due to the limitation of the empirical, the necessities that 
are determined as such by the ethical totality:  the conditional aspect of the necessities of 
ethical life reveals itself at the level of the absolute, and therefore cannot be a shape that 
is the actualization of the absolute.  Since focusing on the positive element of ethical life 
reveals that the ethical totality remains only a point of view on the Idea and not fully 
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congruent with the Idea, one might think that the negative element of ethical life provides 
a path towards overcoming the incongruency between absolute spirit and the spiritual 
ethical totality.  The failure of this route reveals the path towards congruency does not 
reside in positive shape or in negative formalism; instead, the path towards congruency 
resides in the construction of the intuition through which the individual recognizes herself 
in the very same moment of recognizing the intuition of her perspective on the 
Absolute.217   
The complexity surrounding the birth, life, and death of laws reveals the 
inadequacy of a science that focuses merely on natural law from a one-sided perspective.  
Similarly, a science of jurisprudence ignores the ethos of the nation unfolding in relation 
to its grounding principle.  Hegel’s account of natural law requires us to incorporate 
jurisprudence, where the individual is the site where these two opposed perspectives on 
the living relation are navigated as a member of the community. 
Note that through the concept of ethical life, we have revealed a problem with 
accounts of natural law by the formalist.  The specific character of nation is understood 
by how it organizes itself into a totality, where the parts that make up the ethical totality 
 
217 While the negative element within absolute ethical life is a vital force that reveals what is dead and 
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attain this absolute shape by escaping into the shapelessness of cosmopolitanism, still less into the void of 
the Rights of Man, or the like void of a league of nations or a world republic.”  [133]   In order for ethical 
life to reveal itself as a shape of the Idea, the vitality of the ethical must permeate the content of ethical life.  
To be sure, the negative element within ethical life is a vital force, but this force is necessarily formal.  
Since the actualization of the shape of ethical life in the world requires content, the negative element, taken 
as primary, is unable to incorporate content into its actualizations.  Following Hegel’s argument, the league 
of nations is a void because the presence of any ethical content would undermine the actualization of the 
league itself, or would reveal the league of nations to be an impossibility for ethical life.  The specificity, 
the point of view on the Idea, that is the mark of ethical life therefore precludes the possibility of an ethical 
life that is formal, universal, or not bound by a specificity. 
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are determined by the shape of the ethos emerging in the world.  The system of law that 
emerges through the actualization of ethical life has not been determined independently 
by the necessity of a priori thinking.  Rather, the parts of the system have been brought 
about, in the most real sense, through the whole, through the living totality of the nation 
that emerges in the world through its own work.  In this way, no part or aspect is 
subservient to the a priori thinking of the formalist, but only to the living whole.  The 
empirical remains central to an account of natural law, for the laws of a nation are always 
organized around and subservient to the living whole, the ethical totality.  The formalist 
fails to recognize the essential role that the living whole plays in development of a ‘just’ 
system, for determinations of justice require determinations of ethos.   
6.7 Conclusion: 
 The complexity of a philosophy of natural law is now on full display.  This 
chapter has established that, following Hegel’s line of reasoning, the culmination of a 
people is in its ethos, or, more practically, in its system of legislation.  We should not 
seek to determine in advance a framework that lords over the life of a people.  Instead, 
we must recognize that, because of the tension between the universal and the particular 
within ethical life, a people determines its own framework, its own network of meaning, 
actualized in part as a system of legislation.  To be sure, while Hegel’s philosophy 
reveals the ‘path’ whereby the identity of a people is made manifest, his philosophy also 
limits what the philosopher can claim about the content of that identity.  Put differently, 
the way to access the truth of the ethical reality of a people is to describe the experiences 
of individuals within the community.  With respect to the idea of justice, a similar claim 
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has been established:  the site where justice is made real is in the intuitions of the 
individual.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Hegel’s philosophy surrounding the notion of natural law has been shown to be 
quite distinctive relative to the programs of empiricism and a priorism.  First, the reality 
of absolute freedom situates the restlessness of the individual in her absolute negativity 
within the organic and positive living relation, which is itself grappling with the 
empirical.  Furthermore, these two aspects of freedom are in tension with one another, 
where this very tension turns out to be the driving force behind the actualization of the 
human community.  Hegel’s Idea of absolute freedom is distinctive insofar as it situates a 
dynamic tension within the concrete life of free beings.   
Second, since the dynamic tension within the community is expressed in a 
performance, we must concern ourselves with the history of that performance.  The 
trajectory of the community cannot be determined in advance by a conceptual 
framework; rather, Hegel’s philosophy shows us that absolute freedom necessitates a 
process of development that is immanent to the community.  The notion of a fixed first 
principle that could be used to articulate the reality of the community has been 
undermined, for we have established that the individuals within the community are 
always in a position to re-evaluate the legitimacy of an apparent grounding principle.  So, 
instead of appealing to an abstract framework in our account, Hegel’s philosophy tells us 
that we should instead focus on the way in which the ethos of a people has developed 
over the course of its history.   
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Third, our account of the reality of the lawful community must recognize that the 
true site of its expression is in the individual.  Given that the experiences of the ethical 
individual turn out to be moments where the positive and negative aspects of freedom are 
brought into contact with each other, a ‘scientific’ account would always tend away from 
the perspective of the individual for the sake of establishing a principle.  The arguments 
put forth by Hegel in this project show us, in an important sense, just how the historical 
moments for individuals within a community are essential to the ethos of the people.     
Fourth, the empirical should be conceptualized as being incorporated into the 
living relation of the community, where the identity of the community is rooted in the 
way in which the living relation, through its organic growth, has attached itself to the 
empirical.  Broadly, these four distinctive aspects of Hegel’s philosophy demand that we 
move away from thinking about principles to thinking about history, that we bring the 
empirical to the fore through an emphasis on experience and the construction of an 
identity.   
This dissertation project has argued that Hegel’s philosophy surrounding natural 
law re-asserts the role of the empirical.  On the one hand, the presentness of the moment, 
the only way for the moment to bear ethical weight is through the force of perception.  
Determining human action according to abstract rules, or rules that necessitate an 
abstraction from the moment, collapse.  But if we were to, in response, determine human 
action according to empirical moments only, then the empirical moment would be 
wrongly asserted as dominant.  The wrongfulness of this assertion is realized most 
importantly in the negative absoluteness of the free individual.  While the present 
moment ensures the connection between the free being and the ethical action taken, the 
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power of the free being to annihilate the moment and its oppositions ensures that the 
empirical is not the final word.  The free being is not under the demand to strive towards 
infinity, for the presentness of the moment revealed to the free being through the force of 
perception makes clear the ethical course of action in a complete way.  However, that 
ethical course of action is without finality, for the power of the free being to abstract, to 
universalize reveals the limited scope of the supposed final say in the matter.  The 
empirical asserts its importance in the perceptions of the individual and by playing its 
part in engendering a historical moment.  A historical moment is an act of the free being 
imbued in the empirical, where free beings, because of the essential role that presentness 
plays in human action, are always responding to that history.  In short, the universal, 
utterly abstract from all determinacies and articulated a priori, is replaced with history, or 
the story of absolute ethical life expressing itself on its own terms, where these terms turn 
out to bear significant ethical weight for the peoples involved.  A denial of the role of the 
empirical, according to Hegel’s argument, results in courses of action that are always 
vulnerable to charges of immorality or inconsistency.  Absolute ethical life’s expression 
in the world takes the shape of history because history is the spiritualization of an 
empirical moment, one that, while not limiting absolutely the responses of free beings, 
invites a response from those free beings.   
The philosophy of natural law, according to Hegel, must incorporate the empirical 
into its account in two ways:  (1) from the positive aspect of freedom, commitments are 
actualized in the world, where the commitment made are shaped by the history of the 
community; (2) from the negative aspect of freedom, commitments are what the 
individuals negate.  In either aspect, the expression of freedom requires commitments, 
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and those commitments are entangled in the world.  But the science of natural law is not 
beholden solely to the arena of the world:  the program that Hegel puts forth shows us 
that no natural property or fact could be a grounding first principle of a system of natural 
law, for the negating power of the free individual undermines any assertion of 
absoluteness.  However, the denial of any particular empirical ‘component’ as having a 
claim on the individual does not entail the denial of the empirical component of law as 
such.  The turn away from one positive aspect of ethical life, from one expression of 
freedom concretized in the empirical, is a turn towards the expression of another positive 
aspect of ethical life, of the imbuing of another empirical component as having meaning.  
Thus, the a priori plays no overarching role in ‘sculpting’ the system of natural law put 
forth by an ethical community.  The negation of one commitment made by individuals 
within a community does not find its completion in an appeal to an a priori principle; 
only by responding to the empirical content of the world does that expression of freedom 
by the individual become ‘complete.’ 
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